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Dividend policy is a fundamental component of finance. It has profound significance for stakeholders, 
including shareholders, investors, managers, bankers, lenders, and scholars. Theoretical and empirical 
studies have examined dividend payout extensively. However, the results are far from conclusive and 
dividend payout is still one of the most controversial issues in corporate finance. Black (1976) calls this 
the “dividend puzzle.” 
The current study re-examines the relationship between dividend payout and earnings (via a new 
measurement) on the London Stock Exchange. More importantly, this study explores the relationship 
between dividend payout and working capital. To provide more robust results, we adopt the (two-
step) System Generalised Method of Moments (S-GMM) estimator and investigate the dividend 
payouts of 1,575 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange, for the period of 1991 to 2015. The 
findings reveal that a change in working capital has a significant nonlinear (concave) impact on 
dividend payouts. In other words, a relatively low change in working capital has a positive effect on 
dividend payouts, while a relatively high change in working capital is negatively correlated with 
dividend payouts.  
We split the overall sample into a positive group and a positive and negative group according to 
the calculated turning point of change in working capital (5.326). We discovered that this concave 
relationship is a mixture of positive linear correlation (in the positive group) and a concave correlation 
(in the positive and negative group). We also observed that the (dividend-adjusted) earnings variable 
is not significant, which suggests that dividend payout is not a function of the current earnings. We 
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discovered a similar result in our subsamples: the coefficients of (dividend-adjusted) earnings are not 
significant in any subsample. We also observed that young firms, firms listed on the AIM, firms with 
sufficient working capital, and firms with high volatility in sales tend to adjust their dividend payouts 
via working capital. The empirical evidence shows that our results are consistent and robust. Therefore, 
we argue that working capital is a significant determinant of dividend payout and it can be used as a 
source of dividend payout. Overall, the results provide new insights into the value of working capital 
and suggest dividend payout and working capital are important for understanding corporate payout 
policy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 1 
1.1 Background 2 
It is a widely held view that maximising shareholders’ wealth is the most important goal of a business 3 
entity. As a return on shareholders’ investment, dividend payout is an appropriate financial indicator 4 
to measure shareholders’ wealth. Issuing dividends is favourable for several reasons: first, dividends 5 
can attract investors who desire a stable cash flow but do not want to incur transaction costs; second, 6 
dividends can reduce cash availability to minimise agency costs; third, managers may increase 7 
dividends to signal optimism concerning future cash flows (Ross et al., 2008). 8 
However, this does not mean that increasing dividend payouts lead to greater profits for 9 
shareholders. Dividend policy builds on financial theories, such as asset pricing, capital structure and 10 
capital budgeting (Barker, 1999; Allen and Michaely, 2003). Increasing dividend payouts (either the 11 
cash dividend or the stock dividend) arbitrarily would have a negative impact on a firm’s financial 12 
situation (on their levels of available cash, capital structure, and taxation rates). On the one hand, 13 
greater cash dividend payouts mean more tax charges for shareholders. If the tax rate is high, firms 14 
are more likely to favour capital gains on investments rather than dividends (Peterson et al., 1985). 15 
On the other hand, increasing the stock dividend payout would lead to a decrease in the firm’s share 16 
price, which might send a bad signal to individual investors. Additionally, increasing stock dividends 17 
would dilute some shareholders’ control, which might change a firm’s management structure (Khan 18 
and Jain, 2017). As a result, increasing the dividend payout might not necessarily enhance the total 19 
value of shareholders’ wealth. Once dividend policy is established, it is difficult to reduce dividends 20 
without adversely affecting the firm’s share price (Black, 1976). 21 
Prior literature has offered various rationales for the dividend puzzle (Black, 1976). Several 22 
dividend theories have evolved over the past few decades. While Lintner (1956) advocated the 23 
practice of dividend smoothing.1 Miller and Modigliani (1961) have proposed the dividend irrelevance 24 
theory. Due to the inconclusive results of these dividend theories, both researchers and managers 25 
have struggled to find an optimum dividend payout policy. 26 
As argued, a change to dividends are often associated with other financial behaviours; it is hard 27 
                                                          
1 Lintner (1956) proposed the dividend smoothing theory via earnings. It means that dividend decisions are 
based on past and current earnings, so that observed dividend payout exhibits a significant degree of smoothing. 
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to adjust the dividend to the desired level without considering other financial policies. Moreover, 1 
financial constraints might also have an adverse effect on dividend payouts. Therefore, individual firms 2 
must have a good understanding of the dividend payout in order to achieve the optimum dividend 3 
policy, balancing different financial decisions and enhancing the firm’s overall value.  4 
 5 
1.2 Payout Policy 6 
A payout is the undistributed amount of earnings from a firm to its shareholders (Allen and Michaely, 7 
2003). It can be either a dividend payout or a stock repurchase. Most firms pay dividends on a regular 8 
basis (quarterly or semi-annually). Occasionally, firms announce a one-time special dividend (an extra 9 
cash dividend). Alternatively, firms can choose to repurchase stock using an open market repurchase, 10 
a tender offer, or a targeted repurchase. For example, in 2004 Microsoft had 60 billion USDs of 11 
undistributed cash. Under high pressure from its shareholders, Microsoft announced an increase in 12 
annual dividend to 0.32 USD per share; share repurchases of approximately 30 million USDs within 13 
the next four years; and a special dividend of 3 USDs per share to its shareholders. Microsoft had more 14 
than 10 billion outstanding shares, and the special dividend announced in 2004 was a remarkable 15 
amount (32.6 million USDs). 16 
A policy can be described as a consistent system of principles to enable smooth decision-making 17 
processes and to achieve targeted goals. A payout policy, especially a dividend payout, does not mean 18 
that the decisions made are arbitrarily or randomly (Allen and Michaely, 2003). A good payout policy 19 
not only involves solving the payout puzzle, but also the trade-offs (understanding all of the related 20 
advantages and disadvantages). 21 
 22 
1.3 Method of Payment 23 
The purpose of dividends is to return wealth to the shareholders. There are two types of dividends: 24 
cash dividends and stock dividends (Wei and Xiao, 2009). A cash dividend is a payment taken from a 25 
firm’s earnings and given to shareholders. This is either in the form of cash or a bank transfer. In 26 
contrast, a stock dividend, increases the total number of shares outstanding, thereby decreasing each 27 




1.4 Cash Dividend Versus Stock Dividend 1 
When issuing a cash dividend or stock dividend, a firm always starts with its retained earnings. The 2 
only difference is the way it flows out of the firm’s retained earnings. Issuing cash dividends means 3 
retained earnings decrease from the firm’s equity account, while cash decreases from the asset 4 
account at the same level on a firm’s balance sheet. Economic value is transferred from the firm to 5 
the shareholders, instead of the firm retaining the funds (for example, using them to invest). In short, 6 
the money is no longer in the system. Issuing stock dividends refers to the process of shifting retained 7 
earnings into the firm’s share capital account, which means that the shareholders’ equity account 8 
remains unchanged on a firm’s balance sheet. Shareholders who received cash dividends must pay tax 9 
on the value of the distribution, which lowers the final returns. However, when firms issue stock 10 
dividends there is no need to consider the tax effect (Ross et al., 2008). The most prominent benefit 11 
of issuing a stock dividend is that shareholders do not have to pay taxes on them. 12 
One disadvantage of issuing stock is that it results in decreasing share prices. If a firm issues a 5% 13 
stock dividend, it will increase the number of shares by 5%. A shareholder who has 100 shares will get 14 
five more shares in lieu of a cash payout. If the firm’s share price is $10 per share (with 1 million 15 
outstanding shares), the share price will change from $10 to $9.524 (
10 x 1million
1million x 1.05
) after the stock 16 
dividend is issued. This is because issuing a stock dividend does not alter the total value of a firm’s 17 
equity. The total value will be $10 million, but the number of shares has increased. Therefore, the 18 
share price will be diluted as a result of issuing stock dividends (Ehrhardt and Brigham, 2009). Another 19 
concern is that a stock dividend will change the number of shares that different shareholders own. 20 
This may affect some shareholder’s voting rights, and in turn, may affect the management structure 21 
(Yermack, 2010). 22 
It appears that a stock dividend is superior to a cash dividend for the firm since it is not 23 
accompanied by a cash option. However, this does not mean that a cash dividend is not favourable, 24 
given the disadvantages of issuing a stock dividend. In fact, issuing cash or stock dividends is a matter 25 
of choice for a firm’s policymakers. 26 
 27 
1.5 Dividend Payout Policy 28 
Dividend policy is a set of standards that firms use to decide how much of their earnings they should 29 
pay out to shareholders as a reward. A firm can issue large dividends (for example, Microsoft in 2004), 30 
or it can issue small dividends (like new emerging firms), or none at all (such as Google in 2013) and 31 
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invest more into its business. Dividend policy indicates whether a firm should pay out a significant 1 
amount at the present moment or invest more in the firm. Timing is a key consideration in decisions 2 
involving dividends (Brooks, 2016). While there are several different approaches to dividend policy, 3 
there are three primary methods of paying dividends: a stable dividend approach, a residual dividend 4 
approach and a hybrid dividend approach. 5 
 6 
1.5.1 Stable Dividend Approach 7 
The stable dividend policy (either a constant growth dividend or a fixed dividend), highlights the 8 
distribution of net profits before considering the firm’s internal needs. This means that shareholders 9 
receive their dividends first and the remainder is allocated for the firm’s needs. 10 
Dividend payouts are typically regarded as a positive sign and often lead to further investment, 11 
particularly in the long-term. Miller and Rock (1985) note that dividend signalling equilibrium exists 12 
under information asymmetry. Likewise, Baker and Phillips (1993) report that stock dividends signal 13 
favourable information about the firm’s future. Allen et al. (2000) show that paying shareholders 14 
dividends can attract more institutional investors. Eun and Huang (2007) suggest that dividend 15 
payouts signal management’s willingness to pay cash to shareholders. Anderson et al. (2011) also 16 
reveal that dividend payouts send a positive signal to the stock market. 17 
Investors favour the constant growth dividend approach than fixed dividend policies. The 18 
constant growth approach allows investors to observe the increase in their return gradually. Overall, 19 
this policy reduces uncertainty for individual investors and offers investors a more stable income. 20 
 21 
1.5.2 Residual Dividend Approach 22 
The residual dividend approach emphasises satisfying a firm’s internal needs prior to issuing 23 
shareholder dividends. Using this approach, fewer dividends or zero dividends are issued in order to 24 
make up any shortages of funds (for internal needs) or other investments. This may send a negative 25 
signal to individual investors and shareholders. Lakonishok and Lev (1987) argue that issuing stock 26 
dividends can be a costly signal. Below and Johnson (1996) note that market conditions are significant 27 
for both dividend increases and dividend decreases. Bernhardt et al. (2005) conclude that a firm may 28 
increase its dividend payouts if there is either an increase in cash at hand (a good signal) or a decrease 29 
in investment (a bad signal). 30 
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1.5.3 Hybrid Dividend Approach 1 
The third policy, the hybrid dividend approach, combines aspects of the residual and stable dividend 2 
policies. In other words, firms may adopt either a residual or a stable dividend policy and then change 3 
to a stable/residual dividend policy. In the financial markets, the hybrid dividend approach is typically 4 
used by firms that issue dividends. This is because a low dividend payout developed by a firm in its 5 
early years could be easily retained in the following periods. Based on this low dividend payout, the 6 
firm would issue another dividend only if they have surplus earnings. DeAngelo and DeAngelo (2006) 7 
have observed that in their early years, firms tend to increase equity and issue small dividends only 8 
when investment opportunities are higher than the internal capital; later on, firms will issue more 9 
dividends in order to minimise agency problems when internal funds are higher than investment 10 
opportunities. 11 
 12 
1.5.4 Summary 13 
There is nothing intrinsically good or bad about these three dividend policies. However, each approach 14 
has a different impact on both shareholders’ wealth and a firm’s value. A key advantage of the residual 15 
dividend policy is that firms can use surplus money to develop capital budget projects (Baker, 2009). 16 
The residual dividend policy is useful for establishing a long-term dividend policy. 17 
Table 1.1 Sixteen Largest Companies in the S&P 500 that Paid No Dividends in 2013 18 
Company Market Value (in 
billion USDs) 
Company Market Value (in 
billion USDs) 
Google (GOOG) 291.9 Cegene (CELG) 50.1 
Berkshire Hathaway (BRK-B) 187.3 Princeline.com (PCLN) 40.9 
Amazon.com (AMZN) 126.1 DirectTV (DTV) 35.0 
Gilead Sciences (GILD) 80.7 Yahoo (YAHOO) 29.3 
eBay (EBAY) 66.8 Salesforce.com (CRM) 23.4 
American International (AIG) 66.9 Adobe (ADBE) 22.1 
Biogen Idec (BIIB) 53.4 Crown Castle (CCI) 20.6 
Express Scripts (ESRX) 50.2 Cognizant Technology (CTSH) 20.1 
Source: Sterman (2013)  19 
Table 1.1 illustrates the top 16 firms on the S&P 500 that paid no dividends. These firms have a 20 
high market value, and most of them operate highly-profitable and fruitful businesses. However, they 21 
issued no dividends. This was not because they had insufficient funds (most of these firms have 22 
substantial cash reserves – in 2013 Google had nearly 19 billion USDs cash and cash equivalents on its 23 
balance sheet), but because they can use the cash in more beneficial ways. For example, multinational 24 
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firms like Google, Adobe, and eBay, pay no dividends. Instead, they invest aggressively in future 1 
potential growth projects such as high-tech products and online apps/programmes because their 2 
market strategy is more e-commerce/software orientated. However, a significant disadvantage of the 3 
residual dividend policy is that dividends may be unstable over different periods of time. In other 4 
words, earnings vary depending on market demands. 5 
No single dividend policy is favourable to all firms. Policymakers can only learn the advantages 6 
and disadvantages of dividend policies and make decisions based on multiple trade-offs. 7 
 8 
1.6 Problem Statement 9 
1.6.1 Earnings 10 
Linter (1956), who conducted one of the earliest studies, concluded that net earnings (or profit after 11 
tax) are a predominant variable, which leads to dividend payout changes. Wedig (1994) suggests that 12 
dividend payouts are driven by risk aversion and sustainable earnings. Kasanen et al. (1996) also find 13 
a positive relationship between reported earnings and dividend payout. Similarly, Amidu and Abor 14 
(2006) conclude a positive relationship between dividend payout ratio and firm profitability. Truong 15 
and Heaney (2007) demonstrate that firms are more likely to pay dividends when profit is high, and 16 
debt is low. Pettit (1976) uncovered a negative relationship between earnings and dividends. Further, 17 
Manuel et al. (1993) have reported that dividend announcements that closely precede current cash 18 
flow signals lead to more negative valuation effects. Further, Ferris et al. (2006) reveal that only 22% 19 
of UK firms with negative earnings pay dividends, compared to 73% of Japanese firms with negative 20 
earnings who paid dividends in 2001. Furthermore, Mehta et al. (2014) argue that income is negatively 21 
related to dividend payout. 22 
While the relationship between earnings and dividend payout has been extensively researched, 23 
the results are far from conclusive. One limitation of the previous literature is that the earnings 24 
variable may affect the dividend payout. Dividend announcements are made after the earnings have 25 
been reported. This means that regardless of the earnings measurements used in the previous studies, 26 
the earnings variable contains (or at least contains part of) the declared dividends. Thus, it is likely to 27 
result in a less accurate (estimated) coefficient of earnings,2 which decreases the efficiency of the 28 
research model. 29 
                                                          
2 For more details see Section 2.3, Chapter 2. 
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1.6.2 Working Capital 1 
Working capital refers to a firm’s current financial status. It includes capital used for its day-to-day 2 
business transactions and is calculated as the current assets minus the current liabilities. Working 3 
capital includes cash, short-term investments (marketable securities), inventories, trade receivables, 4 
accruals, trade payables, short-term loans and debts. Working capital management deals with the 5 
current accounts and maintains an equilibrium between profits and risks. Literature has shown that 6 
the proper management of working capital enhances firm performance (Deloof, 2003; Padachi, 2006). 7 
Due to the nature of working capital, scholars and managers often limit its significance to its short-8 
term financial aspects. However, we propose that working capital may also affect firms’ long-term 9 
goals (such as their dividend policies). 10 
A firm must have sufficient funds in order to issue a cash dividend. Therefore the obvious starting 11 
point of any dividend payout decision begins with cash (at the bank) on the balance sheet. When the 12 
cash amount is not enough to cover the declared cash dividend, other current assets (such as trade 13 
receivables) and current liabilities (such as trade payables), become equally important in the decision-14 
making process. Owing to its high liquidity, we assume that working capital can be used as a source 15 
for the dividend payout. To illustrate these arguments, we begin with the following illustration: 16 
For example: On 14th of November, Year 1, firm ABC made a sale of £100,000 on credit to its 17 
customers (we assume a tax rate of 16%). The double-entry for the transaction should be recorded as 18 
follows: 19 
 Debit Credit 
Trade Receivables £116,000  
     Tax Payables (GST)   £16,000 
     Sales/Service Revenue  £100,000 
Most of the transactions among business entities are not cash deals, but credit deals (for example, 20 
90 days credit).When a customer pays cash to ABC on the 14th of February of the following year, the 21 
double-entry for ABC is recorded as: 22 
 Debit Credit 
Cash (at Bank) £116,000  
     Trade Receivables  £116,000 
According to Accrual Basis Accounting, a firm should record any revenues or expenses on the date 23 
of the transaction, rather than when the cash is received or paid (Cash Basis Accounting). This creates 24 
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a time difference, between recognising revenue and receiving cash. If firm ABC needs to decide on a 1 
dividend at the end of year 1, the earnings will include the £100,000 of sales.  2 
However, the cash balance will be £100,000 short because the money is still “on the way”. Firm 3 
ABC will not receive the money until the following year and yet still has to make a dividend decision 4 
in year 1. Therefore, trade receivables place some constraints on the dividend payout. If the sales 5 
figure in the above transaction is not £100,000 but £100 billion or £100 trillion, then the impact of 6 
trade receivables on the dividend payout can be crucial. A firm might also hold some short-term loans. 7 
For example, if firm ABC borrows £100,000 from the bank on the 14th of November in year 1, then the 8 
double-entry is: 9 
 Debit Credit 
Cash (at Bank) £100,000  
     Payables  £100,000 
Assuming this short-term borrowing is for 3 months, and the interest rate is 6%, then on the 14th 10 
of February year 2, the ABC double entry includes: 11 
 Debit Credit 
Payables £100,000  
Interest Expenses     £6,000   
     Cash  £106,000 
If ABC needs a dividend payout plan, then the short-term loan from the bank can be used for 12 
paying dividends in subsequent years. However, this may affect the firm’s performance in year 2 since 13 
ABC has to pay back its debt within a certain time period. Similarly, one can also infer that payables 14 
may have an effect on the dividend payout. 15 
 16 
1.6.3 Stock Dividend 17 
The stock dividend is not as popular as the cash dividends within firms. There are limited studies that 18 
document firms’ stock dividend payouts. Most of the studies (Fama and French, 2001; Farsio et al., 19 
2004; von Eije and Megginson, 2008; Javakhadze et al., 2014) only focus on the cash dividend payout 20 
and ignore the stock dividend payout. A stock dividend, as another form of dividend payout, is equally 21 
as important as a cash dividend. Thus stock dividend determinants should not be omitted when 22 
examining dividend payouts. 23 
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Wei and Xiao’s study (2009) investigates the stock dividend in China’s stock market. However, 1 
Wei and Xiao’s (2009) stock dividend model does not take stock repurchase into consideration. The 2 
reasons are: first, there was no financial law in China on stock repurchase before 2005 Second, firms 3 
only began to repurchase their own stock after 2008. Compared to the UK equity market, stock 4 
repurchase has become much more popular among firms over the past two decades. As another 5 
payout method, stock repurchase, has attracted a similar amount of attention as dividends over the 6 
years. We believe that it is necessary to test the impact of stock repurchase on dividend payouts, to 7 
improve the adequacy of the stock dividend determinant model. 8 
 9 
1.6.4 The UK Perspective 10 
1.6.4.1 The London Stock Exchange 11 
As one of the world’s oldest financial markets, the London Stock Exchange (LSE) provides an 12 
international exchange platform, designed for both British and international firms. Its main objective 13 
is to provide firms, and other issuers, who need to raise capital with investors. Over the last decades, 14 
the LSE has developed into one of the most diversified and actively traded stock markets in the world. 15 
In 2012, there were more than 2,400 firms listed on the LSE, from a variety of sectors (see Table 1.2). 16 
Financial, Oil and Gas, Consumer Goods and Industrials are the top four sectors with the highest 17 
market capitalisations. In 2015, the total market capitalisation reached over £3,900 billion with 18 
£3,876.2 billion from the Main Market (MM) and £73,076.6 million from the Alternative Investment 19 
Market (AIM).3 20 
Table 1.2 Market Capitalisation of Firms Listed on the LSE by Industry 21 
 22 
Source: London Stock Exchange Data as at June 2012 23 
                                                          














The capital market consists of several sub-sections: Primary Market, Secondary Market, Equities, 1 
Fixed Income, and Derivatives.4 The majority of trading takes place in the Equities section which 2 
consists of the MM and the AIM.5 The MM is the top market of LSE, and it is designed for larger and 3 
multinational firms. The AIM market is for smaller, emerging firms. This market has lower disclosure 4 
requirements which are designed specifically for high-growth firms that seek to raise capital. 5 
Firms listed on the LSE are regulated by the UK Listing Authority (UKLA), and the Financial Services 6 
Authority (FSA). Listing categories are designed to distinguish between the listing standards that apply 7 
to the MM or the AIM. To list on the MM, firms are required to satisfy the UK’s listing rules (they may 8 
also include FSA declarations and diligence reports) or meet the EU (European Union) minimum 9 
requirements. Firms applying for the AIM are required to appoint a nominated adviser who must be 10 
registered with the LSE. Firms also need to comply with the Prospectus Rules under the FSA, with 11 
certain exclusions. These exclusions require further confirmation from the FSA. If a firm does not 12 
continually meet the listing standards (either in the MM or the AIM), then it is removed (delisted). 13 
Moreover, all firms listed on the LSE must comply with the UK Corporate Governance Code or the 14 
corporate governance code in their domestic countries. 15 
Due to the relatively high listing standards, the LSE offers reliable information on a firm’s 16 
perspectives to all users. Moreover, an individual firm’s real-time data, which updates at a high 17 
frequency, is also available under the LSE. This data is valuable and is normally consumed and/or 18 
referenced by market users, agencies and databases (such as DataStream and Bloomberg). 19 
 20 
1.6.4.2 UK Recessions 21 
In 2008, the UK entered into a recession. Table 1.3 shows that it was the deepest recession (regarding 22 
lost output) in the UK since 1955 (Allen, 2010). In 2009, actual growth saw the sharpest decline (-5.0%) 23 
in GDP. The slowdown affected all sectors of the economy, as well as the UK equity market. 24 
The downturn in economic activity was global, with many countries, including all G7 member 25 
countries, falling into recession during 2008. The UK was in recession longer than the other G7 26 
economies and was the last to exit. However, Japan (8.7%), Italy (6.9%) and Germany (6.8%) suffered 27 
greater total contractions in GDP than the UK’s 6.4%. Both Japan and Italy have since suffered a further 28 
quarter of negative growth. Following two successive quarters of economic growth in 2009 and 2010, 29 
                                                          





the UK economy finally appeared to be on the rise. Despite some downward shocks, the FTSE 100 has 1 
risen sharply after 2009, and the housing market has shown increasing strength. The UK has recovered 2 
reasonably well and today, is the fastest growing economy among the G7 members.6 3 
























UK 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.7% -0.1% -0.9% -1.8% -2.6% -0.7% -0.3% 0.4% 
Canada 1.0% 0.5% 0.3% -0.2% 0.1% 0.1% -1.0% -1.8% -0.9% 0.2% 1.2% 
France 0.4% 0.7% 0.3% 0.5% -0.4% -0.2% -1.5% -1.8% 0.3% 0.2% 0.6% 
Germany 0.3% 0.8% 0.1% 1.6% -0.6% -0.3% -2.4% -3.5% 0.4% 0.7% 0.0% 
Italy 0.2% 0.1% -0.5% 0.4% -0.6% -0.9% -2.2% -2.7% -0.5% 0.5% -0.3% 
Japan 0.2% -0.1% 0.4% 0.7% -1.1% -1.3% -2.7% -3.6% 1.5% -0.1% 0.9% 
US 0.8% 0.9% 0.5% -0.2% 0.4% -0.7% -1.4% -1.7% -0.2% 0.6% 1.4% 
Note: All countries’ GDPs are measured quarterly 5 
Source: Allen (2010) 6 
However, after its recovery, the UK economy returned to recession at the beginning of 2012 (GDP 7 
reduced by 0.2%), leading the UK to its first double-dip recession since 1970. Compared to 2011, the 8 
service sector increased only by 0.1%, the manufacturing sector declined by 0.4%, and the 9 
construction sector decreased severely by 3% in the first quarter of 2012. 10 








ment (b) CPI (c) RPIX (d) 
External 
Current 
Balance (e)  PSNB (f) 
2012 0.1 0.2 7.8 2.6 3.0 -59.2 113.3 
2013 1.2 1.2 8.0 2.5 3.0 -42.5 112.4 
2014 1.9 1.8 7.8 2.2 2.8 -36.9 93.5 
Note: (a) Percentage change, year-on-year. (b) ILO definition, fourth quarter, rate. (c) Consumer prices index, 12 
percentage change, fourth quarter on fourth quarter. (d) Retail price index, excluding mortgages, percentage 13 
change, and fourth quarter on fourth quarter. (e) Year, £ billion. (f) Public sector net borrowing, fiscal year, 14 
£ billion. Excludes the impact of the transfer of the Royal Mail pension scheme in April 2012. Includes flows from 15 
the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility. 16 
Source: National Institute of Economic and Social Research 17 
According to the National Institute of Economic and Social Research’s 2013 economic forecast 18 
report (see Table 1.4), the country’s GDP was expected to grow by 1.2% and 1.8% in 2014 and the year 19 
following, respectively. The unemployment rate was expected to remain at around 8% in 2014. The 20 
                                                          
6 Source: www.worldbank.org. 




report stated that the consumer price index would decrease gradually to 2.2% in 2014. Moreover, the 1 
net national saving only counted as 0.5% of GDP in 2012 and was expected to recover to around 2.5% 2 
of GDP in 2017. Due to the UK double-dip recession in 2012, analysts estimated that business 3 
investment volumes would remain below 2007 levels and would not recover until after 2017. The 4 
external financial shocks put more pressure on the UK government and critically affected firm 5 
performance. 6 
 7 
1.6.4.3 UK’s Tax Regime 8 
Under the UK tax system, when a shareholder receives a dividend, a basic rate of income tax (different 9 
tax rates are applied via different tax bands) is to be paid, based on the dividend issued. This ensures 10 
that the income tax will not be taxed twice. However, this practice causes problems for some non-tax 11 
paying firms, such as special charities, trusts and pension funds which are not allowed to reclaim their 12 
taxes and thus are in effect taxed on their income (Chaturvedi, 2009). There are many firms with 13 
different businesses listed on the LSE, including taxpaying and non-tax paying firms. In the US, the 14 
corporate tax rate is only 15% when firm profits are lower than $50,000. However, it can be as high as 15 
35% if the profits exceed $18,333,333.8 In 2015, the UK corporate tax rate was a fixed rate at 20%, 16 
however, this was reduced to 19% after the 1st of April 2017. Personal income tax rates in the UK vary 17 
from 20% to a maximum of 45%.9 In the US, the personal income tax rate is lower and ranges from 18 
10% up to 39.6%. However, if dividends are qualified (also known as a qualified dividend), some tax 19 
expenses can be avoided. In short, while the US dividend income tax may be significantly lower than 20 
in the UK, on average, UK corporate tax is lower than that of the US. 21 
 22 
1.6.5 Summary 23 
This section summarises the problem statement. Section 1.6.1 demonstrates the limitations of 24 
previous earnings measurements. Next, working capital (trade receivables and trade payables) is 25 
illustrated with examples which show how it may affect dividend payouts. Section 1.6.3 highlights the 26 
importance of stock dividends, which are often omitted or occasionally observed in the literature. The 27 
last section provides the rationale for selecting the UK stock market. 28 
Most dividend studies focus on the US stock market. Scholars have paid far less attention to the 29 
                                                          
8 Source: www.usa.gov/taxes. 
9 Source: www.gov.uk/browse/tax. 
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UK stock market. Additionally, studies on dividend payouts under conditions of economic adversity 1 
have only examined the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis (see for example, Bozos et al., 2011; 2 
Basse et al., 2014). We believe that it is necessary to address all of these unsolved issues in the 3 
literature and shed new light on dividend payouts. 4 
 5 
1.7 Research Objectives 6 
The current study investigates the dividend payouts of firms listed on the LSE from 1991 to 2015. The 7 
study’s specific objectives are: 8 
1. To re-investigate the relationship between current earnings and cash dividend payouts in the 9 
UK stock market. 10 
2. To examine the correlation between working capital and firms’ cash dividend payouts, in the 11 
context of the UK stock market. 12 
3. To test the significance of trade receivables and trade payables, in relation to firms’ cash 13 
dividend payouts in the UK stock market. 14 
4. To explore the impact of working capital on stock dividend and stock dividend determinants 15 
(including the stock repurchase) in the UK stock market. 16 
5. To study how external financial shocks (the 2008 global financial crisis and the 2012 double-17 
dip economic recession) affect dividend payouts in the UK stock market. 18 
 19 
1.8 Structure of the Thesis 20 
The remainder of the thesis is organised as follows. Chapter 2 reviews relevant literature, including 21 
dividend-related theories, earnings and dividends, working capital (including trade payables and 22 
receivables) and dividends, stock dividends and dividend payouts under external financial shocks. 23 
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the study’s data collection processes and research methodology. 24 
The descriptive and empirical results are discussed in Chapter 4. Chapter 5 concludes the study, 25 
outlines the limitations and provides recommendations for future research. 26 
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Chapter 2 Review of Related Literature 1 
2.1 Introduction 2 
This chapter reviews relevant literature on firm dividend payouts in the context of both international 3 
and UK stock markets. Section 2.2 reviews common dividend theories. Section 2.3 summarises the 4 
literature on earnings and dividend payout and highlights the limitations of previous earnings 5 
measurements. Section 2.4 addresses the importance of working capital management and its linkage 6 
that dividend policy. Section 2.5 explains trade receivables and payables under working capital 7 
management and their possible impact on dividend payouts. Section 2.6 summaries the reasons why 8 
working capital affects dividend payouts. Section 2.7 discusses previous studies on stock dividend 9 
payouts. The impact of external shock on firm dividend payouts is presented in the last section. 10 
 11 
2.2 Review of Dividend Theories 12 
2.2.1 The Dividend Irrelevance Theory 13 
Modigliani and Miller (1961) pioneered the dividend irrelevance policy, which explains that neither a 14 
firm’s share price, nor the cost of capital, is affected by dividend policy. Sophisticated investors can 15 
earn returns via smart buying and selling of stocks, rather than waiting for dividends. In other words, 16 
these individual investors will not be interested in the firm’s dividend policy. This theory states that 17 
regardless of what dividend policy a firm applies, it will not attract any investors. The dividend 18 
irrelevance theory (Modigliani and Miller, 1961) is based on several assumptions: 19 
1. Capital Market: it assumes that the capital market is perfect. Investors are rational and have 20 
access to all available information on the stock market. There are no flotation costs, no 21 
transaction costs, and the market price of the share is not affected by large investors. 22 
2. Taxation: no tax, or dividends and capital gains are taxed at the same rate. 23 
3. Investment Policy: fixed investment policy, meaning that firms never change their 24 
investment policies. In other words, new investments are financed through retained 25 
earnings, which do not alter, regardless of the risks and the firm’s rate of required return. 26 
4. Risk: no risks. Investors are confident about the future market prices and the dividends since 27 
all information is provided. The discount rate is the same for all types of shares. 28 
15 
 
Clearly, these assumptions do not hold in any real stock market. In fact, the capital market is 1 
either incomplete or imperfect (Fairchild et al., 2014). Tax charges are compulsory in most of the 2 
financial markets. Transaction cost, such as floating cost exists, and differences between internal and 3 
external finance can be very significant. 4 
 5 
2.2.3 Free Cash Flow Theory 6 
Free cash flow theory provides an alternative to dividend irrelevance theory. Jensen (1986) argues 7 
that managers have a propensity to increase dividend payouts or repurchase stock if they have a 8 
substantial free cash flow. However, Jensen also argues that the creation of debt, which attaches to 9 
managers’ promises to pay out future cash flows, is a substitution for dividends. Similarly, Giriati’s 10 
study (2015) on the Indonesian Stock Exchange suggests that firms’ free cash flow does not 11 
significantly affect the dividend payout. This is because the firm’s funds available can come from both 12 
internal and external sources. Therefore, dividend payouts are not the only option; stock repurchase 13 
and debt creation are also valid alternatives. 14 
 15 
2.2.4 Life-Cycle Theory  16 
Mueller’s life cycle theory (1972) demonstrates that a young/growing firm tends to pay low/no 17 
dividends because cash flows may be low compared to capital expenditure. When the firm matures 18 
and has higher and more stable cash flows, then it is more likely to pay dividends. The relationship 19 
between the life cycle and dividend is thus mediated by cash flows (Jensen, 1986) and the firm’s 20 
investment. Flavin and O'Connor (2017) have expanded life-cycle theory with the notion of reputation 21 
building. They note that firms in low-disclosure regimes, engage in reputation building behaviour, not 22 
only in the early stages of their life-cycle but also as they mature. 23 
 24 
2.2.5 Bird-in-the-Hand Theory 25 
Lintner (1962) and Gordon (1963) argue that dividends increase as the cost of equity decreases. The 26 
“bird-in-the-hand” theory argues that investors are unsure about capital gains, which arise from 27 
retained earnings rather than dividend payouts. In fact, investors pay more attention to dividend 28 
payouts prior to expecting capital gains because the dividend is less risky than the expected capital 29 




2.2.6 Agency Theory 1 
Jensen’s (1986) concept of agency theory illustrates the relationship between the principal (the 2 
managers) and agents (the employees) in a firm. This theory focuses on potential problems that may 3 
exist in this relationship because of a conflict of interests between the two parties. According to 4 
agency theory, firms issue dividends in order to reduce agency costs, thus aligning managers’ interests 5 
with shareholders’ interests (Chang et al., 2016). 6 
 7 
2.2.7 Catering Theory 8 
Baker and Wurgler’s catering theory (2004) argues that dividend decisions can be explained as 9 
managers rationally cater for the stock market’s demand. In short, managers issue dividends to cater 10 
for investors’ demands/expectations (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). Li and Lie (2006) expanded catering 11 
theory by analysing changes in dividend payouts and found that managers consider investors’ 12 
demands when making dividend decisions. They also reported that when managers ignored requests 13 
for dividends share prices tended to decline. Ferris et al. (2008, 2009) provide a more robust 14 
investigation, on a global basis and argue that firms in common law nations (rather than those in civil 15 
law nations) offer more dividend payouts as a way of meeting investors’ demands. Similarly, Lee (2010) 16 
found that managers of Australian firms cater to retail investors’ preference for dividends, when 17 
making dividend-related decisions. Recently, Kuo et al. (2013) also revealed that catering incentive 18 
has a significantly positive impact on changes in dividend payers of firms in common law countries. 19 
However, this result is insignificant for firms in the US and civil law countries. However, von Eije and 20 
Megginson (2008) report that the catering effect is not a significant factor in determining the dividend 21 
policy of firms in Europe. Jun et al. (2017) have argued that dividend catering is caused mostly by 22 
individual investors’ dividend chasing. This often leads to potential agency issues. 23 
 24 
2.3 Earnings 25 
Given that dividend policy is primarily concerned with how much is paid to shareholders, it is not 26 
surprising that earnings have been extensively tested in dividend-related studies. Theories regarding 27 
earnings and dividends are mainly based on dividend signalling (Darling, 1957; Chapman, 2018) and 28 
dividend smoothing (Lintner, 1956; Syed et al., 2018). 29 
The theory of dividend signalling proposes that a firm’s announcement of a dividend payout by a 30 
firm gives a strong signal on its future earnings. Some studies claim that the relationship between the 31 
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current dividend payout and future earnings is positive (see for example, Abeyratna et al., 1996; 1 
Dhanani, 2005; Howatt et al., 2009). However, Pettit (1976) argues that the dividend signalling theory 2 
is inefficient and that the correlation between earnings and dividend payout is negative. Sant and 3 
Cowan (1994) provide an alternative explanation, stating that the dividend does not affect future 4 
earnings. DeAngelo et al. (1996) show that changes in dividends do not signal earnings. This is due to 5 
managers’ behavioural bias. Similarly, Farsio et al. (2004) argue that there is no significant relationship 6 
between dividend policy and long-term earnings. They believe that high earnings lead to high 7 
dividends based on short-term analyses only. Tse (2005) argues that not every payout pattern is 8 
consistent with the dividend signalling hypothesis. Likewise, Bernhardt et al. (2005) note that the 9 
signalling concern does not explain why firms pay dividends. In his study on firms listed on the Indian 10 
stock market, Ghosh (2008) revealed that dividend payout could not significantly influence the 11 
probability of the future prospects of the listed firms. Denis and Osobov (2008) discovered that firms 12 
which pay dividends with greater earnings do not need dividends to signal their future earnings. More 13 
recently, Fairchild et al. (2014) concluded that there is no empirical evidence which proves that 14 
dividend signalling holds. 15 
Lintner (1956) argues that the dividend payout is a function of past and current earnings, and that 16 
dividends exhibit a smoothing phenomenon over the years. Other studies note that keeping a stable 17 
dividend stream is a crucial goal for managers (Jeong, 2013; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Javakhadze et al., 18 
2014). Brav et al. (2005) report that 93.8% of managers are reluctant to reduce dividend and nearly 19 
90% seek to maintain a stable dividend payout. However, Basse et al. (2014) did not find any empirical 20 
evidence to support dividend signalling or dividend smoothing in their study of European bank 21 
dividends. 22 
A key limitation in the previous literature on dividends and current earnings, is that the current 23 
earnings variable incorporates information about the dividend payout variable. A firm’s dividend 24 
payout policy is usually announced after releasing the earnings report. Therefore, the variable 25 
representing current earnings in the previous studies partially incorporates dividend payouts. This 26 
issue is indicated as follows:  27 
Assuming a firm’s dividend payout (𝐷𝑖𝑡) is regressed as a function of earnings (𝑃𝑖𝑡, profits after 28 
tax) and other determinants (∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡) such as firm size and leverage: 29 
𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝑏𝑃𝑖𝑡 + 𝑐 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡       (2.1) 30 
In previous studies (for example, Lintner, 1956; Fama and French, 2001; Denis and Osobov, 2008; 31 
Skinner, 2008), the coefficient representing 𝑏 is used to capture the direct effect of current earnings 32 
on dividend payouts. However, the 𝑃𝑖𝑡 variable used in those studies incorporate dividend payouts. 33 
Failing to subtract redundant information in the current earnings variable tends to produce biased 34 
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estimates with respect to the impact of current earnings on dividend payouts. For this reason, we 1 
employ Div-adj Earnings, which is measured as profits after tax, minus any declared dividends and 2 
other adjustments, to provide a more robust estimate. 3 
For analytical purposes, we further assume that the firm’s dividend payout ratio is r at t period. 4 
By substituting 𝐷𝑖𝑡 with 𝑟𝑃𝑖𝑡 into equation (2.1), we obtain: 5 
 𝐷𝑖𝑡 =  𝑎 + 𝑏[𝐷𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝑟)𝑃𝑖𝑡] + 𝑐 ∑ 𝑋𝑖𝑡 + 𝑒𝑖𝑡     (2.2) 6 
By rearranging equation (2.2), we can subsequently obtain equations (2.3) and (2.4), respectively: 7 
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 and ?̂? =
𝒆𝒊𝒕
𝟏−𝒃
. In particular, ?̂? in equation (2.4) represents the 10 
modified Div-adj Earnings variable in our study. 11 
 12 
2.4 Working Capital 13 
Short-term, or current assets and liabilities, are collectively known as working capital (Brealey et al., 14 
2014). Gross working capital commonly refers to the total current assets. Net working capital is 15 
calculated as the total current assets minus total current liabilities. The major accounting items of 16 
current assets are cash (at the bank), inventory and trade receivables. Trade payables, accruals and 17 
bank overdraft are essential parts of current liabilities (McLaney and Atrill, 2016). 18 
 19 
2.4.1 Working Capital Management 20 
Working capital management is the management of current assets and liabilities to ensure that a firm 21 
has sufficient cash to pay its short-term obligations. This demonstrates the benefits of liquidity, 22 
solvency, efficiency, profitability, and maximising shareholders’ wealth (Gitman et al., 2015).  23 
The working capital cycle (see Figure 2.1 (a)) measures the time between making payments to 24 
suppliers and collecting cash from credit sale transactions. In other words, it indicates the time that a 25 
firm converts current assets and liabilities into cash. The shorter the working capital cycle, the greater 26 
the effectiveness of working capital management. The longer the working capital cycle is, the longer 27 
a firm’s working capital is tied up without earning returns. It is considered desirable to keep the 28 
working capital cycle as short as possible (Padachi, 2006). A border view of the cash cycle is presented 29 
in Figure 2.1 (b). The figure shows different channels of cash distribution within a firm. Cash can be 30 
generated either internally, through working capital (as previously discussed), or externally, through 31 
19 
 
new financing (debt finance or equity finance). The outflow of cash can be used for operating purposes 1 
(for example, for research and development costs) or investment purposes (for example, for merger 2 
and acquisitions). Alternatively, cash can be used for dividend payouts or stock repurchases. As a 3 
necessary component, understanding changes in cash flow can provide critical information on 4 
corporate liquidity management (Bates et al., 2018). 5 






























Source: Ross et al. (2016) 
Liquidity is a prerequisite to guarantee that firms can meet their short-term obligations and be 10 
assured of a profitable operation on an on-going basis (Padachi, 2006). It is affected primarily by cash, 11 
trade receivables, inventory, and trade payables that contribute a significant part of the overall cash 12 
flow of businesses (Maness, 1994). Changes in firm liquidity levels, either increases or decreases, can 13 





















making any profit. In which case, the firm can use these funds to gain some returns rather than leave 1 
them unused. If the working capital are too low, this may lead to insolvency and illiquidity. This will 2 
send a negative signal to the market (Richa, 2014). Therefore, to ensure liquidity and the efficiency of 3 
working capital management, it is advisable that investment in working capital components is neither 4 
too low nor too high (Mathur, 2007). 5 
 6 
2.4.2 Importance of Working Capital Management 7 
Working capital, as a short-term financial indicator, plays a major role in different aspects of the firms. 8 
Proper management of working capital is linked to greater firm performance. Mervill and Tavis (1973) 9 
show that understanding working capital management can help firms to achieve optimal credit, 10 
inventory, and short-term borrowing policies. Sustaining working capital, apart from daily operational 11 
uses, is of vital importance for growing firms (Bierman et al., 1975). Scott (1978) provides an 12 
estimation method that can improve the accuracy of project evaluation, which is sensitive to working 13 
capital errors. Sokoloff (1984) notes that working capital has a dominant effect on investments and is 14 
positively associated with firm size. Fazzari and Petersen (1993) contend that under financial 15 
constraints, working capital can smooth fixed investments relative to cash flow fluctuations. This is 16 
due to working capital’s high liquidity. 17 
Most firms have invested a significant amount of cash in working capital, as well as large amounts 18 
of trade payables as a source of financing (Deloof, 2003). Working capital management aims to cope 19 
with the firms’ current accounts and maintain an equilibrium between profits and risks (Ricci and Vito, 20 
2000). Effective management of working capital has a significant effect on firm performance. Deloof 21 
(2003) examines the relationship between working capital management and profitability based on 22 
2,000 Belgian firms. The findings show a significant negative correlation between operating income 23 
and the number of days for trade receivables, inventory and trade payables. Deloof argues that 24 
decreasing the number of days for trade receivables, and inventory can increase shareholders’ wealth. 25 
Following Deloof (2003), an increasing number of studies have documented the correlation 26 
between working capital and firm performance. Lazaridis and Tryfonidis (2006) report statistical 27 
significance between profitability and the cash conversion cycle (CCC) on the Athens Stock Exchange. 28 
Ganesan (2007) observes that decreasing the days in working capital can improve firms’ profit margins 29 
in the US telecommunications sector. Further, Nazir and Afza (2009) demonstrate that more 30 
aggressive working capital policies can result in lower profits for non-financial firms on the Karachi 31 
Stock Exchange. In his examination of non-financial firms on the US stock exchange, Nobanee (2009) 32 
found that decreasing the cash conversion cycle does not increase firm profitability. However, it has 33 
21 
 
been argued that one unit of cash invested in net operating working capital is worth less than one unit 1 
of cash for the average firm (see Autukaite and Molay, 2011; Kieschnick et al., 2013). Other findings 2 
indicate that there is a negative relationship between gross operating profits and average days in trade 3 
receivables; while there is a positive relationship between the cash conversion cycle and profitability 4 
(Gill et al., 2010). 5 
Similarly to Deloof (2003) and Lazaridis & Tryfonidis (2006), Karaduman et al. (2010) argue that 6 
firms should pay attention to working capital management to enhance firm profitability. In their 7 
examination of the Brazilian Stock Exchange, De Almeida and Eid (2014) discovered that greater 8 
investment in working capital will reduce firms’ value. Working capital not only affects profitability for 9 
large firms but also plays a significant role in Small and Medium Enterprises’ (SMEs) performance. 10 
Padachi (2006) contends that greater investment in inventory and receivables will lead to lower profits. 11 
Similarly, Juan García-Teruel and Martinez-Solano, (2007) also detect a negative relationship between 12 
the numbers of days in trade receivables and inventory. Further, Banos-Caballero et al. (2010) report 13 
that mature firms with more cash flows tend to maintain a longer cash conversion cycle. 14 
Several empirical studies have confirmed a relatively new (non-linear) relationship between 15 
working capital and profitability. Banos-Caballero et al. (2012, 2014) have found a concave 16 
relationship between working capital and profitability. Similarly, Afrifa (2016) observes a strong 17 
concave relation between net working capital and firm performance. However, it converts to a convex 18 
relationship when the cash flow variable is taken into consideration. Further, Aktas et al. (2015) reveal 19 
that firms pursue optimal working capital by changing levels of working capital, which, in turn, improve 20 
share performance. Table 2.1 provides a summary of the studies on working capital.21 
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Table 2.1 Summary of Studies on Working Capital 1 
Year Author/s  
(Last name) 
Data Sample Period 
Analysed  
Key Findings  Working Capital 
Measurement 
1973 Mervill and 
Tavis 
n.a. n.a. The optimal policy is affected by credit terms, inventory and short-term 









It is very important for firms with growth opportunities to maintain 
working capital at a certain level because firms may lose these 
opportunities unless they have guarded themselves. 
 
n.a. 
1984 Sokoloff US 
manufacturing 
firms 








firms in the US 
1970-1984 Under a firm’s financial constraints, working capital, as a source of 
liquidity, can smooth the fixed investment to cash flow ratio. 
change in working 
capital 
1995 Lamberson 50 small firms 1980-1991 Working capital is relatively stable. Contrary to Gup (1983) who states 
that the level of investment in working capital account would likely 
increase in economic expansion. 
 
current ratio, quick 
ratio 




Days in net trade cycle have a significant and negative impact on firms’ 
profitability. 
 








Gross operating income is negatively correlated with the number of 
days of trade receivables, inventories and trade payables. 
no. of days trade 
receivables, inventory, 
and trade payables 
2006 Lazaridis and 
Tryfonidis 
 





Cash conversion cycle is significantly correlated with gross operating 
profit (profitability). 











Year Author/s  
(Last name) 
Data Sample Period 
Analysed  












The number of days of trade receivables and days of inventory are 
negatively correlated with Spanish SMEs’ profitability.  
no. of days trade 
receivables, 











More aggressive working capital and finance policies result in a 
negative impact on firm profitability. 
 
investment in current 










Decreasing the cash conversion cycle may have a negative effect on 
firm profitability. 
 










A more aggressive working capital policy is likely to be adopted by firms 
with high leverage ratios, growth opportunities, investments and 
return on assets. Firms with more cash flow tend to have a longer cash 
conversion cycle.  
 
 
cash conversion cycle 
2010 
 
Gill, Bigger and 
Mathur 
 
88 firms listed 





Average days in trade receivables have a negative impact on gross 
operating profit (profitability), while the cash conversion cycle is 
positively correlated with profitability. 
 
 
cash conversion cycle 
2010 
 








Aggressive working capital policies can increase sales growth but also 
increase  sales volatility  
The sum of trade 
receivables and 
inventories net of 
trade payables. 








One euro invested in cash or in net operating working capital leads to 
returns less than one euro. 










Working capital reports a concave relationship to profitability. In other 
words, an optimal working capital level exits when profitability is 
maximum. 
 





Data Sample Period 
Analysed  











For SMEs, both the cash conversion cycle and net trade cycle have a 
positive impact on firm performance (operating income and stock 
returns). For bigger firms, the cash conversion cycle and net trade cycle 
are negatively correlated with firm profitability. 
cash conversion 
cycle, net trade cycle 
2012 Vahid et al. firms Listed in 
Tehran Stock 
Exchange (TSE) 
2006-2009 An increase in the collection period, payment period and the net 
trading cycle will result in decreasing firm profitability. 
average collection period, 
inventory turnover in days, 
average payment period, cash 
conversion cycle, and 
net trading cycle 





2000-2007 Working capital can be used to smooth the cash flow shocks on fixed 
capital investment. 
working capital to 









One dollar invested in the net operating capital is worth less than one 
dollar held in cash. 







2001-2007 Working capital shows an inverted U-shaped relationship to corporate 
performance. An optimal level of working capital can be found when 
trading off costs and benefits. This maximises firm performance. 
 
net trade cycle 




1995-2009 Increasing levels of working capital investment reduces firms’ value at 
the beginning of the fiscal year. 
 
net working capital 
2015 Aktas, Croci and 
Petmezas 
15,541 large US 
firms 
1982-2011 To maintain optimal levels by changing investments in working capital. 
This improves operating performance as well as share performance.  
 
net working capital 









Net working capital displays a significant concave correlation with firm 
performance. This relationship changes to convex when taking the cash 
flow variable into account. 
net working capital 
1 
25 
2.5 Trade Receivables and Trade Payables 1 
Since working capital involves current assets and current liabilities, it can be divided into several 2 
specific short-term items, namely, cash, inventory, trade receivables and trade payables. Trade 3 
receivables (or accounts receivable), refers to the cash that needs to be collected from clients as a 4 
result of product sales or services, given on credit (Horngren et al., 2012). Trade receivables, as a 5 
control account, include the total amount of receivables from the individual client. These are generally 6 
due within 12 months. In contrast, the amounts owed (usually to be paid within 12 months) for 7 
products or services purchased on the account are trade payables. 8 
Table 2.2 Operating and Cash Conversion Cycle 9 
 
<------------------------- Inventory period ------------------------> 
Trade 
<----------- receivables ------------> 
period 
Trade 
<-------------- payables ------------> 
Period 
 
<---------------------- Cash conversion cycle --------------------> 
 











Source: Brealey, Myers and Allen (2014) 10 
Table 2.2 illustrates the operations of a simple business that purchases materials, processes them, 11 
and then sells these inventories on credit. The inventory period measures the time period between 12 
when the raw material was purchased and when it was sold. The period between the sales period and 13 
when the client pays for their goods, is called the trade receivables period. Similarly, the period 14 
between when the raw materials are purchased and the payment for these materials, is called the 15 
trade payables period. The total length of time between purchasing raw materials and receiving 16 
payments from the client is called the operating cycle. The interval between purchasing raw material 17 
and collecting payment from the customer is known as the firm’s cash conversion cycle (Brealey et al., 18 
2014). The main difference between these factors is the time period.  19 
Traditionally, firms prefer to maintain a short operating cycle, characterised by a shorter cash 20 
conversion cycle, a shorter inventory period, a shorter trade receivables period and a longer trade 21 
payables period. However, decreasing the cash conversion cycle can harm the firm’s operations and 22 
reduce profitability (Nobanee, 2009). Decreasing the inventory period may also lead to an inventory 23 
shortage. Likewise, shortening the receivables period could result in losing clients with good credit, 24 
just as lengthening the trade payables period may increase a firm’s credit risk. Therefore, it is 25 
necessary to maintain these periods at an optimal (certain) level. 26 
26 
As shown in Table 2.2, trade receivables and payables periods are very important in determining 1 
the levels of working capital and firm liquidity. However, trade receivables and payables are the 2 
opposite, based on their specific nature. This fact may provide some explanation for the concave 3 
relation between working capital and firm profitability which is discussed in section 2.3.2.  4 
Under current assets, trade receivables are the most significant accounting item, following by 5 
cash.10 Similarly, trade payables have great significance under current liabilities. Therefore, to further 6 
analyse whether working capital affects firm dividend payouts, we argue that it is necessary to 7 
examine both trade receivables and trade payables under working capital. 8 
 9 
2.6 Working Capital and Dividend Payouts 10 
Due to the high liquidity of working capital and its significant impact on firm performance, it is 11 
reasonable to assume that managers are able to control the working capital cycle, adjust desired cash 12 
levels, and re-distribute dividend payouts. Figure 2.2 shows how the working capital may affect 13 
dividend payout. Below we discuss two working capital scenarios. 14 
 












    Trade Payables 
  
 
Figure 2.2 Theoretical Framework Showing Relationship between Working 
Capital and Dividend Payout 
 15 
2.6.1 A Low Working Capital Scenario 16 
Low (net) working capital levels may indicate that a firm has relatively low current assets and relatively 17 
high current liabilities. Specifically, firms with lower current assets suggest that cash, trade receivables, 18 
and inventories are at a low level, whereas higher current liabilities show that trade payables and 19 
other short-term debts are high. A low cash level may indicate that a firm’s cash conversion cycle is 20 
too long. This is not favourable for firms facing potential risks, as they may have liquidated assets to 21 
                                                          
10 Inventory, as another important current asset, is not discussed here, because some of the firms drawn from 
the data sample do not have a physical inventory, such as firms in the financial sectors which count for around 




make payments (Opler et al., 1999; Mun and Jang, 2015). This suggests that the available cash level is 1 
too low. Low trade receivables indicate that a firm has collected payment from its customers/clients 2 
(Mun and Jang, 2015). Low inventories suggest that a firm has sold most of its products to reduce 3 
inventory holding costs (Alfares, 2007). High trade payables and other short-term debts reveal that a 4 
firm has a high amount of debt (that is due within a short period) to pay off. Therefore, either a lower 5 
level of current assets, or a higher level of current liabilities, demonstrates that a firm may have less 6 
cash and more obligations to clear. This is an obstacle for firms intending to issue cash dividends. 7 
 8 
2.6.2 A High Working Capital Scenario 9 
High (net) working capital levels may indicate that a firm has relatively high current assets and 10 
relatively low current liabilities. Higher current assets show that a firm’s cash, trade receivables, and 11 
inventories are at a high level, whereas lower current liabilities show that trade payables and other 12 
short-term debts are low. On the one hand, a high cash level often indicates a positive cash flow, which 13 
facilitates future sales growth (Hill et al., 2010). Firms with higher cash grow faster and tend to have 14 
more investments and higher market to book ratio (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003). A high level of trade 15 
receivables suggests that a firm has extended into new markets and built strong supplier-customer 16 
relationships (Wilson and Summers, 2002). Holding considerable amounts of inventory can reduce 17 
supply costs and avoid loss of sales when demand is high (Blinder and Maccini, 1991; Fazzari and 18 
Petersen, 1993). On the other hand, low trade payables and other short-term debts, reveal that a firm 19 
has paid most of its debts due in a short period. Thus, we assume that relatively high working capital 20 
is a great potential source for dividend payouts. 21 
However, when working capital is too high, the situation may change. A high level of trade 22 
receivables may suggest that more sales are on credit, which reflects a lack of cash as well as a 23 
potential credit risk (Bougheas et al., 2009; Martínez‐Sola et al., 2013). Holding a large amount of 24 
inventory may indicate that products cannot be sold easily or most have been returned (Buzacott and 25 
Zhang, 2004). If a firm has considerable cash in its working capital, it may consider new investments, 26 
mergers and acquisitions (M&As), and R&D expenditure (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003), rather than 27 
issuing dividends. Alternatively, an extremely high working capital does not necessarily mean that a 28 
firm has considerable cash, but a greater level of trade receivables and a large amount of unsold 29 
inventory. Therefore, in either case, the firm may not be able to utilise working capital as a source for 30 
dividend payout, holding the current liabilities remain unchanged. 31 
In summary, working capital appears to exhibit a concave impact on dividend payouts. We 32 
hypothesise that dividend payouts increase as working capital increases, until the working capital 33 
28 
reaches a certain threshold level. It declines when working capital is beyond the threshold level. 1 
Understanding the link between working capital and dividend payout can provide critical information 2 
for payout policymakers. Therefore, trade-offs among short-term (for example, investment in 3 
business operations, R&Ds) and long-term financial decisions (such as dividend payouts and M&As) 4 
can help policymakers to design optimal payout policies. 5 
 6 
2.7 Stock Dividends 7 
There are no apparent costs associated with stock dividends or stock splits in the literature. In 8 
fact, dividend signalling theory suggests that these activities should not convey any information 9 
regarding future earnings. In order to test this hypothesis, Grinblatt et al. (1984) examined the 10 
announcement effects of stock dividends and splits in the US stock market from 1967 to 1976. They 11 
conclude that overall, stock prices are positively correlated with stock dividends, in which post-12 
announcement returns are substantial for stock dividends around the ex-dates on the US Exchange. 13 
This implies that announcing a stock dividend option is seen by shareholders as a good sign (see also 14 
McNihols and Dravid, 1990; Bessembinder and Zhang, 2015). However, Lakonishok and Lev (1987), 15 
who report a decrease in the use of stock dividends, argue that they are used as a substitute by firms 16 
who are unable to issue cash dividends and thus are usually seen as a negative sign. 17 
Lasfer (1997a) examined UK firms’ motivations for paying a scrip dividend, for the period of 1987 18 
to 1992.11 The author found that stock dividends are not used to save on corporate tax and firms are 19 
less likely to issue stock dividends when they have insufficient cash or are facing financial difficulties. 20 
However, Lasfer (1997b) later revealed that the stock dividend option is driven by high rates of 21 
corporation tax, based on the majority of the respondents (managers). Lasfer found that shareholder 22 
pressure is the main reason firms offer stock dividends. 23 
Wei and Xiao (2009) examined both cash dividends and stock dividends of listed firms on the 24 
Chinese stock market, from 1995 to 2006. Whilst shareholder preferences have been omitted in 25 
previous studies, they identify a new factor (equity ownership rights) as the shareholder preference 26 
to answer firms’ dividend payout. They conclude that cash and stock dividends are negatively 27 
correlated, an argument which supports substitution theory. They argue that shareholders’ different 28 
preferences on stock or cash dividends may result from the segregation of equity ownership rights, 29 
which leads to differences in share tradability. In particular, the amount of publicly traded shares has 30 
                                                          
11 Scrip dividend is also known as stock dividend. 
29 
a positive impact on stock dividend payouts.  1 
More recently, David and Ginglinger (2016) have argued that firms committed to paying dividends 2 
are more likely to offer an option for stock dividends when they may struggle to pay cash dividends. 3 
This option is common in times of economic recession or when there is a high gearing ratio. The 4 
authors found that abnormal stock returns after the announcement of a stock dividend option are 5 
positive. This finding suggests that options for stock dividends are seen as a positive option by 6 
shareholders, in spite of a decrease in cash dividends. However, Zhang and Kalay (2016) propose that 7 
investors initially overreact to stock dividend announcements, but gradually change their minds 8 
according to firms’ (poor) performance. They also argue that purely stock dividends and options for 9 
stock dividends are inherently different; purely stock dividends provide limited insight into 10 
shareholder preferences (for cash or stock dividends). 11 
 12 
2.8 Dividend Payouts during External Financial Shocks  13 
Not surprisingly, the 2008 global financial crisis has been investigated by numerous economists. It has 14 
been described as the severest financial crisis since the great recession of the 1930s. The dramatic 15 
decreases in house prices after the collapse of the housing bubble in the US, impacted global markets. 16 
UK dividend payouts were negatively affected by the 2008 crisis. In 2007 the total dividend payout in 17 
the UK banking sector was £13.3 billion. In 2009 and 2010 it shrank to just £5.8 billion.12 18 
Using dividend signalling theory, Bozos et al. (2011) tested the signalling effects of UK dividend 19 
announcements over four years (2006 to 2010), a period which includes both stable periods and 20 
periods of economic turmoil. By adopting the event study method, they observed positive abnormal 21 
returns around the dividend earnings announcements. On the one hand, their study reveals a negative 22 
relationship between external economic conditions and the dividend information content. On the 23 
other hand, they found changes in dividends conveyed less information during stable economic 24 
conditions and more in times of financial adversity. 25 
Adreu and Gulamhussen (2013), who documented US bank holding firms’ dividend payout, also 26 
support dividend signalling theory. They explain the dividend payout during the financial crisis. Based 27 
on a comparison of dividend payouts pre- and during crisis periods, they argue that external economic 28 
conditions (before and during the crisis) had a significant impact on dividend payouts. They found that 29 
large banks with low growth rates were more likely to pay more dividends both before and during the 30 
                                                          
12 Source: www.theguardian.com/business/2013/feb/28/dividends-banks-halved-financial-crisis 
30 
crisis periods. Their findings also support agency theory. Moreover, Bildik et al. (2015) compared the 1 
US firms’ dividend payouts with firms in another 32 countries, over the period of 1985 to 2011. They 2 
observed that while the proportion of dividend payers dropped dramatically from 1985 to 2000, it 3 
increased after 2000. This upward direction is statistically significant for the US firms. This indicates 4 
that the US acts as a leader in terms of payout trends. They also found that post-crisis payout ratios 5 
were higher than pre-crisis ones. Floyd et al. (2015) provide a comprehensive review of US bank and 6 
industrial firms’ payout policies during a period of financial crisis (1980 to 2012). They observed that 7 
banks and industrials increased payouts before the financial crisis. In particular, industrials’ dividend 8 
payouts increased sharply after 2002 when the declining propensity to pay reverses. Banks tend to 9 
have a more stable dividend payout policies and therefore were reluctant to cut dividend payouts 10 
before periods of financial crisis. The findings indicate that industrial payouts are more in line with 11 
free cash flow theory, while agency theory provides a better explanation for bank dividend payouts. 12 
In contrast, Basse et al. (2014) found different results after analysing European banking industry 13 
dividend payouts from 1998 to 2008. They argue that decreasing/omitting dividends is one possible 14 
way to improve banks’ financial performance (through retaining earnings). However, investors are 15 
more likely to interpret this as a signal of future problems. Considering these doubts, they examined 16 
European banks using both the dividend signalling theory and smoothing hypothesis. Using the VECM 17 
(vector error correction model), their results show no support for the investors’ explanation. They 18 
concluded that the dividend signalling and smoothing hypothesis are not relevant under external 19 
economic conditions. Similarly, Al-Malkawi et al. (2014) used a Tobit model to examine dividend 20 
payouts in the Muscat Securities Market, from 2001 to 2010. They argue that the relationship between 21 
financial crisis and dividend payout is insignificant. They also found that firms continued to issue 22 
dividends even after periods of financial crisis. 23 
  24 
31 
Chapter 3 Research Methodology 1 
3.1 Introduction 2 
This chapter provides an overview of the data collection and research methods used to investigate the 3 
significance of working capital management on dividend payouts, determinants of stock dividends and 4 
dividend payouts under external shock conditions. Section 3.2 describes the panel (firm, sector and 5 
year) data collection. Section 3.3 outlines the variables and the measurements used in the empirical 6 
models. Section 3.4 provides the research model specifications (for both the cash and stock dividend 7 
models). Section 3.5 presents the rationale for selecting the Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), Fixed-8 
Effects (FE), Random-Effects (RE), and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) estimators. Section 9 
3.6 provides a summary of the chapter. 10 
 11 
3.2 Data Collection 12 
The panel data in this study includes all of the publicly listed firms on the LSE, from 1991 to 2015. The 13 
sample firms (a total number of 1,575 firms) were drawn from the LSE in the Bloomberg Database. 14 
The sample firms include the following screening criteria: 15 
1. Firms that have been actively trading on the LSE or other Stock Exchange markets (cross-listed) 16 
since 1990. 17 
2. Firms that have paid dividends (cash dividends or stock dividends) continuously from 1990. 18 
Most of the financial and accounting data were acquired on an annual basis, from the Bloomberg 19 
database and the LSE website. We used World Bank database to collect macroeconomic data at a 20 
country’s level. The World Bank database provides information on Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 21 
growth and inflation rates. These variables were used to further test the external shock of financial 22 
crisis periods, in addition to the dummy year variable. Based on the Global Industry Classification 23 
Standard (GICS), we divided the listed firms into different sectors (Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, 24 
Consumer Service, Financials, Health Care, Industrials, Oil and Gas, Technology, Telecommunications 25 
and Utilities). Owing to missing information in the Bloomberg Database, we obtained a final sample 26 
consisting of 20,858 firm-year observations for the period of 1991 to 2015. 27 
32 
3.3 Variables Specification 1 
3.3.1 Dependent Variables 2 
3.3.1.1 Cash Dividend 3 
We used the total common cash dividend payout (Bloomberg IS052) as one of our dependent variables. 4 
It is calculated as the dividend paid to common shareholders, from firm profits. This includes regular 5 
cash, as well as special cash dividends for all classes of common shareholders.13 Following Aivazian et 6 
al. (2003) and Lee (2010), we multiplied cash dividends by 1,000 and scaled them down by dividing by 7 
the firm’s total assets:  8 
CD = Total common cash dividends × 10³ / Total Assets              (3.1) 9 
We did not scale the cash dividends with net incomes for the following reasons: 10 
1) The total common cash dividends variable has less missing values than the dividend payout 11 
ratio variable. 12 
2) Some firm’s net incomes are negative. If we scaled cash dividends with net incomes, it would 13 
yield negative ratios, which need to be removed from the analysis. 14 
 15 
3.3.1.2 Stock Dividend 16 
There are limited studies that document stock dividend payouts. Wei and Xiao (2009) used a ratio of 17 
stock dividend per share to EPS, sales per share, and stock price, to measure stock dividend payout. In 18 
this study, we define stock dividend payout to total payout ratio14 as another dependent variable, 19 
which is expressed as: 20 
 SD = (Total Payout – Total common cash dividend – Stock Repurchase)/ Total Payout (3.2) 21 
 22 
3.3.2 Testing of the Variables 23 
                                                          
13 When dividends attributable to the periods are not disclosed, they are estimated by multiplying the dividend 
per share (Bloomberg IS151) by the weighted average number of outstanding shares (Bloomberg BS081). 
14 There is no direct stock dividend information on Bloomberg, such as the stock dividend per share. Therefore, 
we calculated stock dividend using the following formula. Stock dividend = total payout – cash dividend – stock 
repurchase. 
33 
3.3.2.1 Earnings 1 
Dividend policy is essentially concerned with how much of a firm’s earnings are paid to shareholders 2 
as returns. Earnings have become the most direct financial determinant to explain dividend payout. 3 
While there are many ways to report earnings (they vary according to different accounting principles), 4 
but the term corporate earnings typically refers to profits after tax, which equals total revenue minus 5 
the cost of sales, operating expenses, depreciations, other expenses, and corporate taxes. 6 
Numerous studies have examined the relationship between earnings/profitability and dividend 7 
payout (see for example, Skinner, 2008; von Eije and Megginson, 2008; Fatemi and Bildik, 2012). These 8 
studies all measure earnings/profitability differently (via return on assets, net earnings after tax, and 9 
net income plus interest expenses). However, there is a potential problem with defining earnings in 10 
these ways. As discussed previously, the estimated coefficient (b) used in this earlier literature lacks 11 
accuracy (see Chapter 2 section 2.4). Rather than recalculating b̂ based on the estimated b, the current 12 
study uses adjusted earnings (calculated as net income15 after tax, minus the cash dividend declared), 13 
to measure the current earnings/profitability in order to improve our model efficiency. We calculate 14 
the dividend-adjusted earnings16 as: 15 
Divi-adj Earnings = (Net Income – Total Cash Preferred Dividend – Total Cash Common Dividend 16 
– Other Adjustments) / Total Assets                           (3.3) 17 
 18 
3.3.2.2 Working Capital 19 
Working capital measures a firm’s efficiency and its short-term financial health. There are several 20 
ways to measure working capital management (see Table 2.1 in Chapter 2). As an inclusive 21 
measurement of working capital, the cash conversion cycle involves all of the current flows of 22 
inventory, trade receivables and trade payables (Nobanee, 2009). The cash conversion cycle (CCC) 23 
normally reports as the “number of days.” However, the panel data we obtained are from an annual 24 
basis. Therefore, we use change in working capital (∆WC) as a key explanatory variable. 17  It is 25 
calculated as follows: 26 
                                                          
15 Earnings available for common shareholders (net income) are not considered a cash item. 
16 For the purpose of comparing different coefficients across the subsamples, this variable is divided by total 
assets (as a ratio). Algebraically, this ratio equals the ROA, excluding shareholder payments. 
17 Change in working capital is used to capture the dynamic of working capital on dividend payout. Firms in 
different industries may report different changes in working capital. Working capital level (scaled down by total 
assets) is also used and the results are reported in the Robustness Check in the Appendices. 
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∆WC = {working capital (t) – working capital (t-1)} / working capital (t-1)                   (3.4) 1 
 2 
3.3.2.3 Trade Receivables and Trade Payables 3 
To divide working capital management into more specific components, we tested the relationship 4 
between two variables (changes in trade receivables and trade payables) and cash dividend payouts. 5 
Apart from cash, the management of trade receivables and trade payables contribute the most 6 
significant portion of working capital management. As proposed earlier, trade receivables and trade 7 
payables are most likely to assist in opposing ways to firm cash dividend payouts. Therefore, trade 8 
receivables and trade payables are tested as two separate variables under the working capital 9 
hypothesis. 10 
Trade receivables are receivables with a maturity of less than one year, and are directly related 11 
to operating activities. These receivables are the net amount of the provision for doubtful accounts; 12 
note receivables are not included. The change in trade receivables (∆TR) is calculated as: 13 
∆TR = {trade receivables (t) – trade receivables (t-1)} / trade receivables (t-1)   (3.5) 14 
Trade payables are payables resulting from operating activities, which include trade payables to 15 
associates and related parties. In the UK, this includes payments received on account, land creditors 16 
for property investment firms, and consignment stock creditors for car dealerships. The change in 17 
trade payables (∆TP) is calculated as: 18 
∆TP = {trade payables (t) – trade payables (t-1)} / trade payables (t-1)    (3.6) 19 
 20 
3.3.2.4 External Financial Shocks 21 
A few studies (see Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Attig et al., 2016) have used the dummy variable to capture 22 
the impact of the 2008 global financial crisis. We include both the 2008 global financial crisis and the 23 
2012 UK double-dip recession in our model. A dummy variable Dum (fs) was created to measure the 24 
external financial shocks on firm dividend payouts: 25 
Dum (fs) = 1 (if the year equals to 2008 or 2012) 26 
  = 0 (otherwise)              (3.7) 27 
where Dum (fs) equals 1 for the financial crisis period, and 0 for the non-financial crisis period. 28 
 29 
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3.3.3 Control Variables 1 
3.3.3.1 Profitability 2 
Following Alzahrani and Lasfer (2012), we also added earnings per share to control for firm profitability 3 
since firms with different EPSs may issue different dividend payouts. EPS includes the effects of all 4 
one-time, non-recurring and extraordinary gains/losses. It uses basic weighted average shares, 5 
excluding the effects of convertibles, and is computed as: 6 
EPS = Net Income Available to Common Shareholders / Basic Weighted Average Shares 7 
Outstanding.                   (3.8) 8 
According to FRS 3, the EPS calculation also includes extraordinary, abnormal, discontinued and 9 
one-off items for UK firms.18 10 
Gordon (1963) has argued that high dividend payout decreases the cost of equity or the required 11 
rate of return on equity. We use this control variable when modelling stock dividend payouts. Return 12 
on common equity (ROE) measures a firm’s profitability by revealing how much profit a company 13 
generates with the money shareholders have invested, in a percentage form: 14 
ROE = Net income available for common shareholders × 100 / Average Total Common Equity  (3.9) 15 
 16 
3.3.3.2 Taxation 17 
Overall, taxation has been considered a significant reason that leads to the decreasing of firms’ 18 
dividend payout (see Lintner, 1956; Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012; Jeong, 2013). In particular, Brittain 19 
(1964) notes that both individual and corporation taxes affect (negatively) firms’ dividend payout. 20 
Other studies reveal the tax differences between capital gains and tax paid for dividends from an 21 
investor’s perspective (Peterson et al., 1985; Pettit, 1976). However, in this study, we focus primarily 22 
on firm taxation. Therefore, we use Taxation (Tax) to indicate tax that has been paid and include it as 23 
a control variable. It is computed as the tax amount paid in cash, which includes actual cash paid for 24 
income taxes and net of any tax refunds.19 Income tax is divided by total current liabilities: 25 
Tax = Income tax paid in cash / total current liabilities               (3.10) 26 
                                                          
18 Financial Reporting Standard 3-‘Reporting Financial Performance’ requires companies to include ALL items of 
cost and revenue in their EPS calculations. Before the adoption of FRS 3 (1993), EPS was calculated as: (net profit 
– preferred dividend)/average number of shares. 
19 Unless refunds exceed taxes paid, the number will be positive. 
36 
3.3.3.3 Investment 1 
The relationship between investments and dividend decisions is far from conclusive. Bhaduri and Durai 2 
(2006) report a strong correlation between financing and investing decisions in an emerging market. 3 
Evidence also shows an insignificant correlation between investment and dividends (Fama, 1974; Gul, 4 
1999; Wang, 2010). In order to control for shareholders’ preferences for investments or dividends, we 5 
include total investments as another control variable. The total investment (Inv) consists of both long-6 
term and short-term investments. These include marketable securities and other investments that are 7 
expected to convert to cash within, or after, one year. This also includes available for sale and held to 8 
maturity securities, classified as short-term and short-term interest-bearing loans to third parties, 9 
interest or dividends accrued on investments.20 The total investments (Inv) are calculated as: 10 
Inv = (Short-term investments + Long-term investments) / Total Assets    (3.11) 11 
 12 
3.3.3.4 Firm size 13 
Firm size is an important determinant of firm dividend payout (see Faccio et al., 2001; Fama and French, 14 
2001). Most studies use the logarithm of the book value of total assets when defining firm size (see 15 
Wei and Xiao, 2009; Breuer et al., 2014; Javakhadze et al., 2014). The test variables (working capital, 16 
trade receivables and trade payables) are included as part of the total assets. Thus we define firm size 17 
(size) as the logarithm of the book value of net sales (see Alzahrani and Lasfer, 2012) to avoid 18 
collinearity problems among the independent variables. It is computed as: 19 
Size = Log (net sales)                           (3.12) 20 
 21 
3.3.3.5 Gearing Ratio 22 
Gearing ratio is often used to measure a firm’s financial leverage, which is an effective financial 23 
indicator for revealing a firm’s capital structure (Fridson and Alvarez, 2011). Gearing ratio is also an 24 
indicator of a firm’s financial risk. We use long-term debt to common equity (gearing) to measure 25 
firm’s financial leverage, which can be calculated by dividing its long-term debt (Bloomberg BS051) by 26 
common stockholders’ equity (Bloomberg RP010), in percentage: 27 
Gearing = Long-term debt × 100/ total common equity        (3.13) 28 
                                                          
20 In the UK, investment does not include ‘held for resale’ which are included in Other Current Assets. 
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3.3.3.6 Opportunity Growth 1 
Following Denis and Osobov (2008), we use the market to book ratio as a proxy to measure firm 2 
growth opportunity. Market-to-Book (MtB)21 is a measure of the relative value (Bloomberg RP010) of 3 
a firm compared to its market value (Bloomberg RP902). It is calculated as: 4 
MtB = Market Capitalisation/ Book Value          (3.14) 5 
3.3.3.7 Stock Repurchase 6 
Skinner (2008) has shown that firms use stock repurchases as a substitute for dividend payouts. The 7 
substitution hypothesis (Grullon and Michaely, 2002) also reveals that dividend and stock repurchase 8 
are negatively correlated. In other words, firms either choose to issue dividends or repurchase stocks. 9 
Stock repurchase is used as a control variable when modelling a stock dividend payout to test whether 10 
the substitution hypothesis between dividend and stock repurchase holds in our sample. The 11 
“decrease in capital stock” represents the repurchase (buyback) of common stock, common stock 12 
warrants, or other common stock equivalents. This includes redemption of preferred share capital and 13 
the purchase of treasury stock. We use the absolute value of the decrease in capital stock scaled by 14 
total assets: 15 
Rep = ∣decrease in capital stock∣/ Total Assets                    (3.15) 16 
 17 
3.3.3.8 Macroeconomic Factors 18 
We add GDP growth and inflation rates to measure the macroeconomic conditions which can affect 19 
firm performance (McMillan, 2014).  20 
 21 
3.4 Research Model 22 
3.4.1 Cash Dividend Model 23 
To examine the cash dividend payout, we begin with the classic model of dividend payout by Lintner 24 
(1956) who found that earnings are an important factor that changes dividend payout. The model is 25 
given as follows: 26 
                                                          
21 Also known as price to book ratio, this is a financial ratio used to compare a firm's current market price to its book value. 
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𝑫𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂 + 𝒃𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝒄𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒆𝒊𝒕             (3.16) 1 
where, 𝐷𝑖𝑡  and 𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) represents the dividend payout at time t and t-1, respectively, and 𝑃𝑖𝑡  is the 2 
firm’s profit after tax. This is one of the earliest models used to measure the relationship between 3 
earnings and dividend payouts. 4 
To answer research objectives 1, 2 and 5, the current study includes variables used in Lintner’s 5 
equation (3.16). Our model differs from Lintner’s (1956) model, however, as we include adjusted 6 
earnings, denoted as dividend-adjusted earnings (profits after tax and after dividend declared). This 7 
enables us to mitigate the potential multicollinearity problem between the dependent variable 8 
(dividend) and earnings. We rebuild Afrifa’s (2016) model and formulate the following equation: 9 
𝑪𝑫𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐∆𝑾𝑪
𝟐
𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑∆𝑾𝑪𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑫𝒊𝒗 − 𝒂𝒅𝒋 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕 +10 
𝜷𝟔𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑮𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝒖𝒎(𝒇𝒔)𝒊𝒕 +11 
𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                         (3.17) 12 
where, 𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡  and 𝐶𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) represent the cash dividend payout at times t and t-1, respectively, ∆𝑊𝐶
2
𝑖𝑡 13 
and ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 are changes in working capital squared and changes in working capital at time period t, 14 
respectively. 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑖(𝑡−1) is the stock repurchase at time period t-1 (last year’s repurchase). The definition 15 
of variables for equation (3.17) is presented in Table 3.7. 16 
To further explore how trade receivables and trade payables may affect firm dividend payouts, 17 
we split the variable ∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡 into ∆𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡  and ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡  along with other control variables to answer research 18 
objectives 1, 3 and 5. The model can be expressed as follows: 19 
𝑪𝑫𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 + 𝜷𝟏𝑪𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐∆𝑻𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑∆𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟒𝑫𝒊𝒗 − 𝒂𝒅𝒋 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕 +20 
𝜷𝟔𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟕𝑮𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝒖𝒎(𝒇𝒔)𝒊𝒕 +21 
𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                        (3.18) 22 
where, ∆𝑇𝑃𝑖𝑡 is the change in trade payables; ∆𝑇𝑅𝑖𝑡 is the change in trade receivables, and 𝑅𝑒𝑝𝑖(𝑡−1) is 23 
the stock repurchase at time period t-1 (last year’s stock repurchases). The definition of variables for 24 
equation (3.18) is presented in Table 3.7. 25 
 26 
3.4.2 Stock Dividend Model 27 
Unlike cash dividend analysis, stock dividend patterns are rarely discussed in the literature. Most of 28 
the dividend policy studies (Koch and Shenoy, 1999; Fukuda, 2000; Huang et al., 2011) either omit or 29 
exclude stock dividends or adjust other financial data in regard to stock dividends. We retain most of 30 
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the explanatory variables in order to test whether the working capital variables are significant in our 1 
stock dividend model. To answer research objectives 4 and 5, our model follows equation (3.17). The 2 
stock dividend model can be expressed as follows: 3 
𝑺𝑫𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐∆𝑾𝑪
𝟐
𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑∆𝑾𝑪𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕 +4 
𝜷𝟕𝑮𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝒖𝒎(𝒇𝒔)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒈𝒊𝒕 +5 
𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                            (3.19) 6 
where, 𝑆𝐷𝑖𝑡 and 𝑆𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) are the stock dividend payouts at times t and t-1, respectively.  7 
Similarly, we divide the change in working capital into the change in trade receivables and trade 8 
payables for our stock dividend model. However, we made several adjustments due to the natural 9 
differences between stock dividends versus cash dividends. Equation (3.19) can be rewritten as: 10 
𝑺𝑫𝒊𝒕 =  𝜷𝟎 +  𝜷𝟏𝑺𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟐𝑻𝑷𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟑∆𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕 +  𝜷𝟒𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟓𝑬𝑷𝑺𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟔𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕 +11 
𝜷𝟕𝑮𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟖𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟗𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟎𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝜷𝟏𝟏𝑫𝒖𝒎(𝒇𝒔)𝒊𝒕 + 𝜷𝟏𝟐𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒈𝒊𝒕 +12 
𝜷𝟏𝟑𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                          (3.20) 13 
Following Dittmar (2000), the first lag of stock repurchase is added into equations (3.19) and 14 
(3.20) to test the significance of the substitution hypothesis, between stock repurchase and stock 15 
dividend. It is noted that the current EPS would be affected by previous stock repurchases since stock 16 
repurchases decrease the number of shares outstanding, resulting in an increase in earnings per 17 
share.  18 
Compared to equations (3.17) and (3.18), we remove 𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑖𝑡  in equations (3.19) and (3.20). 19 
Earnings per share (EPS)22 measures earnings as well as equity, therefore the dividend-adjusted 20 
earnings in equations (3.17) and (3.18) are removed as well. We also use ROE (return on shareholders’ 21 
equity) to control for profitability.23 The main reason for making these adjustments in equations (3.19) 22 
and (3.20) is that issuing a stock dividend is a channel for using equity finance. We believe that such 23 
adjustments, along with the retention of liabilities variables (such as gearing, which is an indicator of 24 
debt finance), may capture the impact of issuing stock dividends on a firm’s capital structure. The 25 
definition of the variables for equations (3.17) and (3.18) are presented in Table 3.7. 26 
                                                          
22 The current EPS would be affected by previous stock repurchases since stock repurchases decrease the 
number of shares outstanding, resulting in an increase in EPS. 
23 There are several accounting ratios for measuring firm profitability, including gross profit ratio, return on 
assets, and return on equity. Most of the dividend related literature adopts the ROA to control for firm 
profitability. Following Gordon (1962), Booth and Cleary (2003), ROE is used to measure the profitability of firms 
in our stock dividend models. Another reason is that stock dividends involve issuing additional shares. Such 
behaviour is more equity based. 
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3.5 Selection of Estimators 1 
3.5.1 Diagnostic Test 2 
3.5.1.1 Unit Root Test 3 
Given the study’s relatively large time period (25 years), it is necessary to test whether the data is 4 
stationary or not. We applied a Dickey-Fuller test to overcome spurious regressions. When 5 
nonstationary data is used in a regression model, the results may show apparently significant 6 
relationships from unrelated variables (Hill et al., 2012). This phenomenon is called spurious 7 
regression. Thus, the estimator and predictor obtained in the spurious regression do not have their 8 
usual properties, and the t-statistics are not reliable. Moreover, macroeconomic data are most likely 9 
nonstationary; for example, at least a part of their movement each quarter is random (Davidson et al., 10 
2010).24 11 
Table 3.1(a) Unit Root: Dickey-Fuller Test 12 
 z statistics p-value 
Gearing (%) -43.814     0.000*** 
ROE (%) -42.126     0.000*** 
MtB (%) -43.937     0.000*** 
EPS -45.929     0.000*** 
Rep -52.301     0.000*** 
Div-adj Earnings -51.376     0.000*** 
∆TP -51.554     0.000*** 
∆TR -89.085     0.000*** 
CD -40.209     0.000*** 
∆WC -56.701     0.000*** 
∆WC² -57.184     0.000*** 
Tax -47.169     0.000*** 
Inv -50.114     0.000*** 
Size -52.375     0.000*** 
*** represents significance at the 1% level 13 
Source: Author’s calculations 14 
                                                          
24 Rapach (2002) found that macroeconomic variables, such as international real GDP and real GDP per capital 
levels are nonstationary. 
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Table 3.1(b) Unit Root: Phillips–Perron Test  1 
 z statistics p-value 
GDPg (%) -3.382     0.026** 
Inf (%) -4.023     0.00*** 
** and *** represent significance at 5% and 1% levels, respectively 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
It is necessary to determine whether our time series data are stationary or not. There are several 4 
tests we can use to check for stationarity. In this study, we used both the Dickey-Fuller test (1979), 5 
and the Phillips-Perron test (1988). The results are shown in Tables 3.1(a) and (b).25 6 
Based on the Dickey-Fuller test (1979), we examined most of the variables using the Fisher-type 7 
unit-root test for the unbalanced panel data in our study. The null hypothesis assumes that all panels 8 
contain unit roots, while the alternative hypothesis argues that at least one panel is stationary. 9 
Similarly, under the Phillips–Perron test (1988), the null hypothesis claims that the variable contains a 10 
unit root. The alternative hypothesis is that the variable is stationary. We adopted the Phillips–Perron 11 
test (1988) for GDP growth and inflation rates and the Dickey-Fuller test (1979) for the remainder of 12 
the variables. 13 
We report the results in Table 3.1. All of the p-values of inverse normal Z statistics are zero 14 
(insignificant at the 1% level) under the Dickey-Fuller test (1979). The GDPg and Inf report a z-statistic 15 
of -3.382 (insignificant at the 5% level) and -4.023 (insignificant at the 1% level), respectively. 16 
Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and accept that the variables are stationary. 17 
 18 
3.5.1.2 Multicollinearity Test 19 
Multicollinearity is a state of a very strong intercorrelation between two or more independent 20 
variables (Albright et al., 2016). In other words, multicollinearity occurs when two or more variables 21 
contain much of the same information. The presence of disturbance in the data and results 22 
interpretations may not be reliable. 23 
Table 3.2 (a) and (b) report the correlation matrix for cash and stock dividend models, 24 
respectively.26 Table 3.2 (a) shows the correlation coefficients among the variables are below 0.5, 25 
except for the correlation between CD and CD (t-1), which is 0.8072 (greater than 0.5). This indicates 26 
                                                          
25 Annual GDP growth and inflation rate repeat in multiple panels. Therefore, we adopted the Phillips-Perron 
test which is more efficient than the Dickey-Fuller test to check the unit root in one panel. 
26 See Table 3.7 for definitions of the abbreviated variables. 
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that the current cash dividend payout can be affected by previous cash dividend payouts (dynamic 1 
relation). Similarly, we find that the correlation between SD and SD (t-1) is 0.6931 (as seen in Table 2 
3.2 (b)). This implies that the stock dividend also has a dynamic relationship. 3 
The correlation matrices in Table 3.2 (a) and (b) are helpful to detect a multicollinearity problem 4 
in our dataset, but do not necessarily indicate that multicollinearity exists (Leech et al., 2014). We 5 
adopted the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) and Tolerance for all of the independent variables in both 6 
cash and stock dividend models.27 The results are shown in Tables 3.3 (a) and (b). Larger VIF values 7 
show a greater variance in the regression weight of that variable. Multicollinearity is detected for a 8 
particular variable if the VIF value is greater than 10. Alternatively, if the tolerance value of a variable 9 
is 0.01 or less, it suggests multicollinearity exists (Meyers et al., 2016). Each VIF value is smaller than 10 
10, and the Tolerance (1/VIF) value is greater than 0.1 in both tables. Thus, between the results shown 11 
in the correlation matrices and the VIF tests, we can safely conclude that there is no multicollinearity 12 
issue in our data. 13 
 14 
3.5.1.3 Heteroscedasticity Test 15 
The homoscedasticity assumption of general OLS regression states that the variance of the 16 
unobserved error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 , based on the explanatory variables, is constant over time, across 17 
individuals, firms and countries (Wooldridge, 2010). The standard errors of general OLS are not valid 18 
for constructing confidence intervals and t-statistics if the data has heteroscedasticity problems. F-19 
statistics are not reliable since they are not F distributed, similar to the Chi-square distribution which 20 
is asymptotic if heteroscedasticity is present. According to the Gauss-Markov Theorem, OLS is best 21 
linearly unbiased if all the assumptions (MLR.1 to MLR. 5) hold. If it violates the homoscedasticity 22 
assumption, then OLS is no longer BLUE (best linear unbiased estimator) (Wooldridge, 2015). 23 
In this study, the Breusch-Pagan test (1979), the Cook-Weisberg test (1983) and the White test 24 
(1980) for heteroscedasticity were used to examine whether the error term 𝑢𝑖𝑡 was constant or not. 25 
These results are reported in Tables 3.4 (a) and (b). The null hypothesis of the Breusch-Pagan/Cook-26 
Weisberg test claims that the variance of the unobserved error term has a constant variance. The Chi-27 
square reports a value of 9467.67, with a p-value of 0.000, which suggests that the null hypothesis is 28 
strongly rejected. Under White’s test, the null hypothesis argues that the disturbances are 29 
homoscedastic. Similarly, Chi-square reports a value of 2,012.24 which is significant at the 1% level. 30 
                                                          
27 VIF measures multicollinearity: VIF = 1/ (1-R²) and Tolerance is another measurement used to test 
multicollinearity: Tolerance = 1/ VIF. 
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These results suggest that heteroscedasticity exists.28  1 
One widely applied solution to the heteroscedasticity issue is known as Heteroscedasticity-2 
Robust procedures, under which standard errors can be adjusted, so that general OLS estimates are 3 
valid in the presence of heteroscedasticity of unknown forms (Wooldridge, 2015).29 Adopting this 4 
Heteroscedasticity-Robust method, whether the disturbances have a constant variance or not, in a 5 
large sample, means that this is not an issue; thus the general OLS estimates are valid. 6 
 7 
3.5.1.4 Serial Correlation Test 8 
One assumption (MLR. 5) of the Classic Linear Model is that there is no autocorrelation in the error 9 
term. It means that the error terms in two different periods are not correlated with each other 10 
conditional on X: 𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑢𝑖𝑠|𝑋) = 0, for all t ≠ s. When this fails, the errors in the classic linear model 11 
suffer from serial correlation, or autocorrelation (Wooldridge, 2015). Baltagi (2008) argues that the 12 
condition of no serial correlation can be restrictive and unrealistic in cross sectional data and it is 13 
unrealistic when the error term in the previous period can affect the current one. 14 
If the serial correlation occurs, the Classic Linear Model estimation is still consistent, but less 15 
efficient, because of the downwardly biased standard errors (Wooldridge, 2015). In order to obtain 16 
unbiased results, Drukker (2003) suggests that the first step is to identify serial correlation in the 17 
idiosyncratic error term in a panel data model. In the current study, we adopted the Wooldridge test 18 
(Drukker, 2003; Wooldridge, 2010) to check for autocorrelation in our panel data model (equations 19 
(3.17) and (3.18)). The results are reported in Tables 3.5 (a) and (b). According to the Wooldridge tests, 20 
the small p-values indicate that the null hypothesis of no first-order autocorrelation is strongly 21 
rejected. In other words, there are serial correlation issues with the error terms in our data.3022 
                                                          
28 In the stock dividend model, the White Test shows that there is no heteroscedasticity issue.  
29 All the regression results in Chapter 4 are based on the heteroscedasticity-robust procedures, thus all the 
reported standard errors are shown in robust standard errors. 
30 In the stock dividend model, the Wooldridge Test for autocorrelation reports an F-test of 3.580 and p-value of 
0.0706. This indicates that there is no serial correlation issue at the 5% significance level, while the serial 
correlation issues (in cash dividend) were resolved in the m₂ (second-order autocorrelation) test when we used 
the system GMM estimator. These results are presented in Chapter 4. 
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Table 3.2 (a) Correlation Matrix for the Cash Dividend Model 1 
 CD CD(t-1) ∆WC ∆TP ∆TR 
Div-ajd 
Earn Tax Inv Size Gearing MtB Rep(t-1) Dum(fs) GDPg Inf 
CD 1.000               
CD(t-1) 0.807 1.000              
∆WC -0.020 -0.034 1.000             
∆TP -0.063 -0.045 0.054 1.000            
∆TR -0.081 -0.077 0.041 0.308 1.000           
Div-adj 
Earn 0.200 0.219 0.015 -0.019 -0.048 1.000          
Tax 0.385 0.375 -0.011 -0.034 -0.059 0.257 1.000         
Inv 0.016 0.013 0.032 0.035 0.021 -0.017 -0.008 1.000        
Size 0.274 0.274 -0.039 -0.114 -0.146 0.347 0.233 -0.047 1.000       
Gearing -0.023 0.002 -0.010 -0.034 -0.044 0.024 -0.012 -0.037 0.258 1.000      
MtB 0.255 0.231 0.016 0.018 0.030 -0.132 0.023 0.034 0.024 0.323 1.000     
Rep(t-1) 0.194 0.201 -0.003 0.000 0.004 0.041 0.111 0.020 0.098 0.060 0.159 1.000    
Dum(fs) -0.037 -0.023 -0.016 -0.011 -0.022 -0.041 0.012 -0.014 -0.012 0.019 -0.072 0.032 1.000   
GDPg 0.066 0.054 0.014 0.029 0.028 0.040 0.015 0.022 0.031 -0.026 0.073 -0.018 -0.317 1.000  
Inf -0.037 -0.030 -0.015 -0.003 0.005 0.024 -0.031 -0.022 -0.001 -0.007 -0.063 -0.010 0.351 -0.324 1.000 
The correlation coefficient is calculated as: p =   ∑(var1 − var1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )( var2 − var2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  /√∑(var1 − var1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2 ∑(var2 − var2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2  2 




Table 3.2 (b) Correlation Matrix for the Stock Dividend Model 1 
 SD SD(t-1) ∆WC ∆TP ∆TR ROE EPS Tax Size Gearing MtB Rep(t-1) GDPg Inf 
SD 1.000              
SD(t-1) 0.693 1.000             
∆WC 0.053 0.112 1.000            
∆TP 0.026 -0.075 -0.008 1.000           
∆TR -0.111 -0.141 0.044 -0.134 1.000          
ROE -0.010 0.074 -0.021 0.001 -0.029 1.000         
EPS -0.385 -0.276 0.005 0.096 -0.136 0.352 1.000        
Tax -0.281 -0.294 0.026 0.092 -0.093 0.289 0.130 1.000       
Size -0.590 -0.606 0.143 0.007 0.062 0.026 0.157 0.044 1.000      
Gearing 0.052 -0.065 0.148 -0.032 0.052 0.400 0.063 -0.196 0.203 1.000     
MtB -0.043 -0.049 -0.009 0.112 -0.050 0.898 0.469 0.309 0.029 0.500 1.000    
Rep(t-1) -0.124 0.038 0.017 0.158 -0.039 0.170 0.382 0.086 -0.006 0.002 0.243 1.000   
GDPg -0.138 -0.168 -0.096 0.069 0.109 -0.060 0.058 -0.048 0.144 -0.100 -0.073 -0.022 1.000  
Inf -0.113 -0.119 -0.186 -0.067 -0.027 -0.131 -0.007 -0.052 0.229 -0.071 -0.127 -0.210 0.253 1.000 
The correlation coefficient is calculated as: p =   ∑(var1 − var1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )( var2 − var2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  /√∑(var1 − var1̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2 ∑(var2 − var2̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅ )2  2 
Source:  Author’s calculations 3 
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Table 3.3 (a) Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the Cash Dividend Model 1 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
∆WC  2.570 0.389 
∆WC² 2.570 0.389 
CD(t-1) 1.420 0.707 
Size 1.300 0.767 
MtB (%) 1.250 0.799 
Tax 1.240 0.808 
Div-adj Earnings 1.220 0.820 
Dum (fs) 1.220 0.821 
Inf 1.210 0.824 
Gearing (%) 1.180 0.849 
GDPg 1.170 0.853 
∆TR 1.100 0.907 
∆TP 1.100 0.910 
Rep(t-1) 1.070 0.933 
Inv 1.010 0.990 
Mean VIF and 1/VIF 1.380 0.784 
Dependent variable: CD (Cash Dividend). 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
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Table 3.3 (b) Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) for the Stock Dividend Model 1 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
∆WC  4.480 0.223 
∆WC² 4.340 0.230 
ROE (%) 3.440 0.290 
Rep(t-1) 2.010 0.497 
SD(t-1) 2.000 0.499 
MtB (%) 1.970 0.509 
EPS 1.940 0.515 
Gearing (%) 1.880 0.531 
Tax 1.520 0.657 
Size 1.320 0.757 
Inf 1.220 0.822 
GDPg 1.210 0.828 
Dum(fs) 1.170 0.852 
∆TP 1.100 0.906 
∆TR 1.030 0.968 
Mean VIF and 1/VIF 2.040 0.606 
Dependent variable: SD (Stock Dividend). 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
4 
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Table 3.4 (a) Heteroscedasticity Test for Equation (3.17) 1 
Source  SS df MS  Number of obs = 14,221 
Model  8169885.200 13 628452.708  F(13, 14207) = 2238.84 
Residual  3987975.020 14,207 280.705  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total   12157860.200 14,220 854.983  R-squared = 0.6720 
     Adj R-squared = 0.6717 
     Root MSE = 16.754 
CD Coef. R S. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
CD(t-1) 0.739 0.006 129.720 0.000 0.728 0.750 
∆WC² -0.012 0.004 -2.910 0.004 -0.021 -0.004 
∆WC 0.232 0.075 3.100 0.002 0.085 0.379 
Div-adj Earnings 1.813 0.580 3.130 0.002 0.676 2.950 
Tax 23.639 1.358 17.410 0.000 20.978 26.300 
Inv 1.659 1.859 0.890 0.372 -1.985 5.304 
Gearing -0.022 0.002 -12.940 0.000 -0.026 -0.019 
MtB 0.692 0.037 18.820 0.000 0.620 0.765 
Size 0.682 0.058 11.750 0.000 0.568 0.796 
Rep(t-1) 27.895 8.536 3.270 0.001 11.163 44.627 
Dum(fs) -0.590 0.470 -1.260 0.209 -1.510 0.331 
GDPg 0.216 0.084 2.570 0.010 0.052 0.381 
Inf -0.020 0.140 -0.140 0.889 -0.293 0.254 
Constant 0.577 0.477 1.210 0.227 -0.358 1.511 
       
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
H₀: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of CD 
chi2(1) = 9467.67 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000*** 
       
White's test for H₀: homoscedasticity 
against Hₐ: unrestricted heteroscedasticity 
chi2(101) = 2012.24 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000*** 
       
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test    
Source  chi2 df p    
Heteroscedasticity  2012.240 101.000 0.000***    
Skewness  463.940 13.000 0.000***    
Kurtosis  107.660 1.000 0.000***    
Total   2583.830 115.000 0.000***    
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
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Table 3.4 (b) Heteroscedasticity Test for Equation (3.18) 1 
Source  SS df MS  Number of obs = 12,274 
Model   7109029 13 546848.408  F(13, 12260) = 1946.56 
Residual  3444214 12,260 280.931023  Prob > F = 0.0000 
Total   10553244 12,273 859.874818  R-squared = 0.6736 
     Adj R-squared = 0.6733 
     Root MSE = 16.761 
CD Coef. R S. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
CD(t-1) 0.735 0.006 119.910 0.000 0.723 0.747 
∆WC² -0.543 0.133 -4.070 0.000 -0.804 -0.281 
∆WC -0.196 0.103 -1.900 0.058 -0.398 0.007 
Div-adj Earnings 1.285 0.688 1.870 0.062 -0.063 2.633 
Tax 24.428 1.546 15.800 0.000 21.398 27.458 
Inv 2.045 2.245 0.910 0.362 -2.356 6.446 
Gearing -0.026 0.002 -13.140 0.000 -0.029 -0.022 
MtB 0.733 0.040 18.220 0.000 0.654 0.811 
Size 0.708 0.068 10.350 0.000 0.574 0.842 
Rep(t-1) 35.112 9.109 3.850 0.000 17.257 52.966 
Dum(fs) -0.757 0.514 -1.470 0.141 -1.766 0.251 
GDPg 0.200 0.092 2.180 0.029 0.020 0.381 
Inf 0.023 0.153 0.150 0.880 -0.277 0.323 
Constant 0.610 0.544 1.120 0.262 -0.455 1.676 
       
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for heteroscedasticity  
H₀: Constant variance 
Variables: fitted values of CD 
chi2(1) = 7860.96 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000*** 
       
White's test for H₀: homoscedasticity 
against Hₐ: unrestricted heteroscedasticity 
chi2(102) =  1806.34 
Prob > chi2 = 0.000*** 
       
Cameron & Trivedi's decomposition of IM-test    
Source  chi2 df p    
Heteroscedasticity   1806.34 102 0.000***    
Skewness  414.57 13 0.000***    
Kurtosis  90.95 1 0.000***    
Total   2311.86 116 0.000***    
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
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Table 3.5 (a) Serial Correlation Test for Equation (3.17) 1 
CD Coef. R Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
lag2 CD -0.256 0.021 -12.230 0.000 -0.297 -0.215 
lag ∆WC² -0.001 0.003 -0.450 0.656 -0.007 0.004 
lag ∆WC 0.034 0.046 0.750 0.453 -0.056 0.125 
lag Div-adj Earnings -4.907 1.688 -2.910 0.004 -8.217 -1.596 
lag Tax 15.892 2.224 7.150 0.000 11.528 20.255 
lag Inv 0.994 3.003 0.330 0.741 -4.898 6.886 
lag Gearing -0.016 0.003 -5.400 0.000 -0.022 -0.010 
lag MtB 0.216 0.070 3.070 0.002 0.078 0.354 
lag Size 0.516 0.259 1.990 0.047 0.007 1.025 
lag2 Rep -6.266 10.746 -0.580 0.560 -27.349 14.816 
lag Dum(fs) -0.081 0.297 -0.270 0.784 -0.664 0.502 
lag GDPg 0.474 0.077 6.190 0.000 0.324 0.625 
lag inf -0.899 0.149 -6.030 0.000 -1.192 -0.606 
              
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H₀: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 1070) = 354.180 
Prob > F = 0.000*** 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
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Table 3.5 (b) Serial Correlation Test for Equation (3.18) 1 
CD Coef. R Std. Err. t P>|t| [95% Conf.Interval] 
lag2 CD -0.253 0.022 -11.740 0.000 -0.295 -0.211 
lag ∆TP -0.198 0.137 -1.440 0.150 -0.467 0.072 
lag ∆TR -0.001 0.068 -0.010 0.992 -0.134 0.133 
lag Div-adj Earnings -7.031 2.343 -3.000 0.003 -11.628 -2.434 
lag Tax 19.077 2.640 7.230 0.000 13.896 24.259 
lag Inv 0.152 4.367 0.030 0.972 -8.417 8.720 
lag Gearing -0.019 0.004 -5.090 0.000 -0.026 -0.012 
lag MtB 0.284 0.082 3.450 0.001 0.123 0.445 
lag Size 0.713 0.414 1.720 0.085 -0.099 1.526 
lag2 Rep -4.663 11.642 -0.400 0.689 -27.508 18.182 
lag Dum(fs) -0.106 0.346 -0.310 0.760 -0.784 0.573 
lag GDPg 0.462 0.084 5.490 0.000 0.297 0.627 
lag inf -0.962 0.164 -5.850 0.000 -1.285 -0.640 
       
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data 
H₀: no first-order autocorrelation 
F(1, 917) = 303.729 
Prob > F = 0.000*** 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 2 
Source: Author’s calculations 3 
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3.5.2 Dividend Payout: A Dynamic Relationship 1 
Lintner’s (1956) classic model of dividend payout (equation (3.16)) suggests that a firm’s dividend 2 
payout 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 or change in dividend 𝛥𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡  is a function of current earnings 𝑃𝑖𝑡and last year’s dividend 3 
payout (the lag of dividend𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡−1)). Following Lintner (1956), a number of dividend payout studies 4 
also reveal that the dependent variable 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡 is significantly affected by its lag value 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖(𝑡−1) (see also 5 
Fama and Babiak, 1968; Aharony and Swary, 1980; von Eije et al., 2008; Javakhadze et al., 2014). 6 
Therefore, the literature has shown that dividend payout is most likely affected by its lag value, which 7 
suggests that it has a dynamic relationship. 8 
Table 3.6 Static Model versus Dynamic Model  9 
  General OLS Dynamic OLS General FE Dynamic FE 
R² 28.35% 67.20% 6.96% 27.24% 
Root MSE 24.761 16.754 n.a. n.a. 
Dividend payout(t-1) not included 0.000*** not included 0.000*** 
Note: The static model (general OLS and FE) is based on the equation: 𝑫𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝒊𝒕 + 𝒃 ∑ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕; while the 10 
dynamic model (dynamic OLS and FE) is shown as: 𝑫𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝒊𝒕 + 𝒃𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒃 ∑ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕. The R² reported in the 11 
Fixed-Effects models are with-in R². 12 
*, ** and *** represents significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 13 
Source: Author’s calculations 14 
Empirically, we applied the general OLS and FE estimators to the “static” model as well as the 15 
“dynamic” model.31 Table 3.6 reports the partial results for the static and dynamic models.  16 
As observed, the R² rises from 28.35% in the general OLS model to 67.20% in the dynamic OLS 17 
model. The within R² also increases dramatically from 6.96% in the normal Fixed-Effects model to 18 
27.24% in the dynamic fixed-effects model. Similarly, the root MSE (the root of the Mean Sum of 19 
Squares) indicates that the dynamic OLS model is more accurate and has fewer errors. Apart from a 20 
significant increase in R² and within R² from the static model to the dynamic model, the coefficient of 21 
lag dividend payout reports a positive and significant sign in both dynamic OLS and dynamic FE model. 22 
These results suggest that the dividend payout has a dynamic relationship. 23 
 24 
3.5.3 F-test and Hausman-test 25 
To test whether the dynamic OLS or FE model is adequate or not, we adopted the F-test. Consider the 26 
unobserved fixed effects 𝑢𝑖𝑡 in the dynamic FE model: 27 
                                                          
31 The full results of the static and dynamic models are available upon request. 
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𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝒊𝒕 + 𝒃𝑫𝒊𝒗𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒄 ∑ 𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                        (3.21) 1 
Where 𝐷𝑖𝑣𝑖𝑡  and 𝑋𝑖𝑡 represent the dividend payout and explanatory variables, respectively. 𝑒𝑖𝑡 is 2 
a random error term. 3 
The null hypothesis of the F-test argues that the observed and unobserved fixed effects 𝑢𝑖𝑡 are 4 
equal to zero. The alternative hypothesis claims that the fixed effects are non-zero. The F-test is 5 
automatically reported at the bottom of the fixed effect regression output via using the “xtreg, fe” 6 
command in Stata. The F-test results are shown as follows in our dynamic FE model: 7 
“F test that all ui=0: F (1289, 12918) = 3.31, Prob > F = 0.0000” 8 
As observed, the F-test displays a figure of 3.31 which is significantly (p-value less than 0.01) 9 
different from zero. Therefore, we reject the null hypothesis and conclude that the dynamic FE model 10 
is more appropriate than the dynamic OLS model. 11 
The Hausman-test (1978) shows a chi2 (13) of 962.23 when comparing the dynamic FE model 12 
with the dynamic RE model. The p-value is 0.000, which indicates rejection that the individual-level 13 
effects are adequately modelled by a dynamic RE model. In other words, the dynamic FE model is 14 
more appropriate for our study. 15 
 16 
3.5.4 Endogeneity 17 
As Alison (2009) argues, FE discards potentially between-individual variation. The FE adopts only 18 
within variation to estimate the causal effect based on one assumption that the within variation is 19 
exogenous. As shown in equation (3.21), a weak exogenous is 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) = 0, and a strict exogenous 20 
requires 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑠) = 0 , s=t, ∀s. If either of these assumptions does not hold ( 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 , or 21 
𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑠) ≠ 0, s=t, ∀s), then endogeneity occurs. The endogeneity issue can result from simultaneity 22 
and unobserved heterogeneity which leads to a FE estimation bias (Wooldridge, 2010). 23 
Simultaneity occurs when 𝐸(𝑒𝑖𝑡|𝐷𝑖𝑡 , 𝑋𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0. It indicates not only that the explanatory variables 24 
have an impact on dividend payouts, but also that the firms’ historical dividend payout also affects the 25 
explanatory variables. According to the literature, these variables can be earnings, 32  leverage 26 
(Crutchley and Hansen, 1989), investments (Dhrymes and Kurz, 1967; Bhaduri and Durai, 2006), and 27 
stock repurchases (Asquith and Mullins, 1986; Grullon and Michaely, 2002). If simultaneity exists, then 28 
the OLS and the FE estimator are biased (Wintoki et al., 2012). A possible solution to simultaneity is to 29 
estimate the effect of the explanatory variables (for example, stock repurchases) on dividend payouts 30 
                                                          
32 See also the Dividend Signalling Theory in Chapter 2 
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via the simultaneous equation models (Gujarati, 2004). In the first equation, it measures dividend 1 
payouts with stock repurchases and other control variables; while the second equation estimates 2 
stock repurchases with dividend payouts and other control variables (Gujarati, 2004). However, using 3 
this method requires strict exogenous instruments which are difficult to identify (Wintoki et al., 2012). 4 
An unobservable heterogeneity exists if 𝐸(𝑢𝑖𝑡|𝑋𝑖𝑡 , 𝑍𝑖𝑡) ≠ 0 which can result in endogeneity issues 5 
if there are unobservable factors that affect both the dividend payout and the explanatory variables. 6 
According to Wintoki et al. (2012), the fixed part or the time-invariant of unobserved heterogeneity 7 
can be resolved by adopting the normal FE estimator. Considering the following linear model: 8 
𝑫𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂 + 𝒃𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                          (3.22) 9 
The FE transformation requires time-demeaning all variables and yields: 10 
?̈?𝒊𝒕 =  𝒂𝒊𝒕 + 𝒃?̈?𝒊𝒕 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                    (3.23) 11 
Where ?̈?𝑖𝑡 =  𝑋𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡  and ?̈?𝑖𝑡 =  𝐷𝑖𝑡 − ?̅?𝑖𝑡. However, Wooldridge (2010) argues that the normal 12 
FE estimator would result in potential bias in a dynamic relationship: 13 
𝟏
𝑻











𝒊)                  (3.24) 14 
Equation (3.24) indicates that the FE estimator of 𝐷𝑖𝑡  on the 𝑋𝑖𝑡  will be biased when the 15 
explanatory variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 is correlated with its lag value 𝑋𝑖(𝑡−1). Further, Wintoki et al., (2012) proved 16 
that the FE estimator could generate spurious results even if the explanatory variable 𝑋𝑖𝑡 has no causal 17 
relationship with the dependent variable 𝐷𝑖𝑡. 18 
Roberts and Whited (2013) suggest that it is necessary to discuss the primary endogeneity 19 
concern in Corporate Finance studies, which many researchers have failed to do in the existing 20 
dividend literature. It is difficult to address whether the variable(s) are strictly exogenous or not in a 21 
dividend payout without first understanding it. Nevertheless, if the endogeneity issue exists (with a 22 
high probability in Corporate Finance), then the dynamic FE estimator would yield spurious results. 23 
Thus, FE estimator’s reliability is challenged. Advanced estimators are used to overcome these issues. 24 
 25 
3.5.5 Dynamic GMM Estimator 26 
In previous sections, we have shown that the traditional/dynamic OLS and FE model does not address 27 
potential endogeneity issues. The standard approach for resolving serial correlation or endogeneity 28 
issue is using Instrumental Variables (IVs). These instrumental variables are the variable(s) that must 29 
not be correlated with the error term, but correlated with the explanatory variables. Several 30 
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estimation techniques, using instrumental variables, are available, including 2 Stage Least Squares 1 
(2SLS), Maximum Likelihood, and Generalised Method of Moments (GMM).33 2 
In this study, the panel data obtained are more applicable for Generalised Method of Moments 3 
(GMM) estimates. According to Roodman (2009), the reasons are as follows: 4 
1. When exploring dividend payout, the process is most likely to be dynamic. Lintner’s (1956) study 5 
on dividend payouts found that that lagged values influence the dependent variable. 6 
2. There may be arbitrarily distributed fixed individual effects. 7 
3. Some independent variables are most likely to be endogenous, such as Investment, Stock 8 
Repurchase, Market-to-Book and Gearing ratios in our model. 9 
4. The idiosyncratic disturbances may have individual-specific patterns of heteroscedasticity and 10 
serial correlation. 11 
5. The idiosyncratic disturbances are uncorrelated across individuals. 12 
6. Some repressors can be predetermined but are not strictly exogenous; in our case, the lagged 13 
cash dividend payout variable. 14 
7. The number of time periods in the data, “T” may be small. In our data set, “T” is 25 which is a 15 
relatively high period compared to other studies, but “N” is as large as 1,575. 16 
8. The only available instruments are “internal.” While previous literature on dividend payout 17 
provides some information on appropriate instruments, finding a suitable instrument is difficult. 18 
Holtz-Eakin et al. (1988), Arellano and Bond (1991), and Arellano and Bover (1995) introduced 19 
the dynamic GMM estimator for panel data. The estimator has two essential steps. First, the first 20 
difference of regression and instruments are used to control the unobserved effects. Second, the 21 
previous explanatory variables and lagged dependent variables are used as instruments (Loayza et al., 22 
2004). The general dynamic dividend payout model is as follows: 23 
𝑫𝒊𝒕 = 𝒂𝒊𝒕 + 𝒃𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒄𝑿𝒊𝒕 + 𝒖𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕                                  (3.25) 24 
To remove the firm-specific effects, the first difference of equation (3.25) is taken, and the 25 
transformed equation is given as: 26 
𝑫𝒊𝒕 − 𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) = 𝒂𝒊𝒕 − 𝒂𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) + 𝒃[𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) − 𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟐)] + 𝒄[𝑿𝒊𝒕 − 𝑿𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)] + [𝒆𝒊𝒕 − 𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)] (3.26) 27 
The instruments were added to address the potential endogeneity issue of the explanatory 28 
variables. The error term after the first difference transformation 𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) is correlated to the lag 29 
                                                          
33 We also used the 2SLS and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) to estimate our models, but the results were 
not significant. These results are available upon request. 
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change in dividend payout 𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) − 𝐷𝑖(𝑡−2). The previous observations of the explanatory variable and 1 
lag change in dividend payout are included in the instruments. The current and future values of the 2 
explanatory variables are influenced by the error terms, only because the lagged values are used as 3 
instruments. The instrument variables do not allow the explanatory variables to be strictly 4 
endogenous. Therefore, the strict exogeneity assumption is relaxed. 5 
Based on the assumptions of there is no serial correlation in the error terms 𝑒𝑖𝑡 , and the 6 
explanatory variables 𝑋𝑖𝑡 are not strictly exogenous, the GMM dynamic estimator adopts the following 7 
moment conditions: 8 
𝑬{𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝒎) ⋅ [𝒆𝒊𝒕 − 𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)]} = 𝟎, 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒎 ≥ 𝟐, 𝒕 = 𝟑, 𝟒, 𝟓 … , 𝑻                            (3.27) 9 
𝑬{𝑿𝒊(𝒕−𝒎) ⋅ [𝒆𝒊𝒕 − 𝒆𝒊(𝒕−𝟏)]} = 𝟎, 𝒇𝒐𝒓 𝒎 ≥ 𝟐, 𝒕 = 𝟑, 𝟒, 𝟓 … , 𝑻                             (3.28) 10 
The GMM, based on these conditions, is called Difference GMM. However, Blundell and Bond 11 
(1998) argue that lagged variables are weak instruments for the transformed equation in differences, 12 
in both short sample periods and persistent series. Roodman (2009) shows that the Difference GMM 13 
estimation is biased in finite samples because the first-differenced transformation enlarges variances 14 
in unbalanced panels. To improve the model’s efficiency, the System GMM estimator, which combines 15 
the regression in differences, as well as the regression in level, is introduced. System GMM requires 16 
additional assumptions. Despite the fact that the correlation between the levels of variables on the 17 
right-hand side and the firm-specific effects in equation (3.25), there is no interaction between the 18 
differences of these variables and the firm-specific effect. The assumption is based on the stationary 19 
hypothesis: 20 
𝑬[𝑫𝒊(𝒕+𝒈) ⋅ 𝒖𝒊] = 𝑬[𝑫𝒊(𝒕+𝒉) ⋅ 𝒖𝒊], for ∀g and ∀h          (3.29) 21 
𝑬[𝑿𝒊(𝒕+𝒈) ⋅ 𝒖𝒊] = 𝑬[𝑿𝒊(𝒕+𝒉) ⋅ 𝒖𝒊], for ∀g and ∀h          (3.30) 22 
The additional moment conditions are: 23 
𝑬{[𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) − 𝑫𝒊(𝒕−𝟐)] ⋅ (𝒖𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕)]} = 𝟎            (3.31) 24 
𝑬{[𝑿𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) − 𝑿𝒊(𝒕−𝟐)] ⋅ (𝒖𝒊 + 𝒆𝒊𝒕)]} = 𝟎            (3.32) 25 
The System GMM estimator is based on the moment conditions (equations (3.27), (3.28), (3.31), 26 
and (3.32)). Following Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995), the System GMM will 27 
generate consistent estimates of parameters of interest and their asymptotic variance covariance. 28 









                (3.34) 1 
Where 𝜃 is the vector of parameters of interest a, b, and c in equation (3.25); ?̅? is the dividend 2 
payout stacked first in differences and then in levels, ?̅? is the explanatory variable matrix that includes 3 
the first lag dividend payout 𝐷𝑖(𝑡−1) and 𝑋𝑖𝑡, 𝑍 is the instruments matrix, and ?̂? is a consistent estimate 4 
of the variance covariance matrix of the moment conditions.  5 
In terms of the estimation of dynamic GMM, Roodman (2009) explains the selection between 6 
one-step GMM and two-step GMM: The one-step estimator assumes that error terms 𝑒𝑖𝑡  are 7 
independent and homoscedastic cross sectional over time. In the second step, the assumption is 8 
relaxed via a weighting matrix that is used to produce first-step results. Then, it performs a consistent 9 
estimate of the variance covariance matrix to re-estimate the parameters of interest. Both the one-10 
step and two-step GMM estimators are consistent, but the two-step estimator is more asymptotically 11 
efficient (Arellano and Bond, 1991). Besides, the standard covariance matrix is robust to firm-specific 12 
serial correlation and heteroscedasticity in the two-step estimator. However, the standard errors are 13 
severely downwardly biased in the two-step estimator, particularly in a small number of cross-section 14 
samples (Baltagi, 2008). Windmeijer (2005) has rectified this error by formulating a small sample 15 
correction for the two-step standard errors. Thus, after adopting Windmeijer’s Correction, the 16 
reported two-step standard errors are more accurate (with a lower bias) compared to the one-step 17 
estimator. Therefore, the current study uses the two-step estimator. 18 
 19 
3.5.6 Tests for GMM Validity 20 
The reliability of the GMM estimator relies upon whether the instruments used in the regression are 21 
valid or not. As Arellano and Bond (1991) and Arellano and Bover (1995) suggest, two specification 22 
tests are required when using GMM in order to check the validation of the instruments. The first test 23 
is the Sargan-Hansen test of over-identifying restrictions, which examines the validity of the 24 
instruments. The instrument variables are valid in the regression when the null hypothesis is not 25 
rejected. The second check is the test for autocorrelation (AR1 and AR2) which examines whether 26 
there is serial correlation within the error term 𝑒𝑖𝑡. The null hypothesis assumes no autocorrelation. 27 
The first order serial correlation test (AR1) usually rejects the null hypothesis. This is expected since 28 
∆𝑒𝑖𝑡 = 𝑒𝑖𝑡 − 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1)  and ∆𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) = 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) − 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−2)  both include 𝑒𝑖(𝑡−1) . The second-order serial 29 
correlation test (AR2) in first differences is more important. It checks for auto correlation in levels and 30 
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is more efficient than the AR1 test.34 1 
 2 
3.6 Summary 3 
This chapter has presented this study’s research methodology. First, we explained the data collection 4 
methods. The study’s results are based on an overall sample of 1,575 firms listed on the LSE, from 5 
1991 to 2015. Data were drawn from the Bloomberg Database and the World Bank. Since there are 6 
missing variables in the Bloomberg Database, we used an unbalanced panel with 20,858 firm-year 7 
observations. Second, the variables specification are shown in Section 3.3. We have explained our 8 
rationale for calculating ratios (variables). To mitigate both potential multicollinearity issues and 9 
outlier effects and further improve our model’s efficiency, we adjusted, scaled down or winsorised 10 
some ratios. Following Lintner’s (1956) classic dividend model, in Section 3.4 we constructed several 11 
empirical models (equations (3.17) to (3.20)) to investigate the dividend payout via working capital 12 
under both cash dividend and stock dividend scenarios. Since a stock dividend differs from a cash 13 
dividend, a few changes were made to the stock dividend models (equations (3.19) and (3.20)) 14 
compared to the cash dividend models. Lastly, Section 3.5 has provided a critical discussion on the 15 
selection of estimation techniques. We have reported some basic diagnostic test results before we 16 
estimate the classic linear model (general OLS). Next, combining the dividend literature and the 17 
empirical findings, we concluded that the dividend payout has a dynamic relationship, which suggests 18 
that dynamic OLS and FE are more favourable compared to “static” models. Further, we have 19 
highlighted the limitations of the dynamic FE estimator. To address serial correlation and potential 20 
endogeneity issues, to mitigate estimation bias and improve our dividend model efficiency, we used 21 
a dynamic System-GMM estimator (based on two-step). The last section has outlined GMM estimator 22 
validity tests. 23 
  24 
                                                          
34 For the Sargan-Hansen tests and the second-order autocorrelation test (denoted as m₂ in our output), see the 
GMM regression result in Chapter 4. 
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Table 3.7 Definition of Variables for Equations (3.17), (3.18), (3.19) and (3.20) 1 
Abb Variables Measurements 
𝑪𝑫𝒊𝒕 Cash Dividend Payout Ratio The cash amount distributed for common dividend 
divided by total assets 
𝑺𝑫𝒊𝒕 Stock Dividend Payout Ratio The stock value declared for dividend divided by 
total payout ratio 
∆𝑾𝑪𝒊𝒕, ∆𝑾𝑪
𝟐
𝒊𝒕 Change in Working Capital (squared)  Change in working capital (squared) 
𝑫𝒊𝒗 − 𝒂𝒅𝒋 𝑬𝒂𝒓𝒏𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 Dividend-adjusted Earnings Profits after tax and interest excluding any dividend 
declared, and adjustments divided by total assets 
∆𝑻𝑷𝒊𝒕 Change in Trade Payables Change in trade payables, along with other short-
term payables(within 12 months), excluding tax 
payables 
∆𝑻𝑹𝒊𝒕 Change in Trade Receivables Change in trade receivables, along with other short-
term receivables (within 12 months) 
𝑻𝒂𝒙𝒊𝒕 Taxation  Tax paid via cash divided by total current liabilities 
𝑰𝒏𝒗𝒊𝒕 Investment Policy (Short-term investments + long-term investments)/ 
total assets 
𝑹𝒆𝒑𝒊(𝒕−𝟏) Stock Repurchase The value of repurchase stock at i(t-1) period, 




Basic Earnings per Share 
(Profit or loss attributable to common equity 
holders of parent company) divided by (weighted 
average number of common shares outstanding 
during the analysed period) 
𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆𝒊𝒕 Firm Size Log value of sales 
𝑮𝒆𝒂𝒓𝒊𝒏𝒈𝒊𝒕 Gearing Ratio Long-term debt/total common equity 
𝑹𝑶𝑬𝒊𝒕 Return on Equity Net income available to common shareholders 
divided by average total common equity 
𝑴𝒕𝑩𝒊𝒕 Market-to-Book Ratio Market Capitalisation/Book Value of Equity 
𝑫𝒖𝒎(𝒇𝒔) Dummy Variable of Financial Shock 1 for financial shock period, 0 for non-financial 
shock period 
𝑮𝑫𝑷𝒈𝒊𝒕 GDP Growth  The UK’s annual GDP growth  
𝑰𝒏𝒇𝒊𝒕 Inflation Rate The UK’s annual inflation rate  
𝒆𝒊𝒕 Error Term Estimated error term 
Source: Author’s calculations 2 
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Chapter 4 Results and Discussion 1 
4.1 Introduction 2 
This chapter presents the empirical results. Section 4.2 provides descriptive statistics of the dividend 3 
payout 35 and explanatory variables. Section 4.3 presents the results of the cash dividend models, 4 
based on the two-step system GMM estimator and the stock dividend model with the Fixed-effect 5 
estimator. Specifically, Section 4.3.1 presents the empirical findings on cash dividend payouts from 6 
the overall sample. Sections 4.3.2 and 4.3.3 present the empirical findings on cash dividend payouts 7 
from the subsamples. The empirical findings on the stock dividends are discussed in Section 4.3.4. 8 
Section 4.4 reports the robustness test results of the estimated dividend models. Section 4.5 9 
summarises the chapter. 10 
 11 
4.2 Descriptive Analysis 12 
Table 4.1 reports the cash dividend payouts (both in numbers and in ratios) of firms listed on the LSE, 13 
from 1991 to 2015. The table shows that the dividend ratios (as a percentage of sales revenues) 14 
fluctuate between 2% and 5%. This indicates that the dividends to revenues ratio does not change 15 
significantly from 1991 to 2015. On the contrary, the average cash dividend payout increased 16 
dramatically from £34.83 billion to £127.12 billion (over 3.6 times), from 1991 to 2015. Similarly, the 17 
total cash dividend payout went up, astoundingly from £7,071 billion to £166,652 billion over the 18 
study period. Interestingly, these increases are nonstop, despite sharp decreases in 2008 and 2012. 19 
We also found that 11 firms did not pay cash dividends in 1991. This number peaked at 732, which 20 
is more than the number of firms who issued dividends in 2013. In 2014 and 2015, the number of firms 21 
which did not pay dividends accounted for nearly half of the firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. 22 
These results are consistent with Fama and French’s (2001) finding that the propensity of firms to pay 23 
any dividend has decreased over the last two decades. Significantly, the total dividend payout amount 24 
issued by firms has increased over the same period (Denis and Osobov, 2008).  25 
The total cash dividend payout in 2008 decreased to around £9,908 billion compared to 2007, 26 
                                                          
35 In this chapter, the cash dividend payout has several meanings. The cash dividend payout refers to the total 
common cash dividend payout in Table 4.1. In section 4.3, it represents a ratio of the cash dividend payout as a 
percentage of total assets.  
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where the firms’ average cash dividend payout shrank by about 17.86%. Furthermore, the average 1 
cash dividend payout dropped by approximately 23% in 2012, with the total cash dividend payout 2 
decreasing from £158,146 billion to £126,366 billion. The substantial decrease in the total cash 3 
dividend payout in 2012 is more than three times greater than the last drop in 2008. Sudden drops in 4 
cash dividend payouts were most likely caused by UK macroeconomic fundamentals, such as the 5 
global financial crisis in 2008 and the double-dip recession in 2012.36 It appears that the cash dividend 6 
payout is affected by both global and domestic financial shocks. However, the decline in the total 7 
amount of dividends paid out in 2012 was higher than in 2008. In this case, it is likely that the UK 8 
domestic economic condition had a more significant impact on the firm’s dividend payout compared 9 
to the 2008 global financial crisis. These results imply a high level of independence and sovereignty in 10 
the UK economic condition. The number of observations (both dividend-paying firms and non-paying 11 
firms) increased from 203 to 1,311, from 1991 to 2015. As a matter of fact, the total IPOs (Initial Public 12 
Offers) on the UK official list are only 15 in 1991 (Khurshed et al., 1999). However, by 2015, there are 13 
over 2,300 firms listed on the London Stock Exchange.37 Reductions in the propensity of dividends 14 
issued can be explained by the dramatic increase in newly listed firms (Denis and Osobov, 2008). 15 
According to the Life-Cycle Theory (Mueller, 1972), young firms have more investment 16 
opportunities and thus are less likely to issue dividends, while mature firms with more stable cash 17 
flows are more likely to pay dividends. The result also shows that a small group of dividend-paying 18 
firms issued substantial dividends (in value), which contributed to dramatic increase in the total cash 19 
dividend payout. It has been reported that in 2005 33% of all UK dividends were paid by five firms 20 
(British Petroleum, Shell, HSBC, GlaxoSmithKline and Vodafone).38 As argued, mature firms with more 21 
stable cash flows are more likely to issue dividends and to adopt a stable dividend approach 22 
(growth/fixed dividend). For example, Vodafone’s dividend per share was 1.272p in 1999. It increased 23 
at a certain growth rate between 2% to 15% over several years, to 11.45p in 2016.39 24 
In summary, the cash dividend payout shows an increasing trend over the sample period, despite 25 
decreases in 2008 and 2012. Fewer firms issued dividends, but those dividend-paying firms issued 26 
more dividends over the study period. In other words, dividends were paid by a small group of firms. 27 
The results are consistent with other studies in the US (see Fama and French, 2001; DeAngelo et al., 28 
2004; Denis and Osobov 2008). 29 
                                                          
36 Because of the sharp drop in dividend payouts in 2008 and 2012, we used the years 2008 and 2012 as a dummy 
variable (equals to 1) to measure external financial shocks in the empirical analysis. 
37 By 31 Dec 2015, there were 2,365 firms listed on LSE, of which 1,257, 1,044 and 64 are listed on the Main 
Market, the AIM market and the SFM/PSM, respectively. For more info: www.londonstockexchange.com 
38 Source: www.newtonim.co.uk/uk-institutional/blog/chris-smith/uk-dividends-uncovered/ 
39 See www.vodafone.com 
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Table 4.1 Cash Dividends Payouts  1 
Year 






Payers Mean S.D. Sum. Mean S.D. 
1991 34.836 136.225 7,071.620 0.037 0.049 203 11 192 
1992 30.911 113.165 7,078.620 0.036 0.045 229 23 206 
1993 30.597 107.184 7,557.570 0.036 0.045 247 23 224 
1994 30.814 113.333 10,076.300 0.040 0.053 327 33 294 
1995 40.362 174.464 15,256.800 0.040 0.058 378 53 325 
1996 41.028 217.823 17,806.200 0.040 0.056 434 72 362 
1997 44.865 220.823 21,490.100 0.039 0.057 479 95 384 
1998 45.399 241.938 23,199.000 0.041 0.062 511 111 400 
1999 50.152 251.815 28,135.000 0.036 0.056 561 167 394 
2000 55.325 300.925 33,360.800 0.033 0.054 603 204 399 
2001 56.491 322.851 35,928.300 0.031 0.056 636 240 396 
2002 65.814 378.615 42,976.500 0.030 0.053 653 250 403 
2003 73.843 432.300 48,884.200 0.029 0.053 662 241 421 
2004 85.757 658.350 65,518.600 0.033 0.067 764 315 449 
2005 72.643 497.333 64,651.800 0.032 0.063 890 418 472 
2006 77.567 550.053 77,334.200 0.034 0.067 997 473 524 
2007 83.523 600.644 91,039.900 0.039 0.077 1,090 518 572 
2008 70.857 552.366 81,131.300 0.030 0.067 1,145 599 546 
2009 96.866 1,322.550 114,205.000 0.031 0.072 1,179 659 520 
2010 112.809 1,738.890 135,145.000 0.030 0.067 1,198 627 571 
2011 126.415 1,963.510 158,146.000 0.029 0.063 1,251 659 592 
2012 97.731 889.647 126,366.000 0.033 0.070 1,293 674 619 
2013 126.456 1,427.160 173,877.000 0.036 0.076 1,375 732 643 
2014 121.862 1,763.960 174,507.000 0.041 0.081 1,432 731 701 
2015 127.118 1,702.880 166,652.000 0.045 0.085 1,311 622 689 
Standard deviation (S.D.) of the average total common cash dividend payouts (in Billion GBP) and dividends to 2 
revenues ratios are provided. Sum represents the accumulated cash dividend payouts of all firms. Observations 3 
indicate the number of firms for which dividend payout information is available on the LSE by year. Non-payer 4 
and payer refer to whether a firm issued any cash dividend. 5 
Source: Author’s calculations 6 
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Basic Materials 177  71.22 142,162.00  129.52 271,481.10  203.55 422,566.00  54.99% 52.37% 
 
 
 (453.40)   (1,173.71)   (1,072.01)     
Consumer Goods 110  81.74 142,710.00  179.42 326,009.30  170.44 310,379.00  45.56% 43.77% 
 
 
 (327.161)   (930.48)   (1,518.62)     
Consumer Service 232  59.12 178,671.00  128.85 410,757.10  -255.13 -808,748.00  45.89% 43.50% 
 
 
 (693.90)   (1,789.74)   (3,147.52)     
Financials 337  91.43 322,566.00  2,165.02 8,127,482.00  178.97 472,670.00  4.22% 3.97% 
 
 
 (562.78)   (123,528.20)   (2,335.47)     
Health Care 109  89.72 103,084.00  146.75 182,264.90  137.62 171,057.00  61.13% 56.56% 
 
 
 (488.66)   (816.29)   (716.40)     
Industrials 301  17.38 83,171.60  32.33 159,548.90  46.19 226,427.00  53.75% 52.13% 
 
 
 (121.55)   (245.79)   (376.86)     
Oil and Gas 123  200.02 263,226.00  408.33 580,242.50  228.05 318,814.00  48.98% 45.36% 
 
 
 (1,275.49)   (2,755.84)   (2,123.60)     
Technology 144  3.65 6,505.64  2.70 5,160.37  12.95 24,658.10  34.90% 126.07% 
 
 
 (16.62)   (54.64)   (66.80)     
Telecommunication 21  1,821.32 435,295.00  1,820.85 460,675.00  -1,266.66 -324,266.00  100.03% 94.49% 
 
 
 (8,744.51)   (10,935.31)   (5,298.04)     
Utilities 21  177.95 50,004.80  235.25 68,458.08  -105.03 -30,669.20  75.64% 73.04% 
 
 
 (312.13)   (528.44)   (578.15)     
Total 1,575  87.03 1,700,000.00  506.63 11,000,000.00  39.73 782,889.00  17.18% 15.45% 
   (1,114.59)   (52,370.50)   (1,860.44)     
Note: All firms are classified into ten sectors according to the FTSE sector on the LSE. Mean and Sum refer to the average and accumulated cash dividend, net 
earnings and net working capital, respectively. Standard deviations (S.D.) of the mean cash dividend/net earnings/net working capital are presented in parentheses. 




Table 4.2 shows the cash dividend payouts, net earnings, working capital and dividends to 1 
earnings ratios by industries over the study period. As observed, firms in the telecommunication 2 
sector issued the largest cash dividends (a cumulative number of £432,295 billion), followed by 3 
Financial, Oil and Gas, Consumer Service, Consumer Goods, Basic Material, Health Care, Industrials, 4 
Utilities and Technology. The result shows that firms in the largest dividend payout sectors also make 5 
the highest net earnings.  6 
Telecommunications and Oil & Gas firms rank second and third places regarding net earnings and 7 
accumulated earnings. We conclude that firms with higher net earnings are more likely to issue 8 
dividends (see also Fama and French, 2001). Over the past 25 years, the average Telecommunications 9 
dividend payout (£1,821 billion) is nearly 20 times higher than the financial sector (£91.43 billion). 10 
Although the total dividend payout in the financial sector is higher than in the Oil and Gas sector, the 11 
average dividend payout of the Oil and Gas sector is twice as high as the financial sector. A major 12 
reason could be the difference in business landscape between the Telecommunications and Financial 13 
sectors. Telecommunication firms are very profitable and have many pre-paid business transactions. 14 
Therefore, most of the firms adopt a growth dividend approach (for example, Vodafone). Oil and Gas 15 
also make huge profits. The UK is the 14th largest oil and gas producer in the world (and the second 16 
largest in Europe).40 Similarly, firms in the Utility sector (some owned by the UK government) have 17 
higher average net earnings and thus a more stable cash flow. The average dividend payouts range 18 
from £60 to £90 billion, similar to the Basic Materials, Consumer Goods, Consumer Services, and 19 
Health Care sectors. Firms in the Technology sector with the lowest net earnings (mean of £2.7 billion) 20 
issued the smallest cash dividend payout (mean of £3.64 billion). Firms in the Industrial sector issued 21 
the second lowest average cash dividend of £17.38 billion. Firms in the Utility sector had an average 22 
dividend payout of £177.95 billion, which was slightly lower than Oil and Gas’ dividend payout. The 23 
financial sector reported 76.7% (8.127/10.600) net earnings, but only 18.97% of the total dividend 24 
payouts. It is likely that firms in the financial sector have different considerations regarding payout 25 
policies. During the 2008 global financial crisis period, some financial institutions (including most of 26 
the banks) were prohibited (by the financial regulators) from issuing dividend payouts or increasing 27 
dividend payouts (Ashraf et al., 2015; Cohen and Scatigna, 2016). Another reason is that some bank 28 
dividend payouts are limited due to the capital adequacy requirements, such as the Basel Accords 29 
(Ashraf et al., 2016; Hirtle et al., 2016; Rogers, 2018). One inference is that capital structure plays a 30 
critical role in dividend payouts for firms in different sectors (financial versus non-financial firms). 31 
                                                          
40 See BP Statistical Review of World Energy 2009, available on www.bp.com 
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Table 4.2 also shows that Telecommunications, Oil and Gas and Financial firms contributed most 1 
of the total cash dividend payout (over 60%) in the UK stock market. Not surprisingly, these sectors 2 
are also the most profitable. Thus, firms with higher earnings tend to issue more dividend payouts; 3 
firms with lower earnings issued the smallest dividends.41 These findings are consistent with previous 4 
studies (Fama and French, 2001; Murekefu and Ouma, 2012). The average dividend payout (£87.03 5 
billion) is smaller than the average net earnings (£506.63 billion). However, we found that the average 6 
dividend payout is higher than the average net earnings in the Technology and Telecommunications 7 
sectors. This shows that these sectors paid more in dividends than they earned, which requires extra 8 
funds. It also implies that firms in these two sectors adopt a more aggressive dividend payout policy 9 
(see also the dividends/earnings ratio in Table 4.2). The result also indicates that firms in the Oil and 10 
Gas, Basic Materials, and Financial Sectors exhibit higher levels of net working capital compared to the 11 
other sectors. The telecommunication firms, the largest dividend payout sector, with considerable 12 
earnings, report the lowest net working capital. Interestingly, firms in the financial sector have a 13 
dividend payout ratio of only 3.97% of their earnings (the smallest payout ratio among all sectors). 14 
This is a stark contrast to the dividend payout ratio of other sectors (excluding financial firms), which 15 
is around 55.71% of earnings. This implies that dividend payouts differ markedly between financial 16 
and non-financial firms.42 17 
Table 4.3 UK Stock Dividend Payouts (Over Total Payouts) 18 
Year Mean Median S.D. Sum. N 
2012 0.682 0.682 0.180 6.817 10 
2013 0.583 0.523 0.289 19.820 34 
2014 0.703 0.839 0.305 35.872 51 
2015 0.726 0.832 0.276 37.026 68 
Total 0.677 0.777 0.291 99.557 163 
Stock dividend (rate) is calculated as the total payout minus total common cash dividend, minus stock 19 
repurchase and divided by the total payout. 20 
Source: Author’s calculations 21 
Table 4.3 illustrates the stock dividend payout results over the study period. The dominant 22 
shareholders of UK firms would not opt for a stock dividend; cash dividends are the preferred option 23 
(Lasfer, 1997a). Based on our calculation of stock dividend rates, the sample of the stock dividend is 24 
small compared to the cash dividend sample. 25 
                                                          
41 The dividend payouts are related to earnings both for firms and investors. The use of working capital variable 
(as a proxy for cash) is less obvious for unsophisticated investors, but more useful for managers and academic 
scholars. 
42 A mean test shows that the ratio of dividends to earnings for financial and non-financial firms are 
significantly different at the 1% level. 
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Table 4.4 Stock Repurchases (in Billion GBP) 1 





1991 0.671 8.336 132.902 198 191 7 
1992 0.579 7.288 132.524 229 222 7 
1993 0.490 3.551 120.598 246 238 8 
1994 2.893 28.503 931.459 322 307 15 
1995 1.001 11.599 369.394 369 346 23 
1996 3.748 45.132 1,585.500 423 393 30 
1997 11.645 145.712 5,461.430 469 438 31 
1998 6.994 68.286 3,531.890 505 448 57 
1999 2.413 23.731 1,334.320 553 482 71 
2000 12.296 109.268 7,328.580 596 506 90 
2001 19.213 157.305 12,180.900 634 548 86 
2002 16.090 124.065 10,249.400 637 527 110 
2003 14.915 120.504 9,903.260 664 515 148 
2004 36.330 369.566 26,302.700 724 541 183 
2005 50.409 554.944 42,948.100 852 659 193 
2006 67.456 677.097 66,174.500 981 750 231 
2007 50.415 396.035 54,700.400 1,085 811 274 
2008 20.487 187.358 23,682.700 1,156 870 286 
2009 7.118 147.503 8,527.820 1,198 958 240 
2010 19.484 322.798 24,433.300 1,254 986 268 
2011 33.805 503.175 45,365.900 1,342 1,031 311 
2012 16.426 143.596 22,799.600 1,388 1,044 344 
2013 18.129 209.921 26,250.100 1,448 1,061 387 
2014 14.559 160.951 21,475.000 1,475 1,094 381 
2015 11.410 85.331 15,415.200 1,351 1,055 296 
SD is the standard deviation of average stock repurchase (in Billion GBP), and Sum represents the accumulated 2 
stock repurchase of all firms. Observations indicate the number of firms for which stock repurchase information 3 
is available on the LSE by year. Non-repurchaser and repurchaser refer to whether a firm repurchase its own 4 
stock.  5 
Source: Author’s calculations 6 
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Thus we have 163 observations for the stock dividend. Interestingly, stock dividend data, which 1 
is available from 2012, exhibits an increasing trend.43 The number of firms that issued stock dividends 2 
is small, but the average stock dividend rate is relatively high (67.75%). This indicates that when firms 3 
issued stock dividends, they were less likely to issue cash dividends or stock repurchases, or they only 4 
issued a small proportion of cash dividends or stock repurchases at the same time. Lasfer (1997b) 5 
found that firms that issued script dividends do not follow an optional dividend policy and the script 6 
dividend is likely to be low, because it is unlikely that the majority shareholders will opt for it.44 The 7 
author also argues that firms’ which offer a script dividend generally do so because of shareholder 8 
pressure. Lasfer reveals that firms’ pay script dividends because non-institution investors request it. 9 
In short, if firms do not pay a scrip dividend, it is because the shareholders have not requested this 10 
option. It is most likely that shareholders have not requested a stock dividend and because the cash 11 
dividend is more popular among the UK. 12 
Table 4.4 reports the descriptive statistics for stock repurchases, from 1991 to 2015. The table 13 
shows stock repurchases, another form of corporate payout, present a more volatile situation, 14 
compared to cash dividends. This finding is similar to Dhanani and Roberts’ (2009) results. In the UK, 15 
stock repurchase has been legalised since 1981 and became popular after tax reforms in the earlier 16 
years (Andriosopoulos and Hoque, 2013). According to Table 4.4, stock repurchases increased on a 17 
few occasions after the 1990s. The table shows a marked increase in the number of firms engaged in 18 
stock repurchases after 2000. In 1991, only seven firms repurchased their own stocks. However, this 19 
figure rose to 387 at the end of 2013. The first increase began during the period of 1991 to 1997. This 20 
practice decreased significantly until 1999 (average £2.41 billion). In contrast to the US, stock 21 
repurchasing in the UK has timing, price and volume restrictions and needs shareholders’ approval. 22 
Firms must also disclose financial information before engaging in stock repurchases (Dhanani and 23 
Roberts, 2009). In the UK, regulators are concerned about stock repurchase because it involves insider 24 
trading (Ikenberry and Vermaelen, 1996). Hence, the slow development of stock repurchase (both in 25 
value and the number of firms that repurchased their stocks) in the early 1990s may be a result of the 26 
UK regulations and the company act which outlines several constraints on stock repurchase 27 
programmes. The second increase began in 2000 and reached its peak in 2006 (£66,174.5 billion). 28 
Stock repurchases show a downward trend over the period of 2006 to 2015. In the year 2009, the 29 
average stock repurchase decreased nearly 86%, while the total stock repurchase rate decreased 30 
around 84% compared to 2007. Further in 2012, the average stock repurchase dropped to around 51%, 31 
                                                          
43 We obtained stock dividend information starting from the year 2012 in Bloomberg.  
44 Scrip dividends, also known as stock dividends, involve firms offering shareholders a new issue of shares 
instead of cash dividends. 
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while the total stock repurchase decreased by about 50%. UK market condition changed markedly as 1 
a result of the 2008 financial crisis. A large number of firms had financial difficulties and ended up 2 
bankrupt during the crisis period. Firm payouts decreased dramatically, and as a result, the growth in 3 
stock repurchase rapidly reversed.45 Despite a major decline in stock repurchases in the UK during the 4 
2008 financial crisis period, it has become a popular payout method in the last decade. The literature 5 
has revealed several determinants of stock repurchase in the UK context, which provide some 6 
explanations for stock repurchase patterns in Table 4.4. Rau and Vermaelen (2002) found that firms’ 7 
stock repurchase announcements are driven by taxes on capital gains that are lower than taxes on 8 
dividends. Hjelmstad et al. (2006) argue that agency theory of free cash flow helps to explain stock 9 
repurchases. von Eije and Megginson (2008) conclude that the average reporting frequency of EU 10 
firms (including the UK) is correlated with higher cash dividends and stock repurchases. 11 
Andriosopoulos and Lasfer (2015) found that a change in legislation in the UK which allows firms to 12 
treat stock repurchase as treasury stocks is a major factor in explaining stock repurchases. In a more 13 
comprehensive qualitative study on UK stock repurchases, Dhanani and Roberts (2009), argue that the 14 
practice can be explained by several motivations, including as a substitution for dividends, for 15 
signalling purposes, minimising agency problems, and protecting the firm against potential takeovers. 16 
Similar to dividend payouts, we found that stock repurchasers also converge to a small number of 17 
firms based on the number of firms that repurchase their stocks, as well as repurchase amounts. In 18 
contrast to dividend payouts, stock repurchases are much smaller (both in number and magnitude). 19 
Figure 4.1 Dividends versus Stock Repurchases 20 
 21 
Total cash dividends and stock repurchases (in £ amount) for all firms on the LSE, from 1991 to 2015. 22 
Source: Author’s calculations 23 
Figure 4.1 compares the two different payout forms (dividends versus stock repurchase). Both 24 
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dividends and stock repurchases increased from 1991 to 2006. Stock repurchases exhibited a 1 
downward trend, from 2006 to 2009. After a significant decrease during 2007-2009, they increased 2 
again until 2011. A second decrease happened during 2012 to 2015. As Figure 4.1 shows, firm payouts 3 
(dividends and stock repurchases) dropped significantly during the two financial crises periods (the 4 
2008 global financial crisis and the 2012 economic recession). Figure 4.1 also shows that these 5 
financial crises had a longer impact (negative) on stock repurchase than on cash dividends. After 2009, 6 
cash dividends and stock repurchases reveal similar trends (decrease in popularity), but the volume of 7 
cash dividends is much larger than stock repurchases. To sum up, stock repurchase behaviour has 8 
increased significantly over the last two decades, but dividends (especially cash dividends) is still the 9 
dominant payout form among UK firms. We find major changes for both dividends and stock 10 
repurchases, but the changes are not the same. At this stage, we did not observe any evidence that 11 
stock repurchases are substitutes for dividends (Grullon and Michaely, 2002). 12 
Figure 4.2 presents the firms’ average working capital, trade receivables and trade payables, from 13 
1991 to 2015, for the overall sample, divided into two sectors; the financial sector and non-financial 14 
sector. Both levels of trade receivables and trade payables are positive over the study period in Figures 15 
4.2 (a), (b) and (c). In Figure 4.2 (a), the trade receivables and the trade payables increased from 1991 16 
to 2006, and decreased in 2007. After 2009, both trade receivables and trade payables show a growth 17 
trend until 2012. In particular, the trade payables start to increase dramatically from 2014 to 2015. 18 
These increase significantly from 2013 to 2015 in Figure 4.2 (b). Although increasing trade 19 
payables/short-term debts is not necessarily treated as a weakness, it could be seen as a potential 20 
issue (credit risk) for financial firms. According to pecking order theory (Fama and French, 2002), debt 21 
finance is preferred over equity finance when internal financing cannot meet a firm’s need. However, 22 
too much reliance on trade payables (short-term debts) is not favourable and may lead to firm 23 
deteriorate (that is, increased credit risk or bankruptcy risk and etc.). Interestingly, in Figure 4.2 (c) the 24 
trade receivables for non-financial firms are relatively flat (they show a slight increase). Working 25 
capital (including trade receivables and trade payables) varies because of different business cycles, 26 
but the changes in trade receivables and trade payables move in a similar direction. This is analogous 27 
to Wilson’s (2014) findings. The only difference is that the average trade payable is lower than the 28 
average trade receivable during the study period. In particular, the average trade receivable is much 29 
higher than the trade payable in 2006 and from 2012 to 2015. It appears that UK firms relied on trade 30 
payables to fund growth after 2009 (Wilson, 2014). However, this is not the case if financial firms are 31 
treated separately. In Figure 4.2 (b), the trade receivables are much higher than the trade payables 32 
for the study period. Figure 4.2 (b) also shows that trade receivables have more volatile movement 33 
compared to the trade payables which have a lower mean (around £50 billion) and smaller standard 34 
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deviations. Financial firms’ working capital does not have negative value during the study period. 1 
Figure 4.2 (a) reveals that trade receivables and trade payables have positive values and that UK firms 2 
have more trade payables and more transactions traded on credit over the study’s period. In terms of 3 
non-financial firms, working capital, trade receivables, and trade payables’ movement are similar to 4 
the overall sample descriptive statistics (see Figure 4.2 (c)). This implies that most UK firms (excluding 5 
financial firms) rely on trade credit more than on short-term borrowing and have more “cash to be 6 
received/collected,” which puts pressure on both payables and receivables management. 7 
Figure 4.2 (a) also shows that firms’ average working capital started at around 100 billion GBP in 8 
1991 and decreased over time, until it reached its minimum value of -20 billion GBP in 2002. There 9 
was a sharp drop (nearly £50 billion), in working capital in 1998 as shown in Figures 4.2 (a) and (c). 10 
This may have resulted from negative growth in the British economy in 1998. Negative working capital 11 
(current liabilities exceed current assets) is often treated as a bad sign. It occurs when a firm makes a 12 
profit so fast (also known as deferred revenue) that it provides products/services to the client before 13 
receiving cash (for example, some hi-tech firms)46. One can conclude that decreases in working capital 14 
show that UK firms (excluding financial firms) were more aggressive in managing their working capital 15 
from 1991 to 2002. After 2003, working capital recovers from negative values to zero and starts to 16 
increase over the subsequent years. For non-financials, increased working capital is often seen as an 17 
indication of profitable investments/expansions, which require the use of cash. Within the recovery 18 
period, average working capital dropped to nearly zero in 2008 and decreased to £50 billion in 2012. 19 
These decreases were most likely caused by the global financial crisis in 2008 and the UK’s double-dip 20 
recession in 2012.47 Working capital was relatively stable after 2013, with an average of £60 – 70 billion. 21 
Overall, working capital decreased significantly from 1991 to 2002. It increased after 2002 except for 22 
two drops during recession periods in 2008 and 2012. However, working capital does not change 23 
considerably for financial firms, as shown in Figure 4.2 (b). Consistent with observations in Table 4.2, 24 
one can infer that financial firms’ working capital (includes trade receivables and trade payables) are 25 
different from non-financial firms’ working capital. Besides, we also observe that the performance 26 
(working capital variables) of firms listed on the LSE does not change dramatically after the exclusion 27 
of financial firms. The only difference is that trade payables show a relatively smaller slope in Figure 28 
4.2 (c) from 2013 to 2015 (compared to the sharp increase in Figure 4.2 (a)). One can conclude that 29 
the majority of the firms listed on the LSE have an aggressive way of managing their working capital 30 
                                                          
46 In 2011, GEOEYE had an operating working capital of -50.24%, and GLOBAL DIGITAL had an operating working 
capital of 92.98% (for detail see: www.cashflowanalytics.com) 
47 Credit policies tightens up during economic downturns and so  trade payables are expected to decrease during  
a recession, particularly if the firm is in an industry that is hit hard by declining sales  or if the firm itself is 
experiencing hard times. 
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Figure 4.2 (a) Average Working Capital, Trade Receivables and Trade Payables (in Billion GBP) 1 
 2 
Figure 4.2 (b) Financial Firms’ Average Working Capital, Trade Receivables and Trade Payables (in 3 
Billion GBP) 4 
 5 
Figure 4.2 (c) Non-Financial firms’ Average Working Capital, Trade Receivables and Trade Payables 6 
(in Billion GBP) 7 
 8 
Note: This table includes the average working capital, trade receivables and trade payables (in £ amounts) of all 9 
the firms on the LSE from 1991 to 2015. Most firms in the financial and service sectors do not hold any physical 10 
inventories or other working capital components. Therefore, firms’ inventories and trade receivables/payables 11 
are not obvious in these sectors. 12 
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72 
from 1991 to 2002, but change to a relatively more conservative policy from 2008 to 2012. Working 1 
capital was also affected by the external financial shocks (the financial crises). 2 
To assess whether there is a relationship between dividends and working capital, we examined 3 
dividend payout trends and changes to working capital in Figure 4.3. 4 
Figure 4.3 Dividend Payouts (as a Percentage of Total Assets) versus Changes in Working Capital 5 
from 1991 to 2015 6 
 7 
Note: Dividend payout (the left vertical axis) is indicated as a ratio calculated as the total common cash dividend 8 
divided by the total assets. Changes in working capital (the right vertical axis) are shown in percentage form. 9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
The dividend payout ratio displays a slowly descending trend from 1991 to 1998. It decreases 11 
significantly from 1998 to 2001. In contrast, working capital tends to increase. Despite decreases in 12 
1994 (the minimum) and 1998, working capital increases from 1990 to 1999. The up and down 13 
movements of dividend payouts and change to working capital are similar from 2000 to 2008. The 14 
dividend payout continues to decline until 2011, while working capital starts to increase from 2008 to 15 
2011. Again, both working capital and dividend payout shift to an increasing trend after 2012. As 16 
Figure 4.3 reveals, the dividend payout and the change in the working capital have similar movements 17 
for some periods but not for the entire study period. Sometimes, they move in opposite directions. 18 
This result coincides with our expectation that the relationship between working capital and dividend 19 
payout is nonlinear. 20 
Table 4.5 and Figure 4.4 jointly report the UK’s GDP growth rate and inflation rate from 1991 to 21 
2015. Table 4.5 reports the descriptive statistics for GDP growth and inflation rate variables. As 22 
observed, the inflation rates are positive for the entire study period, while the GDP growth rate 23 
fluctuates more (positive and negative values), and has a higher standard deviation compared to the 24 
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When the GDP growth rate goes up, the inflation rate decreases from 1991 to 1994. The GDP growth 1 
rate and inflation are maintained between 2 and 3% until 2007. In 2008, the inflation rate goes up by 2 
3.6% while the GDP growth rate decreases to a negative value (and keeps decreasing to a minimum 3 
of -4.19% in 2009). From 2009 to 2011, the GDP growth rate and inflation rate share a similar trend. 4 
After 2012, these rates move in opposite directions. The GDP growth and inflation rates decrease in 5 
2015. 6 
Table 4.5 UK’s GDP and Inflation 7 
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
GDP growth (%) 25 1.872 1.816 -4.192 4.024 
Inflation (%) 25 2.256 1.205 0.050 7.533 
Source: Author’s calculations 8 
Figure 4.4 UK’s GDP and Inflation 9 
 10 
Note: GDP growth and inflation are shown in percentage form 11 
Source: Author’s calculations 12 
Table 4.6 provides summary statistics (average and number of observations) of the dependent 13 
and the explanatory variables, 48  from 1991 to 2015. As documented in Table 4.6, the standard 14 
deviation of most variables shows a small magnitude except for total assets.49  15 
                                                          
48 Most of the firm specific variables are scaled by Total Assets and winsorised at the 1% level except for Size 
and Total Assets. 
49 The Total Assets variable differs and has extreme values for some firms. It is used as a denominator to scale 












As firms listed on the LSE vary from sector to sector, the total assets of firms differ significantly. 1 
For example, firms such as Tracsis PLC (software-based) have a significant amount of assets (over £30 2 
million in 2015 and reaching £48 million in 2016), while Beowulf Mining PLC owns a small number of 3 
assets (only a few million pounds worth). 4 
Table 4.6 Summary Statistics of the Dependent and Explanatory Variables (1991 to 2015)  5 
Variables N Mean Min. P25 Median P75 Max. 
CD 20,858 0.018 0.000 0.000 0.006 0.026 0.164 
  (0.028)      
∆WC 17,966 0.467 -8.711 -0.295 0.058 0.470 22.700 
  (3.304)      
∆TP 16,433 0.395 -0.902 -0.148 0.061 0.347 11.543 
  (1.564)      
∆TR 15,270 0.402 -0.918 -0.111 0.063 0.310 13.700 
  (1.741)      
Div-adj Earnings 20,858 -0.107 -3.057 -0.069 0.011 0.048 0.309 
  (0.439)      
Tax 19,718 0.041 -0.423 0.000 0.007 0.066 0.544 
  (0.112)      
Inv 20,858 0.028 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0002 0.698 
  (0.104)      
Gearing (%)  19,391 42.574 0.000 0.000 7.810 44.084 669.601 
 (94.349)      
ROE (%) 18,010 0.218 -196.812 -7.381 8.081 19.193 109.706 
 (42.633)      
MtB (%) 18,295 2.763 -11.214 0.870 1.657 3.174 30.094 
 (4.659)      
EPS 19,321 0.030 -11.291 -0.015 0.043 0.200 6.500 
 (1.586)      
Size 18,836 4.060 1.210 2.313 4.111 6.023 13.603 
 (2.947)      
Rep 20,858 0.004 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.121 
 (0.017)      
GDPg (%) 25 2.045 -4.192 1.972 2.586 2.996 4.024 
 (1.786)      
Inf (%) 25 2.370 0.050 1.363 2.166 2.656 7.533 
 (1.487)      
Total Asset 20,858 7,370.173 0.0002 12.699 69.165 480.7 2,692,538 
 (79,807.3)      
All of the firm-specific variables are scaled by Total Assets and winsorised at the 1% level, except for Size and 6 
Total Assets. Macroeconomic variables are collected on an annual basis. Total assets are in a million unit. 7 
Source. Author’s calculations 8 
The CD (indicated by the total common cash dividend divided by total assets) reports a mean of 9 
0.018 and a standard deviation of 0.028. It shows that on average, firms listed on the LSE only issued 10 
1.8% of their total assets as cash dividends. More interestingly, the Min and P25 (25% or Q1) CD are 11 
both zero, which indicates that a considerable number of firms adopt a zero dividend policy. The CD 12 
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median is only 0.006 (0.6%), the P75 is 0.026 and the Max reports a value of 16.4%. This shows that 1 
dividend-paying firms are a small group. For example, firms such as Cenkos Securities PLC have issued 2 
substantial cash dividends since they were founded. 50  These are consistent with the findings 3 
presented in Table 4.1. The changes in working capital (∆WC) present a slightly more volatile situation, 4 
with a standard deviation of 3.304. The Min and P25 of the ∆WC report -8.711 and -0.295, respectively, 5 
which indicates that at least 25 % of the observations exhibited negative changes in their working 6 
capital. The negative change could result from a number of financial behaviours such as increases in 7 
short-term borrowing and decreases in cash flow. The median, P75 and Max of the ∆WC all show 8 
positive figures and the mean also shows a positive value of 0.467, which indicates that the average 9 
increase in net working capital is 46.7%. The ∆TP and ∆TR share some similarities. The Min and P25 of 10 
∆TP and ∆TR exhibit negative values. The Median, P75 and Max of these two variables exhibit positive 11 
values. The average of ∆TP and ∆TR are 39.5% and 40.2%, respectively. The positive changes in 12 
working capital, trade payables, and trade receivables are similar to the findings presented in Figure 13 
4.2. The only difference is that trade payables and trade receivables represent two different 14 
components of current liabilities and current assets. 15 
The Div-adj Earnings, however, reports a negative mean value of -0.107. This is a stricter way of 16 
reporting earnings, since the dividend-adjusted earnings are calculated as net earnings minus any cash 17 
dividends declared. As discussed in Chapter 3, the Div-adj Earnings was adopted to improve the 18 
efficiency of estimated models. The negative mean of Divi-adj Earnings suggests that on average, 19 
firms’ current earnings are not enough to cover their dividend payouts. Another explanation is that 20 
firms that do not pay any dividend make negative earnings (losses). Tax displays a mean value of 4.1%. 21 
This suggests that firms pay their tax liability over the total assets in cash, at around 4.1%. The Inv 22 
variable shows a mean value of 2.8% (over total assets). However, the Min, P25 and Median of Inv are 23 
zero. This shows that a large number of firms do not hold any investments (short- or long-term) on 24 
their balance sheet. 25 
Gearing has a mean value of 42.574, which represents the long-term debts of 42.57% of the total 26 
common equity on average. The Min and P25 of Gearing both report zero, whilst the Max of Gearing 27 
is as high as 669.601. Thus, based on the firms’ gearing ratios, there are two extreme groups. The first 28 
group includes firms that do not hold any long-term debts; these firms rely more on equity finance. 29 
The second group includes firms that hold a substantial amount of long-term debts over equity; in 30 
short, these firms use debt financing. Since both debt and equity finance have their pros and cons, the 31 
                                                          
50 In 2016, Cenkos Securities PLC issued £102.3 million of cash to their shareholders, equivalent to 154.8p per 
share (for detail see www.cenkos.com/investors). 
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difference between the two extreme groups is the firm’s preference for debt or equity finance. The 1 
ROE indicates a mean value of 0.218. The Min and P25 of ROE are -196.812 and -7.381, while the Max 2 
of ROE is 109.706. The MtB and EPS report similar results. Interestingly, the Rep displays zero in Min, 3 
P25, Median and P75. The Max of Rep is 0.121 which represents 12.1% of the total assets. The Rep 4 
reports a mean value of 0.4%. This indicates that firms’ stock repurchases are of a small magnitude 5 
and most of the firms do not repurchase their stocks. 6 
Table 4.7 compares the descriptive statistics of the variables between young and mature firms.51 7 
MtB reports a mean of 2.7593% and 2.7655% for young and mature firms, respectively. The p-value is 8 
0.9292. This shows that the MtB of young and mature firms are not significantly different from each 9 
other. The p-value of the rest of the variables shows significant value at 1% or 5% significance levels. 10 
This indicates that there is a significant difference in the financial performances of young and mature 11 
firms. 12 
The biggest difference between young and mature firms is the total assets. The mean of mature 13 
firms’ total assets variable is nearly six times more than that of the young firms. The Gearing of mature 14 
firms is 46.5171%, or 8% higher than for young firms. This means mature firms have more debts, while 15 
young firms prefer equity financing. This finding is in line with pecking order theory (Halov and Heider, 16 
2008; Tucker and Stoja, 2011). 17 
The ROE of young firms is about -7%. The mature firms’ ROE shows a positive 6.3%. The standard 18 
deviation of the ROE variable also shows a bigger value for young firms, but a smaller value for mature 19 
firms. This indicates that mature firms have more stable and better performance when investing in 20 
their equity compared to young firms. The EPS variable results are very similar to the ROE variable. 21 
Both ROE and EPS measure earnings (net incomes) and mature firms earn more than young firms. 22 
Young firms report a negative EPS (-0.069), while mature firms show a higher EPS (0.1122). Similarly, 23 
the mean of mature firms’ Div-adj Earnings variable is much higher than young firms (both are negative 24 
values). The Size variable also differs significantly between young and mature firms. The Size of mature 25 
firms is 4.64 while for young firms it is 3.36. The Size variable is calculated as the logarithm value of 26 
total sales. Therefore, mature firms have more sales revenue than young firms.  27 
The Tax variable indicates that mature firms have more cash flow to cover their tax liabilities than 28 
the young firms. Interestingly, the Inv variable of young and mature firms reports a small difference  29 
                                                          
51 A firm is considered to be young if the firm was listed on the LSE after the 1st of January 2005, while a firm is 
classified as mature if the firm was listed on the LSE before the 31st of December 31, 2004. GDP growth and 
inflation rates are collected at a country’s level and they are the same for both young and mature firms. 
Therefore, they are not included in Table 4.7. 
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Table 4.7 Summary Statistics between Young and Mature Firms 1 
 Young Mature     
  Mean   N Mean N t-statistics  p-Value  
Gearing (%) 38.194 9,186 46.517 10,205 6.140 0.000*** 
 (94.762)  (93.806)    
ROE (%) -7.076 8,167 6.271 9,843 21.173 0.000*** 
 (48.939)  (35.466)    
MtB (%) 2.759 8,152 2.766 10,143 0.089 0.929 
 (5.078)  (4.294)    
EPS -0.069 8,792 0.112 10,529 7.941 0.000*** 
 (1.877)  (1.288)    
Rep 0.004 10,093 0.005 10,765 3.555 0.000*** 
 (0.016)  (0.017)    
Div-adj Earnings -0.169 10,093 -0.049 10,765 19.879 0.000*** 
 (0.532)  (0.317)    
∆TP 0.549 7,515 0.266 8,918 -11.615 0.000*** 
 (1.918)  (1.172)    
∆TR 0.559 6,622 0.282 8,648 -9.763 0.000*** 
 (2.128)  (1.361)    
CD 0.013 10,093 0.023 10,765 23.842 0.000*** 
 (0.028)  (0.028)    
∆WC 0.550 8,559 0.391 9,407 -3.219 0.001*** 
 (3.648)  (2.954)    
Tax 0.030 9,687 0.052 10,031 13.795 0.000*** 
 (0.111)  (0.112)    
Inv 0.025 10,093 0.028 10,765 2.1580 0.031** 
 (0.093)  (0.089)    
Size 3.360 8,558 4.643 10,278 30.467 0.000*** 
 (2.951)  (2.814)    
Total Assets 2,134.24 10,093 12,299.71 10,765 9.175 0.000*** 
 (17,009.5)  (110,082.10)    
A firm is grouped as young if its first security trading date is after January 1, 2005. A firm is classified as mature 2 
if its first security trading date is before December 31, 2004 on the London Stock Exchange (LSE).  3 
The difference between the two samples is calculated as mean (mature) minus mean (young). T-statistic is based 4 
on the two-tail t-test. 5 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 6 
Source: Author’s calculations 7 
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in the mean value (0.025 versus 0.027). However, the t-statistic reports a positive value. These ratios 1 
reveal that the performance of young and mature firms differs significantly. This is probably due to 2 
mature firms’ being more profitable than young firms, which results in higher earnings for mature 3 
firms. Therefore, the ROE, EPS, Div-adj Earnings are all positive for mature firms. These findings 4 
support the life-cycle theory (Muller, 1972). 5 
The p-value indicates that the Inv variable between the young and mature group is different at 6 
the 1% significance level. It demonstrates that mature firms have more short- and long-term 7 
investments than young firms. In mature firms, the means of Rep and CD variables are higher than in 8 
young firms. One thing they both have in common is that the average CD is greater than average of 9 
stock repurchase. This shows that regardless of the firms’ age, dividend payout is preferred over stock 10 
repurchase in corporate payout policy. Grullon and Michaely (2002) came to similar conclusions. 11 
On the contrary, the results of the working capital variables are the opposite. The ∆WC variable 12 
is 0.55 for young firms and 0.39 for mature firms. Similarly, the ∆TR and ∆TP variables of young firms 13 
are much higher than for mature firms. This shows that the ∆WC variable is more frequent and volatile 14 
in young firms than in mature firms. Wilson (2014) argues that trade credit is the only source of 15 
external finance for over 90% of small firms, but for only 20% of larger firms. Mature firms have more 16 
money to cover their short-term liabilities and have more financial resources than young firms. 17 
Table 4.7 shows the mean of the majority of variables is statistically different between young and 18 
mature firms. Based on accounting ratios, mature firms perform much better than young firms. The 19 
Life-Cycle Theory (Muller, 1972) argues that young firms have more investment opportunities, but 20 
that they have insufficient profits/earnings to meet financial needs. Therefore, returns are volatile and 21 
unpredictable for younger firms, especially when the firms are trying to market their products/services 22 
and compete with larger firms. When the firms mature, they have higher and less volatile earnings, 23 
and more stable cash, and thus are more likely to pay dividends (see also Damodaran, 1989). 24 
 25 
4.3 Empirical Findings 26 
This study used the two-step system GMM to estimate cash dividend models (equations (3.17) and 27 
(3.18)) for the overall sample. The results are reported in the next section. Section 4.3.2 reveals the 28 
dividend payout through the working capital: there is a concave relationship between dividend payout 29 
and a change in working capital. The subsamples analyses of dividend payouts is presented in Section 30 
4.3.3. In terms of stock dividends, the sample is relatively small. Therefore, the FE estimator was used 31 
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to estimate the stock dividend models (equations (3.19) and (3.20)). The findings are reported in 1 
section 4.3.4. 2 
 3 
4.3.1 Overall Sample Results: Cash Dividends 4 
After excluding the missing value of the data, we had a sample of 20,858 (firm-year) observations for 5 
the period of 1991 to 2015. Table 4.8 provides the results of the dynamic cash dividend model 6 
(equation (3.17)) for the overall sample. In particular, the dividend-adjusted earnings are used in 7 
Model 1, while unadjusted earnings are included in Model 2 for comparative purposes. 8 
We adopted Arellano and Bond’s (1991) two-step system GMM estimator. As discussed earlier, 9 
this model has controls for endogeneity issues for both models. We used the CD, Rep, Inv, MtB and 10 
changes in working capital with lagged levels (t-2) to (t-3) as GMM instruments for the equation. After 11 
controlling for endogeneity and serial correlation, the result shows that the number of groups (1,290) 12 
is much greater than the number of instruments (410) for Model 1 and 2. The Hansen J-test reports a 13 
p-value of 0.123 and 0.143 in Models 1 and 2, respectively. In Model 1, the Difference-Hansen test 14 
shows a p-value of 0.141, while in Model 2 it shows a p-value of 0.190. These results indicate that the 15 
GMM instruments in Models 1 and 2 are valid and our regression results are robust. We specify the 16 
“robust” command in our equation when using STATA. Under the two-step system GMM, the standard 17 
covariance matrix and standard error are robust in terms of panel autocorrelation and 18 
heteroscedasticity (Mileva, 2007). 19 
The results of equation (3.17) are reported in Table 4.8. In terms of the variables of interest, 20 
Model 1 shows the Div-adj Earnings variable has no statistically significant impact on dividend payouts. 21 
Both Fukuda (2000) and Farsio et al. (2004) also noted an insignificant correlation between earnings 22 
and dividend payout. One possible explanation is that earnings can only affect the targeted dividend 23 
payout, but they do not reveal a firm’s ability to issue a dividend payout. The coefficient of ∆WC is 24 
positive and statistically significant, while its squared term (∆WC²) is negative and statistically 25 
significant in Model 1. This suggests that there exists a concave relationship between working capital 26 
and dividend payouts. In other words, a relatively low change in working capital can increase the 27 
dividend payout, while a relatively high change in working capital may decrease it. It also 28 
demonstrates that working capital is an important determinant of dividend payout, which suggests 29 
that working capital can be a great source of finance for dividend payouts. 30 
As previously discussed, an increase in net working capital may be a result of an increase in cash, 31 
trade receivables, inventories and/or a decrease in short-term debts. Thus, an increase in cash, via 32 
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working capital, can be a source for dividend payouts, which explains the positive correlation between 1 
working capital and dividend payouts. However, extremely high net working capital may also be the 2 
result of high levels of trade receivables, inventories, and a relatively low level of cash. In other words, 3 
a firm with insufficient cash has low efficiency in collecting receivables and stocks a lot of unsold 4 
inventory. Thus, it is unlikely that the firm will adjust working capital and maintain more cash in such 5 
a situation, resulting in a decrease in dividend payouts. If extremely high net working capital is caused 6 
primarily by a substantial increase in cash, then a firm is most likely to consider other financial 7 
decisions, such as investments, M&As, and R&D expenditures (Mikkelson and Partch, 2003). In this 8 
case, working capital would subsequently decrease, and eventually, dividend payouts would decrease 9 
as well. Therefore, when WC is greater than the turning point (i.e. 5.428), there is a negative impact 10 
on dividend payouts. 11 
In Model 1, the lagged value of CD shows a significant and positive relationship with CD. This 12 
confirms results in the correlation matrix (see Table 3.2). Previous studies have also identified a 13 
positive (dynamic) relationship (Lintner, 1956; Goddard et al., 2006; Javakhadze et al., 2014). All of 14 
these studies argue that the past year’s dividend payout has a strong impact on the current dividend 15 
payout. In this study, we also found that if a firm issued dividends the previous year, it is likely that 16 
the firm would issue dividends in the current year. The coefficient of Tax is positive and significant at 17 
the 1% level. Jeong (2013) also finds that dividend is positively affected by tax and interest rates. 18 
However, the Tax variable we measure here is slightly different from the literature (mainly tax 19 
expenses). In the current study, Tax represents the tax liabilities that have been paid via cash during 20 
the financial year. In other words, the Tax variable also indicates a firm’s ability to pay its tax liability 21 
through cash. The Size coefficient is also positive and significant which is similar to previous studies 22 
(see Fama and French, 2001; Dhanani, 2005; Denis and Osobov, 2008 and Kaźmierska-Jóźwiak, 2015). 23 
This positive relationship can also be explained by the Life-Cycle Theory (Muller, 1972), which states 24 
that young and small firms, with high growth opportunities tend to issue low/no dividends because 25 
their cash flows may be low compared to their capital expenditure. When firms mature and make 26 
greater profits and have more stable cash flows, they are more likely to issue higher dividends. Since 27 
the Size variable is measured through the logarithm value of total sales revenue, one can conclude 28 
that the bigger the sales revenue of a firm, the higher the cash dividend payout (Alzahrani and Lasfer, 29 
2012). 30 
A similar result was obtained for the MtB in Model 1. The MtB variable is measured by the 31 
difference between the market value and book value of a firm. A higher market-to-book ratio implies 32 
that the firm is worth more than its book value which is regarded as a good sign. Our results show that 33 
the higher market-to-book ratio, the higher the dividend payout. Tse (2005) argues that market  34 
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Table 4.8 Overall Sample Results of Equation (3.17) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Model 1 Model 2 
CD(t-1) 0.516*** 0.515*** 
 (0.037) (0.037) 
∆WC ² - 0.088*** -0.086*** 
 (0.031) (0.031) 
∆WC 0.955** 0.909* 
 (0.479) (0.472) 
Div-adj Earnings 0.060  
 (1.491)  
Unadjusted Earnings   1.151** 
  (1.929) 
Tax 19.833*** 19.643*** 
 (3.361) (3.408) 
Inv 0.191 0.078 
 (6.236) (6.193) 
Gearing (%) - 0.052*** -0.052*** 
 (0.010) (0.010) 
MtB (%) 1.317*** 1.321*** 
 (0.205) (0.205) 
Size 2.850*** 2.766*** 
 (0.434) (0.428) 
Rep(t-1) - 21.065 -20.342 
 (16.740) (16.678) 
Dum(fs) 0.061 0.131 
 (0.536) (0.540) 
GDPg (%) 0.114* 0.120* 
 (0.069) (0.070) 
Inf (%) - 0.205 -0.204 
 (0.132) (0.132) 
Constant -3.907** -3.534** 
 (1.628) (1.614) 
m₂ 0.276 0.276 
Hansen J-test (p-value) 0.123 0.143 
Diff-Hansen test (p-value) 0.141 0.190 
Number of observations 14,221 14,221 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression with explanatory variables. Estimation is by two-step system GMM. Fixed 2 
firm and time effect are included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the 3 
impact of outliers. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within the firm’s serial correlation. m₂ is 4 
a serial correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-5 
identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. 6 
The results presented in Models 1 and 2 are estimated based on equation (3.17). The dividend-adjusted earnings 7 
are included in Model 1, while the unadjusted earnings are included in Model 2. 8 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
82 
Table 4.9 Overall Sample Results of Equation (3.18) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients     t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.723 16.270 0.000*** 
 (0.0445)   
∆TP -0.839 -1.750 0.081* 
 (0.481)   
∆TR -0.128 -0.310 0.758 
 (0.414)   
Div-adj Earnings -4.504 -2.000 0.046** 
 (2.250)   
Tax 17.187 5.080 0.000*** 
 (3.382)   
Inv -12.273 -1.800 0.072* 
 (6.825)   
Gearing (%) -0.034 -3.740 0.000*** 
 (0.009)   
MtB (%) 1.021 4.820 0.000*** 
 (0.212)   
Size 1.712 3.660 0.000*** 
 (0.468)   
Rep(t-1) 15.103 0.360 0.720 
 (42.136)   
Dum(fs) -0.881 -1.480 0.138 
 (0.594)   
GDPg (%) 0.143 1.750 0.080* 
 (0.082)   
Inf (%) -0.102 -0.730 0.463 
 (0.139)   
Constant -3.576 -1.950 0.051* 
 (1.833)   
m₂   0.153 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.220 
Diff Hansen (p-value)   0.197 
Number of observations   12,274 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression with explanatory variables. Estimation is by two-step system GMM. Fixed 2 
firm and time effect are included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the 3 
impact of outliers. Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a 4 
serial correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-5 
identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets.  6 
In equation (3.18), the working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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capitalisation and asset book value are one of the major determinants of a firm issuing dividends in 1 
the UK stock market. Fama and French (2001) and Amidu and Abor (2006) disagree. They all found a 2 
negative relationship between dividend payout and market-to-book value in the US and Ghana stock 3 
markets, respectively. In Model 1, the Gearing coefficient is negative and significant in the regression 4 
result. This shows that a higher gearing ratio implies less dividend payout (Benito and Young, 2003). A 5 
higher Gearing ratio means higher long-term debts over total common equity, therefore, firms have 6 
more debts to pay and fewer funds to distribute to shareholders (Aivazian et al., 2003). 7 
The results in Model 1 also show that the coefficient of Inv, Rep (t-1), and Dum (fs) are 8 
insignificant. The Inv insignificant coefficient of Inv indicates that no matter how much a firm holds in 9 
short-term or long-term investments, dividend payout policy is irrelevant (Gul, 1999; Wang, 2010). 10 
The Rep (t-1) coefficient is insignificant as well. We found that stock repurchases do not dominate 11 
cash dividends (Barclay and Smith, 1988). Our finding contradicts the substitution hypothesis between 12 
dividend and stock repurchase (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; Skinner, 2008). We argue that stock 13 
repurchase is not a substitute for cash dividends, and that cash dividends remain a dominant form of 14 
corporate payout in the UK context. Interestingly, the Dum (fs) is insignificant, even though observed 15 
some drops in dividends during the financial crisis period. According to our empirical results in Model 16 
1, the financial shocks of 2008 and 2012 did not have a significant impact on the LSE firms’ dividend 17 
payouts. The GDPg variable is significant and positively correlated with firm dividend payouts in Model 18 
1. The Inf variable has a negative impact on a firm’s dividend payout, but this relationship is not 19 
significant at any level. To some extent, the varied results indicate that macroeconomic variables play 20 
a role in explaining dividend payouts (except for Inf). The significant result of the GDPg demonstrates 21 
that in a healthy economy, the higher dividend payouts are (Bozos et al., 2011). 22 
For comparative purposes, we also present the results that capture the effect of unadjusted 23 
earnings on dividend payouts in Model 2 (see Table 4.8 second column). Our estimates show that 24 
Unadjusted Earnings have a positive and statistically significant effect on dividend payouts. The finding 25 
differs from Model 1, where estimates using Div-adj Earnings were not adjusted. This is not surprising 26 
since dividend payout information is included in the unadjusted earnings variable. The negative and 27 
insignificant coefficient of Div-adj Earnings can be explained by the fact that most of the firms’ current 28 
earnings are insufficient to cover their dividend payouts. With respect to other coefficients, including 29 
the coefficient of working capital variables, we find similar signs and significance levels in Models 1 30 
and 2. 31 
After dividing working capital into trade receivables and trade payables, we further examined the 32 
significance of these two variables on dividend payouts (equation (3.18)). Again, we adopted the two-33 
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step system GMM estimation in our regression, whilst the ∆WC is replaced and no longer exists in 1 
equation (3.18). We used CD, Rep (t-1), Inv and MtB, ∆TR and ∆TP lagged levels (t-2) to (t-3) as GMM 2 
instruments for the equitation. The results are shown in Table 4.9. The number of groups is 1,172, and 3 
the number of instruments is 454. The Hansen J-test reports a p-value of 0.22 and the Difference-4 
Hansen test shows a p-value of 0.197. The Hansen test is a validity test of the instrument which checks 5 
for over-identifying restrictions. The Hansen J-test results indicate that our GMM instruments are valid. 6 
The standard covariance matrix and standard error are robust in terms of panel autocorrelation and 7 
heteroscedasticity. 8 
After the split of ∆WC, we ran the regression using equation (3.18). The results are reported in 9 
Table 4.9. The coefficient of the first lag of the CD remains positive and significant at the 1% level. This 10 
indicates that there is a dynamic relationship in the cash dividend payout (Lintner, 1956; Goddard et 11 
al., 2006; Javakhadze et al., 2014). 12 
Surprisingly, we found a significant and negative relationship between the ∆TP and dividend 13 
payouts. From the descriptive statistics (see Figure 4.2), the level of trade payables exhibits an 14 
increasing trend, from 1991 to 2005. The ∆TP mean is 0.39. These show that the average LSE firms’ 15 
trade payables increased over the study period. Trade payables are a firm’s current liabilities. The 16 
negative relationship we observed reveals that an increase in trade payables will lead to a decrease in 17 
dividend payouts. An increase in trade payables is a source of cash. However, a firm may have different 18 
priorities for utilising additional funds. Traditionally, an increase in trade payables is associated with 19 
firms’ day-to-day operations, and the cash generated through this process are often included in the 20 
operating cash flow part. Trade payables are short-term debts due within a short time period (less 21 
than 12 months). Firms may use this cash for the dividend payout. While this may satisfy most 22 
shareholders’ demand for dividends it puts the firm under pressure to pay off their short-term debts. 23 
Failing to repay its debtholders is not a good option, either. Therefore, the negative relationship 24 
(between trade payable and dividend payout) reveals that firms are reluctant to use cash generated 25 
from short-term debt to issue dividend payouts. This cash is more likely to be used for firms’ day-to-26 
day operations rather than for dividend payouts. When the short-term debts are due, firms need to 27 
pay both the principal amount and the interest. We also found that the ∆TR coefficient is insignificant 28 
in the model. Similarly, the Rep (t-1) variable is not significant, at any level, which demonstrates that 29 
dividend payouts are not be affected by any stock repurchase policies (Grullon and Michaely, 2002; 30 
Skinner, 2008). The Tax, MtB, Size and GDPg variables are significant and positively correlated with 31 
dividend payouts. The Gearing variable exhibits a negative relationship with dividend payouts. The 32 
results of the control variables (except for Div-adj Earnings and Inv) are consistent with the findings of 33 
equation (3.17) (see Table 4.8). This also shows that the GMM estimates provide consistent and robust 34 
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results. 1 
However, the result shows the Div-adj Earnings and Inv coefficients are negative and significant 2 
after we split the working capital into trade receivables and trade payables. This means that the firms’ 3 
earnings are negatively related to dividend payout (see Pettit, 1976 and Ferris et al. 2006). In fact, 4 
there are a number of firms with negative earnings that issued dividends on the LSE. Higher losses 5 
may force the firms to improve their earnings in the following year, which indicates a relatively higher 6 
market value in the future (Burgstahler and Dichev, 1997). Thus, firms are likely to issue dividends 7 
regardless of negative earnings. The Inv coefficient reports a negative and significant sign (Adedeji, 8 
1998). Less available cash for dividend payouts may be the result of more investments in firm projects. 9 
 10 
4.3.2 Dividend Payout: Subsample Analysis 11 
According to the findings displayed in Table 4.8, the negative and positive coefficients of ∆WC² and 12 
∆WC jointly indicate that a change in working capital has a concave relationship to dividend payouts 13 
(see Figure 4.5). In order to calculate the turning point, we took the derivative of CD, with respect to 14 
∆WC on the right side of the estimated equation (3.17), and set the equation to zero. We found that 15 
when ∆WC equals 5.426, the CD reaches its maximum value. In other words, an increase in working 16 
capital increases the dividend payout with the maximum effect occurring at 5.426 per cent. At higher 17 
working capital levels (anything exceeding the turning point of 5.426 per cent), the dividend payout 18 
declines.  19 
Figure 4.5 Dividend Payout and Changes in Working Capital  20 
 21 
The figure is based on the estimated results (equation (3.17)) in Table 4.8 when all else is held constant. The 22 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: CD = -0.088∆WC² + 0.955∆WC + Constant 23 
Source: Author’s calculations 24 
This is because an increase in net working capital helps a firm to maintain more cash, which 25 















5.426, it has a negative impact on CD. When net working capital increases dramatically (over the 1 
turning point), then a firm may use the extra net working capital for other financial purposes (such as 2 
investments or mergers and acquisitions). Once the firm proceeds with these financial behaviours, 3 
additional net working capital would decrease, and the dividend payout may decline as well.  4 
Figure 4.5 shows that there are 679 observations with a change in working capital higher than 5 
5.426 and 20,179 observations have a change in working capital less than 5.426, in the overall sample. 6 
Based on this turning point, the overall sample is divided into two categories: a “∆WC < 5.426” group 7 
(20,179 Obs) and a “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group (679 Obs). We compare firms’ characteristics and report the 8 
difference between these two groups of firms. 9 
Table 4.10 shows the CD mean is 1.8% and 1.3% in the “∆WC < 5.426” group and the “∆WC ≥ 10 
5.426” group, respectively. Apparently, the average ∆WC in the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group is much higher 11 
than the “∆WC < 5.426” group. These are consistent with the findings illustrated in Figure 4.5. 12 
Similarly, the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group has a higher mean of ∆TP and ∆TR, compared to the “∆WC < 5.426” 13 
group. The standard deviations of the working capital variables are much higher in the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” 14 
group, which suggests that working capital is more volatile in the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group. The t-test of 15 
CD and working capital variables reports a significant (at the 1% level) difference between the “∆WC 16 
< 5.426” group and the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group. The Tax variable indicates that firms in the “∆WC < 17 
5.426” group pay significantly more cash for their tax liabilities compared to firms in the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” 18 
group. The firms in the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group have lower Gearing compared to firms in the “∆WC < 19 
5.426” group. Regarding ROE, EPS and Size variables, the firms in the “∆WC < 5.426” group perform 20 
better than firms in the “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group. However, the Div-adj Earnings, Inv, MtB, Rep (t-1) and 21 
Total Assets variables do not show any significant difference between these two groups. 22 
After backtesting, we found that there are 1,048 firms whose changes in working capital did not 23 
exceed the turning point (5.426) during the study period. The rest of the firms (527), exceed the 24 
turning point, but only for some periods. In other words, these 527 firms are located in both areas 25 
(“∆WC < 5.426” group and “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group) in Figure 4.5. While 1,048 firms are in the “∆WC < 26 
5.426” group only. 27 
According to these findings, we obtained two subsamples: a positive and negative group and a 28 
positive group. Similarly, we found the lag dividend payout is positively correlated with the dividend 29 
payout and that the relationship is significant in both of the subsamples. We observed consistent 30 
results for the Tax, Gearing, MtB, Size, and GDPg coefficients in both of the subsamples compared to 31 
the main findings (see Table 4.8). The Div-adj Earnings, Inv, Rep (t-1), Dum (fs) and Inf coefficients are 32 
not significant in either the positive group or the positive and negative group. As expected, the results  33 
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Table 4.10 Firm Characteristics (∆WC < 5.426 versus ∆WC ≥ 5.426) 1 
Variables 
∆WC < 5.426 ∆WC ≥ 5.426 
t-statistics p-value 
Mean N Mean N 
CD 0.018 20,179 0.013 679 4.964 0.000*** 
 
(0.028)  (0.028)    
∆WC -0.049 17,287 13.593 679 -1.7e+02 0.000*** 
 
(1.614)  (6.591)    
∆TP 0.372 15,850 1.018 583 -9.818 0.000*** 
 
(1.505)  (2.655)    
∆TR 0.385 14,800 0.935 470 -6.749 0.000*** 
 
(1.702)  (2.652)    
Div-adj earnings -0.107 20,179 -0.120 679 0.780 0.435 
 
(0.440)  (0.410)    
Tax 0.042 19,039 0.024 679 4.109 0.000*** 
 
(0.112)  (0.100)    
Inv 0.026 20,179 0.028 679 -0.566 0.571 
 
(0.090)  (0.105)    
Gearing (%)  42.789 18,766 36.122 625 1.738 0.082* 
 
(94.716)  (82.374)    
ROE (%) 0.440 17,406 -6.160 604 3.742 0.000*** 
 
(42.205)  (53.165)    
MtB (%) 2.757 17,703 2.933 592 -0.904 0.366 
 
(4.655)  (4.789)    
EPS 0.035 18,694 -0.141 627 2.744 0.006*** 
 
(1.560)  (2.216)    
Size 4.086 18,261 3.230 575 6.866 0.000*** 
 
(2.929)  (3.369)    
Repurchase 0.004 20,179 0.005 679 -0.534 0.594 
 
(0.017)  (0.017)    
Total Assets 7,543.293 20,179 2,549.643 679 1.597 0.110 
 
(81,403.850)  (15,809.470)    
No. of observations 20,179  679    
The difference between the two samples is calculated as mean (“∆WC < 5.426” group) minus mean (“∆WC ≥ 2 
5.426” group). T-statistic is based on the two-tail t-test. 3 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 4 
Source: Author’s calculations 5 
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Table 4.11 Subsample Results of Positive Group versus Positive and Negative Group 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Positive Group + and - Group  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.494 0.000*** 0.533 0.000*** 0.577 
 (0.042)  (0.056)   
∆WC² NOT INCLUDED n.a. -0.025 0.031** n.a. 
 (n.a.)  (0.021)   
∆WC 1.517 0.038** 0.280 0.045** 0.130 
 (0.730)  (0.366)   
Div-adj Earnings -4.328 0.168 3.363 0.122 0.026** 
 
(3.133)  (1.466)   
Tax 32.416 0.000*** 16.577 0.000*** 0.021** 
 
(5.291)  (4.368)   
Inv 7.306 0.416 -0.057 0.995 0.548 
 
(8.972)  (8.342)   
Gearing (%) -0.068 0.000*** -0.033 0.001*** 0.042** 
  (0.014)  (0.010)   
MtB (%) 1.529 0.000*** 1.151 0.000*** 0.295 
 
(0.277)  (0.232)   
Size 2.693 0.000*** 1.860 0.000*** 0.251 
 
(0.566)  (0.455)   
Rep(t-1) -29.452 0.183 12.085 0.613 0.202 
 
(22.124)  (23.845)   
Dum(fs) -0.812 0.346 1.215 0.252 0.138 
 
(0.861)  (1.060)   
GDPg (%) 0.211 0.048** 0.172 0.082** 0.788 
 
(0.107)  (0.098)   
Inf (%) -0.242 0.219 -0.142 0.486 0.723 
 
(0.196)  (0.203)   
Constant -3.097 0.174 -1.392 0.400 0.545 
 (2.279)  (1.651)   
m₂  0.234  0.899  
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.264  0.262  
Diff-Hansen (p-value)  0.409  0.128  
Number of observations  8,758  5,463  
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations  9 
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present a concave relationship between ∆WC and dividend payout for 527 firms in the positive and 1 
negative group; this relationship changes to linear when the ∆WC² variable is excluded in the positive 2 
group. The ∆WC coefficient reports a positive sign in the positive group which suggests that the ∆WC 3 
has a positive impact on the dividend payout for these 1,048 firms. Therefore, the concave relationship 4 
in the overall sample is a combined result of a positive linear relationship (in 1,048 firms) and a concave 5 
correlation (in 527 firms). 6 
In fact, a firm’s working capital could change from time to time. The firms in the positive group in 7 
the t period do not necessarily stay in the positive group in the (t+1) period. These 527 firms shift from 8 
the positive group to the negative group, from time to time. Combining Figure 4.5, Tables 4.10 and 9 
4.11, one can infer that the majority of firms listed on the LSE have relatively low changes in their 10 
working capital and only part of the firms have a higher change in working capital. This suggests that 11 
the positive linear relationship between net working capital and the dividend payout works for most 12 
of the firms (see also the regression results in the positive group), whilst the concave correlation 13 
between net working capital and dividend payouts are only robust for a few of the firms (with higher 14 
changes in working capital) listed on the LSE. In other words, firms located in both areas (“∆WC < 5.426” 15 
and “∆WC ≥ 5.426” group) are able to adjust their dividend payouts via working capital.  16 
To conclude, the dividend payout depends on changes in working capital holding all else constant. 17 
Firms with lower changes in their working capital (the 1,048 firms) display a positive relationship with 18 
dividend payouts. However, this does not imply that the positive relationship between changes in 19 
working capital and dividend payout holds all of the time. Once a firm’s change in working capital 20 
reaches over the turning point (of 5.426), the relationship shifts to the opposite side (decreasing the 21 
dividend payout). Similarly, firms with higher changes in their working capital (greater than the turning 22 
point) present a concave correlation. If these firms fail to maintain a high change in their working 23 
capital, they move to the positive group. Therefore, our findings show that only a small number of 24 
firms (527) are capable of increasing/decreasing dividend payouts using their working capital. For the 25 
majority of firms (1,048) listed on the LSE, this is not applicable. Nevertheless, the inference is that 26 
these 1,048 firms can increase their working capital in order to change (increase or decrease) their 27 
dividend payouts. 28 
 29 
4.3.3. Subsample Analysis 30 
We divide the overall sample into financial firms and non-financial firms; young versus mature groups; 31 
firms listed on the Main Market (MM) versus the Alternative Investment Market (AIM); firms with 32 
sufficient working capital (Above Average WC) versus firms with insufficient working capital (Below 33 
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Average WC) and the high volatility in sales group versus the low volatility in sales group. We re-ran 1 
the cash dividend models (equations (3.17) and (3.18)). The results are reported below. 2 
The first subsamples are categorised as financial firms and non-financial firms. As argued by Baker 3 
and De Ridder (2018), financial firms, especially banks, and industrial firms show substantial 4 
differences. Based on the descriptive analyses in Table 4.2 and Figure 4.2, we divided the sample into 5 
financial and non-financial firms and reran the estimates. Using the same GMM estimation, the results 6 
are reported in Tables 4.12 and 4.13. Table 4.12 shows the results of equation (3.17) for financial and 7 
non-financial firms. The first lag of CD is positively correlated with the dependent variable CD in both 8 
subsamples. The ∆WC coefficient displays a positive and significant sign and its square term reports a 9 
negative and significant value, suggesting that there exists a concave relationship between working 10 
capital and dividend payouts for financial and non-financial firms. 11 
Figure 4.6 Non-financial Firms: Dividend Payout and Changes in Working Capital  12 
 13 
The figure is based on the estimated results (equation (3.17)) in Table 4.12 when all else is held constant. The 14 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: CD = -0.075∆WC² + 1.408∆WC + Constant. 15 
Source: Author’s calculations 16 
Div-adj Earnings are not significant in both subsets. The results also show that the dividend payout 17 
does not change significantly because of external financial shocks for financial firms and non-financial 18 
firms. However, there is a critical issue in the subsample of financial firms. The number of groups is 19 
less than the number of instruments (same as the overall sample and other subsamples). A large 20 
number of instruments may lead to the standard error downward bias and can overfit endogenous 21 
variables, failing to expunge their endogenous components and leading to biased coefficient estimates 22 
(Roodman, 2009). Because of the issue, the GMM results reported in Table 4.12 for financial firms are 23 
spurious. One should interpret these results with caution. The concave relationship between working 24 
capital and dividend payout for non-financial firms are displayed in Figure 4.6. Holding all else constant, 25 
we calculated the turning point of (∆WC) to be 9.387 per cent. This indicates that at low levels of 26 












Table 4.12 Subsample (Financial firms vs. Non-financial firms) Results of Equation (3.17) 
Dependent variable: CD Financial firms Non-financial firms  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sig. of diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.639 0.000*** 0.473 0.000*** 1.974** 
 (0.075)  (0.038)   
∆WC² -0.075 0.018** -0.115 0.001*** 0.883 
 (0.031)  (0.033)   
∆WC 1.408 0.008*** 0.889 0.082* 0.709 
 (0.525)  (0.510)   
Div-adj Earnings -5.134 0.308 -0.158 0.932 0.930 
 
(5.023)  (1.846)   
Tax 40.071 0.000*** 16.291 0.000*** 2.209** 
 
(10.212)  (3.413)   
Inv -13.111 0.270 -1.363 0.832 0.872 
 
(11.842)  (6.424)   
Gearing (%) -0.031 0.018** -0.061 0.000*** 1.696* 
  (0.013)  (0.012)   
MtB (%) 1.099 0.001*** 1.444 0.000*** 0.878 
 
(0.326)  (0.219)   
Size 1.585 0.058* 3.447 0.000*** 1.919* 
 
(0.830)  (0.503)   
Rep(t-1) -22.400 0.790 -11.465 0.474 0.128 
 
(83.892)  (16.002)   
Dum(fs) -0.066 0.964 0.091 0.889 0.099 
 
(1.448)  (0.652)   
GDPg (%) 0.313 0.228 0.131 0.095* 0.673 
 
(0.259)  (0.078)   
Inf (%) -0.654 0.133 -0.268 0.075* 0.841 
 
(0.434)  (0.150)   
Constant 1.756 0.454 -5.363 0.003*** 2.410** 
 (2.343)  (1.799)   
m₂  0.851  0.342  
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.780  0.271  
Diff-Hansen (p-value)  0.392  0.277  
Number of observations  1,840  12,381  
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated by two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. 
Standard errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is 
a serial correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-
identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance 
difference in coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where 𝑍 = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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Table 4.13 Subsample (Financial firms vs. Non-financial firms) Results of Equation (3.18) 
Dependent variable: CD Financial firms Non-financial firms  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sig. of diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.625 0.000*** 0.486 0.000*** 1.538 
 (0.082)  (0.038)   
∆TP -1.416 0.184 -0.900 0.006*** 0.426 
 (1.061)  (0.587)   
∆TR 0.488 0.552 -0.100 0.012** 0.639 
 (0.818)  (0.421)   
Div-adj Earnings -9.264 0.237 -1.676 0.391 0.944 
 
(7.800)  (1.953)   
Tax 42.276 0.000*** 21.935 0.000*** 1.719* 
 
(11.179)  (3.889)   
Inv -12.692 0.298 -0.458 0962 0.792 
 
(12.164)  (9.525)   
Gearing (%) -0.047 0.005*** -0.044 0.000*** 0.159 
  (0.016)  (0.010)   
MtB (%) 0.814 0.007*** 1.270 0.000*** 1.310 
 
(0.296)  (0.183)   
Size 2.268 0.048** 3.317 0.000*** 0.853 
 
(1.137)  (0.469)   
Rep(t-1) -29.272 0.693 -15.825 0.316 0.178 
 
(74.001)  (15.781)   
Dum(fs) -1.771 0.354 0.151 0.755 0.979 
 
(1.903)  (0.485)   
GDPg (%) 0.131 0.725 0.223 0.004*** 0.242 
 
(0.372)  (0.077)   
Inf (%) -1.049 0.055* -0.136 0.339 1.627* 
 
(0.543)  (0.142)   
Constant 2.081 0.579 -6.763 0.000*** 2.119** 
 (3.740)  (1.854)   
m₂  0.922  0.368  
Hansen J-test (p-value)  1.000  0.187  
Diff-Hansen (p-value)  1.000  0.350  
Number of observations  1,276  10,998  
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated by two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. 
Standard errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is 
a serial correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-
identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance 
difference in coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where 𝑍 = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  
In equation (3.18), the working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  
Source: Author’s calculations 
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occurring at 9.387 per cent; after the turning point, an increase in working capital decreases the 1 
dividend payout.  2 
Table 4.13 reports the results of equation (3.18) for financial and non-financial firms. Likewise, 3 
the number of instruments is greater than the number of groups, thus the results of financial firms 4 
are spurious. Both the Hansen J-test and Diff-Hansen test report a p-value of 1.00, which also suggest 5 
that the results are not reliable for financial firms. 52 In terms of non-financial firms, the change in 6 
trade payables and change in trade receivable are negatively correlated with the dividend payout. This 7 
is similar to our findings in the positive and negative group. The dummy variable financial shock 8 
coefficient is not significant for non-financial firms. Most of the coefficients of the control variables 9 
are consistent with findings in the overall sample. 10 
We collected information regarding security start dates for all of the firms. We divided the full 11 
sample into two categories: young and mature firms.53 We adopted the same method (two-step 12 
system GMM) for the subsamples. The results are shown in Tables 4.14 and 4.15. Table 4.14 reports 13 
equation (3.17) results for young and mature firms. The result shows that the number of instruments 14 
is less than the number of groups for both subsamples. A large number of instruments may lead to 15 
standard error downward bias and can overfit endogenous variables, failing to expunge their 16 
endogenous components and lead to biased coefficient estimates (Roodman, 2009). The J-test and 17 
Difference Hansen test are reported. The results indicate that our GMM instruments are valid. The 18 
first lag of CD is positively significant in both subsamples. The ∆WC² displays a negative and significant 19 
sign and the ∆WC variable is not significant in the mature firms group. This also indicates the concave 20 
relationship between change in working capital and CD. However, the ∆WC² and ∆WC coefficients are 21 
not significant in the young firms group. These indicate that the nonlinear impact of working capital 22 
on CD is more significant in the mature firms group. In mature firms, low changes in working capital 23 
will have a positive impact on dividend payouts, while high changes in working capital would lead to 24 
a decrease in dividend payouts. Next, we calculated the turning point of the change in working capital 25 
for mature firms (see Figure 4.7). The result shows that when ∆WC is less than 2.121 for mature firms, 26 
it has a positive impact on CD; when ∆WC is greater than 2.121, it has a negative effect on CD. Since 27 
the results (the coefficients of ∆WC and ∆WC²) are not significant for the young firms group, the 28 
turning point of ∆WC is not reported here. Mature firms have more stable working capital and cash  29 
                                                          
52 Apart from GMM estimation, we adopted the FE model for financial firms. The results show that the concave 
relationship between the ∆WC and the Div is still significant; and ∆TP, ∆TR are negatively correlated with the 
Div. Similarly, the Div-adj earnings and dum (fs) coefficients are significant. These results are available upon 
request. 
53 We define firms listed after 31/12/2004 as young firms, and those firms listed before 31/12/2004 as matured 
firms. 
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Table 4.14 Subsample (Mature vs. Young) Results of Equation (3.17) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Mature Young  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.536 0.000*** 0.486 0.000*** 0.707 
 (0.051)  (0.049)     
∆WC² -0.070 0.031** -0.044 0.112 2.681*** 
 (0.032)  (0.028)    
∆WC 0.297 0.485 0.876 0.299 0.852 
 (0.424)  (0.531)   
Div-adj Earnings -1.907 0.473 -1.070 0.670 0.229 
 
(2.657)  (2.509)    
Tax 20.456 0.000*** 31.787 0.000*** 1.486  
 
(4.117)  (6.418)    
Inv -3.411 0.627 9.198 0.395 0.979 
 
(7.015)  (10.803)   
Gearing (%) -0.049 0.000*** -0.047 0.003** 0.109 
  (0.009)  (0.016)   
MtB (%) 1.250 0.000*** 1.497 0.000*** 0.661 
 
(0.227)  (0.297)   
Size 2.470 0.000*** 2.997 0.000*** 0.687 
 
(0.429)  (0.636)   
Rep(t-1) 3.465 0.840 -53.279 0.140 1.422 
 
(17.172)  (36.045)   
Dum(fs) -0.507 0.524 0.898 0.435 1.006 
 
(0.793)  (1.150)   
GDPg (%) 0.207 0.039** 0.190 0.148 0.103 
 
(0.100)  (0.132)   
Inf (%) -0.013 0.944 -0.3665 0.140 1.160 
 
(0.177)  (0.248)   
Constant -3.019 0.097* -4.401 0.076* 0.450 
 (1.816)  (2.473)   
m₂  0.445  0.429 
 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.312  0.773 
 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)  0.380  0.292 
 
Number of observations  8,337  5,846 
 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations9 
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Table 4.15 Subsample (Mature vs. Young) Results of Equation (3.18) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Mature Young  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.788 0.000*** 0.483 0.000*** 4.490*** 
 (0.040)  (0.055)   
∆TP -1.382 0.038** -0.095 0.899 1.481 
 (0.664)  (0.744)   
∆TR -0.959 0.016** -0.640 0.208 0.495 
 (0.397)  (0.509)   
Div-adj Earnings -5.346 0.175 -1.988 0.484 0.692 
 
(3.936)  (2.838)   
Tax 13.884 0.000*** 35.881 0.000*** 2.844*** 
 
(3.608)  (6.840)   
Inv -0.098 0.990 10.345 0.474 0.632 
 
(8.075)  (14.428)   
Gearing (%) -0.027 0.000*** -0.044 0.010*** 0.917 
  (0.007)  (0.017)   
MtB (%) 0.835 0.000*** 1.303 0.000*** 1.308 
 
(0.185)  (0.306)   
Size 1.325 0.000*** 2.989 0.000*** 2.301** 
 
(0.373)  (0.620)   
Rep(t-1) -45.516 0.197 -12.230 0.771 0.607 
 
(35.223)  (42.08)   
Dum(fs) -1.917 0.050** 0.027 0.982 1.250 
 
(0.977)  (1.211)   
GDPg (%) 0.154 0.221 0.103 0.490 0.261 
 
(0.126)  (0.149)   
Inf (%) 0.300 0.224 -0.436 0.136 1.910 
 
(0.180)  (0.292)   
Constant -2.965 0.068* -4.360 0.051* 0.506 
 (1.619)  (2.234)   
m₂  0.249  0.370 
 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.389  0.900 
 
Difference Hansen (p-value)  0.418  1.000 
 
Number of observations  7,448  4,794 
 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
In equation (3.18), working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 8 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
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flows compared to young firms. Young firms have more growth opportunities and more volatile levels 1 
of working capital. Therefore, it is likely that the working capital variable is more significant in the 2 
mature firms than in the young firms. The majority of control variable coefficients indicate similar 3 
results compared to our full sample results (see Table 4.8 and 4.9). The Dum (fs) is not significant in 4 
the subsamples. 5 
Figure 4.7 Mature Firms: Dividend Payouts and Changes in Working Capital  6 
 7 
The figure is based on the estimated results (equation (3.17)) in Table 4.14 when all else is constant. The 8 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: CD = -0.070∆WC² + 0.297∆WC + Constant.  9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
After splitting the change in working capital into trade payables and trade receivables, we re-ran 11 
equation (3.18) for both of the subsamples. The results are reported in Table 4.14. The results show 12 
that the number of groups is larger than the number of instruments for both subsamples. The first lag 13 
of CD reports similar results to previous ones. The change in trade payables displays a negative 14 
coefficient in both the young and mature firms groups. This is similar to our findings in the full sample. 15 
The change in trade receivables also reports a negative coefficient in both the young and mature firm 16 
samples. This means that a trade receivables increase of 0.959 will lead to a decrease in CD (by 1 unit). 17 
In other words, if trade receivables increase (which indicates more transactions are made via trade 18 
credit), this allows customers/clients to delay their cash payment to firms and therefore, firms will 19 
have less cash available for distributing cash dividends. 20 
However, changes in trade payables and receivable variables are not significant in our young firms 21 
group. Further, the Difference-Hansen test of the mature firms’ group is 1.00, which indicates that the 22 
number of GMM instruments is suspicious in the model. Therefore, equation (3.18) results in the 23 
subsample of young firms are questionable. Correspondingly, the findings of the control variables are 24 
similar to the full sample. The Dum (fs) is not significant in young firms but negatively significant in 25 











Table 4.16 Subsample (MM vs. AIM) Results of Equation (3.17) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Main Market AIM  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.508 0.000*** 0.470 0.000*** 0.557 
 (0.042)  (0.049)   
∆WC² -0.069 0.019** -0.055 0.370 0.048 
 (0.294)  (0.031)   
∆WC 0.533 0.025** 1.050 0.407 0.733 
 (0.467)  (0.527)   
Div-adj Earnings -9.777 0.440 -2.355 0.250 1.413 
 
(4.840)  (2.044)   
Tax 33.987 0.000*** 19.003 0.000*** 2.100** 
 
(5.853)  (4.082)   
Inv -4.300 0.548 7.460 0.194 1.282 
 
(7.154)  (5.743)   
Gearing (%) -0.056 0.000*** -0.039 0.002*** 1.024 
  (0.011)  (0.013)   
MtB (%) 1.809 0.000*** 0.999 0.000*** 2.288** 
 
(0.243)  (0.257)   
Size 1.570 0.016** 3.876 0.000*** 2.368** 
 
(0.650)  (0.725)   
Rep(t-1) 13.169 0.539 -71.916 0.170 2.306** 
 
(21.437)  (30.028)   
Dum(fs) -0.530 0.604 0.445 0.555 0.768 
 
(1.020)  (0.755)   
GDPg (%) 0.219 0.054* 0.179 0.101 0.257 
 
(0.113)  (0.109)   
Inf (%) 0.154 0.466 -0.530 0.014 2.267** 
 
(0.211)  (0.2160)   
Constant 3.98 0.914 -3.694 0.072* 1.821* 
 (3.679)  (2.051)   
m₂  0.216  0.967  
Hansen J-test  (p-value)  0.146  0.251 
 
Difference Hansen (p-value)  0.395  0.304 
 
Number of Observations  7,484  6,737  
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Table 4.17 Subsample (MM vs. AIM) Results of Equation (3.18) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Main Market AIM  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.525 0.000*** 0.472 0.000*** 0.778 
 (0.044)  (0.052)   
∆TP -1.060 0.011** -0.268 0.071* 0.823 
 (0.656)  (0.704)   
∆TR  -0.997 0.041** -0.048 0.435 1.482 
 (0.486)  (0.416)   
Div-adj Earnings -12.963 0.130 -4.406 0.210 1.398 
 
(5.601)  (2.466)   
Tax 34.758 0.000*** 21.328 0.000*** 1.793* 
 
(5.869)  (4.656)   
Inv -3.650 0.732 -2.239 0.115 0.112 
 
(10.670)  (6.668)   
Gearing (%) -0.056 0.000*** -0.051 0.033** 0.325 
  (0.010)  (0.012)   
MtB (%) 1.799 0.000*** 0.713 0.002*** 3.284*** 
 
(0.248)  (0.219)   
Size 1.846 0.001*** 4.629 0.014** 2.830*** 
 
(0.536)  (0.825)   
Rep(t-1) 23.898 0.225 -36.465 0.603 1.857* 
 
(19.651)  (25.882)   
Dum(fs) -1.184 0.306 0.327 0.964 1.032 
 
(1.156)  (0.899)   
GDPg (%) 0.239 0.065* 0.171 0.214 0.378 
 
(0.129)  (0.126)   
Inf (%) 0.344 0.118 -0.679 0.022** 3.119*** 
 
(0.219)  (0.243)   
Constant -2.060 0.497 -5.359 0.848 0.840 
 (3.028)  (2.500)   
m₂  0.195  0.993 
 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.254  0.589 
 
Difference Hansen (p-value)  0.383  0.625 
 
Number of observations  6,777  5,497 
 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
In equation (3.18), the working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 8 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
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The third sample split is based on the market nature of the LSE. A firm can list shares on the Main 1 
Market (MM) or the Alternative Investment Market (AIM).54 The MM is designed for large, and more 2 
established firms, whilst the AIM is designed primarily for smaller and growing firms to raise the capital 3 
they need for expansion. 4 
The results for both the MM versus the AIM are reported in Tables 4.16 and 4.17. Table 4.16 5 
reveals the estimated results, based on equation (3.17). We found that the number of instruments is 6 
less than the number of groups for both subsamples. The lag CD coefficient reports a positive and 7 
significant sign in the MM and AIM samples. This finding is in line with the overall sample result that 8 
the dividend payout has a dynamic relationship. The ∆WC² displays a negative coefficient and the ∆WC 9 
reports a positive sign. It is significant in the MM sample but not in the AIM sample. These results, 10 
again, are consistent with our overall sample results. We argue that the nonlinear impact of working 11 
capital on cash dividend is robust in the MM but not in the AIM sample. 12 
Figure 4.8 Main Market: Dividend Payouts and Changes in Working Capital 13 
 14 
The figure is based on the estimated results (equation (3.17)) in Table 4.16 when all else is held constant. The 15 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: CD = -0.069∆WC² + 0.533∆WC + Constant.  16 
Source: Author’s calculations 17 
This is because firms listed on the AIM are mostly small and growing firms, while firms listed on 18 
the MM are large and world-leading firms. They have higher levels of liquidity and corporate 19 
governance compared to firms listed on the AIM.55 Therefore, they have more working capital with 20 
which to alter dividend payouts. The turning point is shown in Figure 4.8.  21 
For firms listed on the MM, when the change of working capital is less than 3.862, it has a positive 22 
impact on the dividend payout; when the change in working capital is greater than 3.862, it shows a 23 
                                                          
54 Firms listed on the Main Market have to satisfy certain regulatory criteria; provide audited statements for at 
least three years and be valued at £700,000 or more. Firms with market capitalisation of less than £700,000 














negative relationship, holding all else constant. Similarly, the control variable findings are consistent 1 
with the full sample. The Dum (fs) is not significant in the MM and AIM samples. 2 
Equation (3.18) results are reported in Table 4.17, for both MM and AIM samples. The lag CD 3 
coefficient reports similar results as previous ones (positive and significant). The ∆TP displays a 4 
negative coefficient in the MM and AIM samples, and they are significant. The ∆TP coefficient in the 5 
MM sample is slightly stronger compared to the AIM sample. An increase in ∆TP (1.06 for MM, 0.94 6 
for AIM) will lead to a decrease in CD (1 unit). This indicates that more current liabilities (trade 7 
payables) will not increase dividend payouts because these payables are due within a short period of 8 
times and firms would rather use cash to pay their debts than issue it as a dividend. While the ∆TR 9 
variable is not significant in the AIM sample, but is in the MM sample, and the coefficient reports a 10 
negative sign. This means that more trade receivables will decrease dividend payouts. An increase in 11 
trade receivables indicates more transactions made on credit sales, which delays the collection of 12 
cash.  13 
Similarly, the Rep (t-1) variable is not significant in either the MM or AIM samples. The Tax, MtB 14 
and Size variables are positively correlated with dividend payouts while the Gearing variable shows a 15 
negative and significant correlation with dividend payouts. The Dum (fs) is not significant in both the 16 
MM and AIM samples. The GDPg is positively significant in the MM sample while the Inf coefficient 17 
reports a negative sign in the AIM sample. Most of the results are consistent with previous findings, 18 
for example the Tax, Inv, Gearing, MtB, Size, Rep(t-1) and Dum(fs) variables report similar results 19 
compared to the overall findings (see also Table 4.8). 20 
Empirical studies have revealed that net working capital is often neglected and that there is room 21 
to improve the efficiency of working capital management (such as Buchmann et al. 2008; Ek and 22 
Guerin, 2011). Based on Akatas et al.’s (2015) study, we further divided the sample into the firms with 23 
sufficient working capital (Above Average WC) and firms with insufficient working capital (Below 24 
Average WC). Firstly, we calculated the mean of net working capital for all firms (industry average) 25 
and categorised firms with net working capital as higher than the industry average as a positive 26 
working capital group and vice versa.  27 
The Above Average WC indicates that firms have sufficient/extra working capital, while Below 28 
Average WC group represents firms with working capital levels below average (insufficient working 29 
capital). We re-ran our cash dividend models (equations (3.17) and (3.18)). The results are reported in 30 
Tables 4.18 and 4.19. We found that the number of instruments is less than the number of groups for 31 
both subsamples. The first lag of CD shows a positive and significant relationship in our dependent 32 
variable as demonstrated in Table 4.18. 33 
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Table 4.18 Subsample (Above Average WC vs. Below Average WC) Results of Equation (3.17) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Above Avg. WC Below Avg. WC  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.423 0.000*** 0.576 0.000*** 2.012** 
 (0.049)  (0.058)   
∆WC² -0.093 0.002*** -0.022 0.437 1.759* 
 (0.029)  (0.028)   
∆WC 1.081 0.017** 0.298 0.572 1.127 
 (0.450)  (0.528)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.154 0.950 1.892 0.207 0.603 
 
(2.460)  (1.497)   
Tax 35.728 0.000*** 25.456 0.000*** 1.306 
 
(5.983)  (5.106)   
Inv -1.770 0.856 -0.915 0.918 0.065 
 
(9.717)  (8.924)   
Gearing (%) -0.033 0.004*** -0.052 0.000** 1.170 
  (0.011)  (0.013)   
MtB (%) 1.406 0.000*** 1.205 0.000*** 0.531 
 
(0.258)  (0.277)   
Size 2.581 0.000*** 1.909 0.000*** 0.889 
 
(0.585)  (0.478)   
Rep(t-1) 9.816 0.713 -7.151 0.784 0.071 
 
(26.705)  (26.059)   
Dum(fs) -0.854 0.377 -0.476 0.558 0.299 
 
(0.967)  (0.813)   
GDPg (%) 0.190 0.106 0.064 0.549 0.790 
 
(0.117)  (0.107)   
Inf (%) -0.046 0.851 -0.244 0.233 0.626 
 
(0.243)  (0.204)   
Constant -2.908 0.185 -0.632 0.724 0.803 
 (2.193)  (1.793)   
m₂  0.117  0.893 
 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.218  0.290 
 
Difference Hansen (p-value)  0.127  0.056*  
Number of Observations  5,979  5,740  
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
 10 
102 
Table 4.19 Subsample (Above Average WC vs. Below Average WC) Results of Equation (3.18) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Above Avg. WC Below Avg. WC  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.435 0.000*** 0.598 0.000*** 2.099** 
 (0.050)  (0.060)   
∆TP -1.076 0.087* -0.281 0.589 0.976 
 (0.627)  (0.520)   
∆TR  -0.037 0.094* -0.865 0.220 1.370 
 (0.033)  (0.377)   
Div-adj Earnings -1.746 0.650 0.524 0.777 0.533 
 
(3.842)  (1.846)   
Tax 35.636 0.000*** 27.304 0.000*** 0.963 
 
(6.624)  (5.566)   
Inv -1.657 0.884 1.784 0.867 0.221 
 
(11.364)  (10.644)   
Gearing (%) -0.033 0.006*** -0.042 0.000*** 0.542 
  (0.012)  (0.011)   
MtB (%) 1.266 0.000*** 1.002 0.000*** 0.764 
 
(0.239)  (0.249)   
Size 2.493 0.000*** 2.45 0.000*** 0.054 
 
(0.649)  (0.532)   
Rep(t-1) 19.952 0.453 -6.046 0.834 0.664 
 
(26.598)  (28.759)   
Dum(fs) -0.987 0.430 -0.942 0.310 0.029 
 
(1.249)  (0.926)   
GDPg (%) 0.252 0.043* -0.011 0.932 1.470 
 
(0.124)  (0.129)   
Inf (%) -0.127 0.631 -0.119 0.644 0.022 
 
(0.264)  (0.257)   
Constant -2.469 0.358 -3.353 0.112 0.259 
 (2.686)  (2.110)   
m₂  0.318  0.574 
 
Hansen J-test (p-value)  0.169  0.388 
 
Difference Hansen (p-value)  0.210  0.763 
 
Number of Observations  5,221  4,874 
 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
In equation (3.18), working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 8 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
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This indicates that dividend payout has a dynamic relationship. ∆WC shows a positive sign while 1 
∆WC² reports a negative figure in the regression results, reported in the Above Average WC group. 2 
We argue that there is a concave relationship between change in working capital and dividend payout 3 
in our Above Average WC group. However, the ∆WC² and ∆WC coefficients are not significant in the 4 
Below Average WC group. The findings suggest that firms use their sufficient/extra working capital to 5 
adjust dividend payouts, while for firms with low working capital, this effect is not significant. This may 6 
be the result of firms’ specific working capital management policies. For the Above Average WC group, 7 
firms could make good use of excess working capital for other financial purposes (such as adjusting 8 
their dividend payouts). 9 
 In contrast, for the Below Average WC group adjusting their dividend payout via net working 10 
capital is not recommended, as they already have low levels of working capital. This would increase 11 
the volatility of working capital and may lead to liquidity risks. Similarly, we also calculated the turning 12 
point for the Above Average WC group and sketched the concave relation in Figure 4.9. 13 
Figure 4.9 Above Average WC: Dividend Payouts and Changes in Working Capital 14 
 15 
The figure is based on the estimated results (equation (3.17)) in Table 4.18 when all else is held constant. The 16 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: CD = -0.093∆WC² + 1.081∆WC + Constant.  17 
Source: Author’s calculations 18 
As observed, for the Above Average WC group, when the change in working capital is less than 19 
5.811, it shows a positive relationship; when the change in working capital is larger than 5.811, the 20 
relationship is negative. Similarly, the Div-adj Earnings, Inv and Rep (t-1) variables are not significant 21 
in either the Above Average WC or Below Average WC groups. The Tax, Gearing, MtB, and Size 22 
coefficients are consistent with previous findings. Dum (fs), GDPg and Inf are not significant in the 23 
subsamples. 24 
After splitting changes in working capital into trade payables and trade receivables, we re-ran 25 












lag dividend payout coefficient is positive and significant in both subsamples. Thus, the dynamic 1 
relationship is consistent with previous findings. The ∆TP and ∆TR coefficients are negative in the 2 
subsample results. They are significant in the Above Average WC group, but not in the Below Average 3 
WC group. 4 
This indicates that a 1.0758 unit increase in change in trade payables would lead to 1 unit 5 
decrease in dividend payout; while a 0.0366 unit increase in change in trade receivables results in a 1 6 
unit decline in dividend payouts. More trade receivables indicate that more transactions are made on 7 
credit sales (without being paid); as a result, the firms have less available cash to issue a cash dividend. 8 
An increase in trade payables suggests that current liabilities increase and firms are more concerned 9 
with paying off short-term debts rather than issuing a dividend. 10 
The Div-adj Earnings, Inv, Rep (t-1), Dum(fs) and Inf coefficients are not significant in the 11 
subsamples. The Tax, Gearing, MtB and Size coefficients report consistent results compared to 12 
previous findings. The GDPg variable is positive and significant in the Above Average WC group. 13 
The final sample split is based on volatility in sales of firms. We calculated the volatility in sales 14 
mean and split the overall sample into high volatility in sales (greater than the mean) and low volatility 15 
in sales (smaller than the mean). Instability in sales indicates earnings volatility/performance. We re-16 
examined the model (equations (3.17) and (3.18)). The results are reported in Tables 4.20 and 4.21. 17 
Table 4.20 reports the estimated results of high and low volatility in sales based on equation (3.17).  18 
We found that the number of instruments is less than the number of groups, for both subsamples. 19 
The lag CD coefficient reports a positive and significant sign in the subsamples. This finding is similar 20 
to the overall sample result that the dividend payout has a dynamic relationship. The ∆WC² displays a 21 
negative coefficient and ∆WC reports a positive sign. They are significant in the high volatility sales 22 
sample. However, they are not significant in the low volatility sales group. This indicates that the 23 
concave relationship between the working capital and dividend payout only holds for the high 24 
volatility sales sample. 25 
Next, we calculated the turning point of change in working capital and plotted the relationship in 26 
Figure 4.10. For the high volatility sales group, at low levels of working capital, an increase in working 27 
capital increases the dividend payouts with a maximum effect occurring at 7.214 per cent; after the 28 
turning point of 7.214, an increase in working capital leads to a decline in dividend payouts.  29 
The Div-adj Earnings, Inv, Rep (t-1), Dum (fs) and GDPg coefficients are not significant in the 30 
subsamples. The Tax, Gearing, MtB, and Size coefficients report similar results compared to the overall 31 
findings (see Table 4.8), except for the Gearing in low volatility in sales, which is not significant.  32 
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Table 4.20 Subsample (High ΔSales vs. Low ΔSales) Results of Equation (3.17) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD High Volatility in Sales Low Volatility in Sales  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value Sig. of Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.484 0.000*** 0.515 0.000*** 0.287 
 (0.082)  (0.068)   
∆WC² -0.063 0.012** -0.019 0.485 1.207 
 (0.025)  (0.027)   
∆WC 0.909 0.047** 0.076 0.873 1.267 
 (0.456)  (0.474)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.395 0.894 2.542 0.208 0.601 
 
(2.951)  (2.016)   
Tax 27.914 0.001*** 32.032 0.000*** 0.410 
 
(8.046)  (6.026)   
Inv 11.309 0.425 13.001 0.135 0.102 
 
(14.159)  (8.701)   
Gearing (%) -0.022 0.014** -0.016 0.232 0.414 
  (0.009)  (0.013)   
MtB (%) 0.831 0.023** 0.775 0.005*** 0.120 
 
(0.365)  (0.279)   
Size 1.819 0.011** 1.697 0.002*** 0.137 
 
(0.715)  (0.540)   
Rep(t-1) 72.704 0.213 37.112 0.234 0.539 
 
(58.283)  (31.151)   
Dum(fs) -2.032 0.254 -2.140 0.360 0.053 
 
(1.781)  (1.020)   
GDPg (%) -0.010 0.960 0.135 0.416 0.563 
 
(0.196)  (0.165)   
Inf (%) -0.775 0.033** -0.638 0.065* 0.273 
 
(0.363)  (0.345)   
Constant 2.653 0.359 -1.540 0.491 1.148 
 (2.891)  (2.233)   
m₂  0.393  0.869 
 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)  0.807  0.723 
 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)  0.628  0.976 
 
Number of Observations  2,780  2,964 
 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations  9 
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Table 4.21 Subsample (High ΔSales vs. Low ΔSales) Results of Equation (3.18) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD High Volatility in Sales Low Volatility in Sales  
 Coefficients p-value Coefficients p-value 
Sig. of 
Diff. 
CD(t-1) 0.532 0.000*** 0.577 0.000*** 0.438 
 (0.080)  (0.064)   
∆TP -1.597 0.027** -0.213 0.691 1.545 
 (0.719)  (0.534)   
∆TR  -0.311 0.036** -0.539 0.174 0.504 
 (0.340)  (0.301)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.479 0.887 3.300 0.148 0.694 
 
(3.364)  (2.280)   
Tax 29.454 0.000*** 30.955 0.000*** 0.144 
 
(8.207)  (6.401)   
Inv 15.963 0.321 11.198 0.204 0.260 
 
(16.076)  (8.810)   
Gearing (%) -0.023 0.037** -0.023 0.064** 0.006 
  (0.011)  (0.013)   
MtB (%) 0.618 0.072* 0.788 0.002*** 0.401 
 
(0.343)  (0.248)   
Size 1.578 0.039** 1.404 0.008*** 0.187 
 
(0.764)  (0.530)   
Rep(t-1) 64.794 0.276 67.660 0.200 0.043 
 
(59.433)  (29.103)   
Dum(fs) -2.264 0.238 -2.589 0.204 0.146 
 
(1.916)  (1.142)   
GDPg (%) -0.048 0.825 0.208 0.281 0.886 
 
(0.214)  (0.192)   
Inf (%) -0.803 0.064* 0.874 0.180 2.949*** 
 
(0.434)  (0.369)   
Constant 3.809 0.199 -1.859 0.376 1.562 
 (2.963)  (2.097)   
m₂  0.996  0.972  
Hansen J-test  (p-value)  0.236  0.231 
 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)  0.397  0.385 
 
Number of Observations  2,416  2,556 
 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors (shown in brackets) are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial 4 
correlation test of second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying 5 
restrictions. Diff-Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. The significance difference in 6 
coefficients uses the absolute value of z test statistics, where Z = (b1 − b2)/√SEb1
2 + SEb2
2  7 
In equation (3.18), working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 8 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
107 
The Inf coefficient displays a negative and significant sign in the subsamples, suggesting that the 1 
dividend payouts may increase when the inflation rate is low. 2 
Figure 4.10 High Volatility in Sales: Dividend Payouts and Changes in Working Capital 3 
 4 
The figure is based on the estimated results (equation (3.17)) in Table 4.20 when all else is held constant. The 5 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: CD = -0.063∆WC² + 0.909∆WC + Constant.  6 
Source: Author’s calculations 7 
After splitting working capital into trade payables and trade receivables, we re-ran the model 8 
(equation (3.18)) and found that the lag CD coefficient is positive and significant in the subsamples. 9 
This is in line with the overall sample findings. Both ∆TP and ∆TR show a negative and significant 10 
relationship to CD in the high volatility sales group. Therefore, for this group, a trade payable increase 11 
of 1.596 would decrease CD by 1 unit; a trade receivable increase of 0.3105 will result in a decrease in 12 
CD by 1 unit. However, ∆TP and ∆TR coefficients do not report any significant signs in the low volatility 13 
sales group. 14 
The Div-adj Earnings, Dum (fs) coefficients are not significant in both subsamples. The results 15 
suggest that the dividend-adjusted earnings and external financial shocks do not significantly affect 16 
dividend payouts. Consistent results are observed for Tax, Gearing, MtB, Rep (t-1), Size, Inv, and GDPg 17 
coefficients. 18 
 19 
4.3.4 Stock Dividends 20 
Since stock dividend information is not provided in the Bloomberg database directly, we used the stock 21 
dividend rate based on a straightforward and rough calculation.56 After the calculations, the stock 22 
                                                          
56 Stock dividend rate equals the total payout minus any cash dividends minus the stock repurchases and 











dividend rate yielded a tiny sample (164 observations) for the period of 2012 to 2015. We explained 1 
the rationale for choosing the estimated technique (it varies from fixed/random effect regression and 2 
GMM) in Chapter 3. These included the benefits of using system GMM for controlling endogeneity 3 
and heteroscedasticity issues and improvements in our stock dividend models. We also obtained 4 
consistent and robust results using the system GMM in our overall sample. 5 
According to Roodman (2009), the difference or system GMM can be adopted when panel data 6 
meets some specific assumptions. One assumption states that:  7 
“The number of time periods of available data, T, may be small. (The panel is “small T, large N”.)” 8 
--- (Roodman, 2009, pp. 100) 9 
The number of observations we obtained is 163, and the number of groups is 82, which means 10 
only 82 firms issued stock dividends in our overall sample. The “N” is 82 and “T” is 25 in our stock 11 
dividend sample. This does not fit the GMM assumptions. 12 
When using the GMM estimate method, the number of groups must be greater than the number 13 
of instruments in order to obtain robust results (Roodman, 2009). The small stock dividend sample 14 
results in a limited number of groups. However, the GMM instrument variable does not change and 15 
would create the same number of instruments as a cash dividend. Therefore, it is likely that we would 16 
obtain a number of groups smaller than the number of instruments. The interpretation based on these 17 
results is spurious. Therefore, the GMM estimate is not suitable for the stock dividend sample. We 18 
adopted the random/fixed effect regression test for our stock dividend sample.  19 
The Hausman test reports a chi-square of 43.41 and a p-value of 0.000. Thus, we rejected the null 20 
hypothesis that the difference between random and fixed coefficients is not systematic. In other 21 
words, a fixed effect specification is appropriate for individual-level effects in our stock dividend model 22 
(Hausman, 1978). The fixed effect regression results show an R-squared of 44.56% and F-statistics of 23 
30.85 in our stock dividend model (equation (3.19)).  24 
According to the results, the SD (t-1) has a significant impact on the SD, which indicates that the 25 
stock dividend is also dynamic. However, the coefficient is negative. This contradicts our cash dividend 26 
model (equation (3.17)) findings. If a firm issues a stock dividend in the previous year, the firm has a 27 
higher propensity to cut off or not issue any stock dividend in the current year. The ∆WC² coefficient 28 
reports a positive and significant sign, and its square term shows a negative and significant value. 29 
Therefore, we argue that working capital has a nonlinear effect on stock dividends as well. However, 30 
the results are opposite to what we observed in the cash dividend model (equation (3.17)). In Table 31 
4.22, the ∆WC variable is significant, but it shows a convex relationship with the SD. This implies that 32 
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low volatility in working capital will decrease the stock dividend and high volatility in working capital 1 
will increase the stock dividend. Similarly, we can calculate the ∆WC turning point for the stock 2 
dividend model. 3 
We plotted Figure 4.11 based on the results in Table 4.22. Holding all else constant, we found 4 
that the ∆WC turning point equals 18.411. Therefore, when ∆WC is less than 18.411, it has a negative 5 
relationship with the stock dividend; when ∆WC is larger than 18.411, it has a positive impact on the 6 
stock dividend. 7 
Figure 4.11 Stock Dividends and Changes in Working Capital  8 
 9 
The graph is based on the estimated results (equation (3.19)) in Table 4.22 when all else is held constant. The 10 
estimated equation can be rewritten as: SD = 0.017∆WC² - 0.626∆WC + Constant 11 
Source: Author’s calculations 12 
The Size coefficients positive and significant to the SD. This shows that bigger firms issue more 13 
stock dividends than smaller firms. The EPS coefficient is negatively correlated with the SD (see Wei 14 
and Xiao, 2009). A lower EPS indicates that the firm is not profitable and may have difficulty issuing 15 
cash dividends; therefore, it may choose to issue stock dividends instead. A higher EPS shows that the 16 
firm’s profits are rising, and would have a higher propensity to issue cash dividends rather than stock 17 
dividends. Besides, we find that the Inf coefficient exhibits a positive relationship with the SD. Firms 18 
have a low propensity to issue cash dividends when macroeconomic conditions are unstable. In such 19 
scenarios, firms may seek stock dividends as alternatives. The ROE, Tax, Gearing, and MtB, Rep (t-1) 20 
and Dum (fs) coefficients are not significant in our stock dividend model. This suggests that the SD is 21 
not affected by these financial ratios.  22 
Following the same procedure, we split working capital into trade receivables and trade payables 23 
to further test the working capital variable in our stock dividend model. The estimated results are 24 












Table 4.22 Stock Dividend Results of Equation (3.19) 1 
Dynamic stock dividend (SD) regression is estimated by Fixed-Effects Regression. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 4 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 5 
Source: Author’s calculations 6 
Dependent Variable: SD Coefficients       t-statistics p-value 
SD(t-1) -0.288 -1.77 0.081* 
 (0.163)   
∆WC² 0.017 2.54 0.013*** 
 (0.007)   
∆WC -0.626 -2.02 0.047** 
 (0.310)   
ROE  -0.057 -0.36 0.717 
 (0.156)   
EPS -6.508 -1.71 0.091** 
 (3.802)   
Tax -25.957 -1.02 0.312 
 (25.529)   
Size 11.163 1.62 0.100* 
 (6.880)   
Gearing (%) -0.029 -0.82 0.416 
 (0.035)   
MtB (%) 0.169 1.25 0.215 
 (0.135)   
Rep(t-1) 11.852 0.26 0.793 
 (44.979)   
Dum(fs) 0.873 0.18 0.861 
 (4.984)   
GDPg (%) 3.713 0.96 0.341 
 (3.876)   
Inf (%) 1.337 1.85 0.067** 
 (0.721)   
Constant -69.706 -1.48 0.144 
 (47.230)   
F-Statistics (p-value)    30.85*** 
R-squared   44.56% 
Number of Observations       163 
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Table 4.23 Stock Dividend Results of Equation (3.20) 1 
Dependent variable: SD  Coefficients                t-statistics p-value 
SD(t-1)  -0.269 -1.89 0.062* 
  (0.142)   
∆TP  -0.738 -0.57 0.571 
  (1.296)   
∆TR  -0.090 -0.07 0.947 
  (1.355)   
ROE   -0.071 -0.44 0.662 
  (0.162)   
EPS  -6.914 -1.83 0.071* 
  (3.779)   
Tax  -24.598 -0.94 0.349 
  (26.094)   
Size  11.936 1.59 0.10* 
  (7.506)   
Gearing (%)  -0.029 -0.9 0.372 
  (0.032)   
MtB (%)  0.210 1.61 0.091* 
  (0.131)   
Rep(t-1)  15.992 0.33 0.741 
  (48.297)   
Dum(fs)  0.164 0.03 0.975 
  (5.210)   
GDPg (%)  3.738 0.95 0.346 
  (3.944)   
Inf (%)  1.492 1.72 0.09* 
  (0.869)   
Constant  -73.925 -1.48 0.142 
  (49.835)   
F-Statistics (p-value)    40.35*** 
R-squared    41.48% 
Number of Observations        161 
Dynamic stock dividend (SD) regression is estimated by Fixed-Effects Regression. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 4 
In equation (3.20), working capital is split into trade payables and trade receivables. 5 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 6 
Source: Author’s calculations 7 
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According to Table 4.23, the SD (t-1) coefficient reports a significant and negative sign. Therefore, 1 
we can argue that firms’ current dividend payout is significantly affected by the past year’s dividend 2 
payout policy. More specifically, a previous cash dividend has a positive impact on the current cash 3 
dividend payout, while a previous stock dividend has a negative correlation with the current stock 4 
dividend payout. Thus, the concave (cash dividend) and convex (stock dividend) relationship show that 5 
working capital has a very significant, but opposite, nonlinear impact on cash and stock dividend 6 
payouts, respectively. Thus, under dividend payout via working capital, we conclude that cash 7 
dividends and stock dividends are substitutes. The EPS, Size and Inf rate coefficients display consistent 8 
results (see Table 4.22). Further, we find that MtB is positively correlated with the SD. Unfortunately, 9 
the ∆TP and ∆TR coefficients are insignificant after the split. 10 
Based on the results, one can conclude that the determinants of stock dividends are very different 11 
compared to those of cash dividends. The cash dividend model presents better results than the stock 12 
dividend model. One possible reason is that the system GMM has several benefits over the fixed effect 13 
regression, such as controlling for endogeneity, and serial correlation issues. Another possible reason 14 
is that the stock dividend sample is smaller than the cash dividend sample. 15 
 16 
4.4 Robustness Test 17 
In this section, we provide the robustness test results for our estimated dividend models. Based on 18 
the research objectives in Chapter 1, we designed the third research objective (testing ΔTrade 19 
Receivables and ΔTrade Payables) in accordance with the second research objective (testing ΔWorking 20 
Capital). Trade receivables and trade payables are two essential elements in working capital, and 21 
therefore, ΔTrade Payables and ΔTrade Receivables can be viewed as proxies for ΔWorking Capital. 22 
We split working capital into two components and further tested their significance. The results were 23 
found to be consistent. In the empirical analysis, we found that the change in the working capital 24 
(ΔWorking Capital) shows a concave relationship with cash dividend payout. We observed a linear 25 
relationship between the change in working capital and dividend payout in the 1,048 firms with a 26 
relatively low change in working capital, and a concave relationship in the 527 firms that have a 27 
relatively high change in working capital. Moreover, the concave relationship between change in 28 
working capital and dividend payout is significant in our subsamples. The results show consistency 29 
regarding the correlation between dividend and working capital compared to our main findings. 30 
Further, we found that the change in trade payables (ΔTrade Payables) is negatively correlated 31 
with cash dividend payout and the change in trade receivables (ΔTrade Receivables) has a negative 32 
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impact on cash dividend payouts, in some of our subsamples. The significant results satisfy all the tests 1 
(serial correlation, J-test, Hansen test, validation of instruments, and the number of group and 2 
instruments) and thus our estimated results are robust. 3 
Whilst the stock dividend sample is relatively small and not suitable for splitting into subsamples 4 
and re-running the stock dividend models (equations (3.19) and (3.20)), we use the level of working 5 
capital as a proxy for change in working capital and obtain similar results.57 Therefore, we argue that 6 
working capital has a nonlinear impact on the stock dividend payout. This nonlinear effect (convex) is 7 
opposite to the cash dividend payout. 8 
 9 
4.5 Summary 10 
The result shows that the cash dividend is positively correlated with its first lag (see also Lintner, 1956) 11 
while the stock dividend is negatively correlated with its first lag. Therefore, we conclude that dividend 12 
payout has a dynamic relationship and that firms’ current dividend payout policies are significantly 13 
affected by previous dividend payouts. In other words, if a firm paid a cash dividend last year, it is 14 
likely that the firm will pay a cash dividend this year. If a firm issued a stock dividend in the previous 15 
year, then it expected that the firm will not issue or decrease the stock dividend for the current year. 16 
We found that the ∆WC² and ∆WC coefficients report negative and positive signs, respectively. This 17 
indicates that the change in working capital has a significant impact on the cash dividend payout and 18 
that this relationship is nonlinear (concave). This concave relationship is confirmed in our subsample 19 
results (see Table 4.24).  20 
For the overall sample, when the change in working capital is less than 5.426, it has a positive 21 
impact on the cash dividend payout and when the change in working capital is greater than 5.426, it 22 
has a negative relationship. Further, the turning point (5.426 in ∆WC) means that the overall sample 23 
can be divided into two groups: 1,048 firms in the “∆WC < 5.426” group versus 527 firms in the “∆WC 24 
≥ 5.426” group. We also observed that only 527 firms shift between these two groups from period to 25 
period. The results suggest that the positive relationships between net working capital and the 26 
dividend payout are robust for most of the firms. However, the concave correlation between net 27 
working capital and the dividend payout is significant only for firms with higher changes in working 28 
                                                          
57 Net working capital (scaled down by total asset), as a proxy of change in working capital, is used in both cash 
and stock dividend models. We obtained consistent results (a concave relationship in cash dividends and a 
convex relationship in stock dividends). The original outputs (including the Stata commands) are shown in the 
Appendices. 
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capital. For firms in the positive group, we found that working capital has a positive (linear) impact on 1 
the dividend payout, holding all else constant. For firms in the positive and negative group, working 2 
capital has a concave effect on the dividend payouts.  3 
Table 4.24 Summary of Key Findings: Cash Dividend Models 4 
 Overall 
Sample 
+ and − 
group 
Non-financial  Mature MM Pos WC High v in 
Sales 
CD(t-1) + + + + + + + 
Div-adj Earn × × × × × × × 
∆WC ² ̶  ̶  - ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
∆WC  + + + × + + + 
∆TP ̶ n.a. - ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
∆TR × n.a. - ̶ ̶ ̶ ̶ 
Rep(t-1) × × × × × × × 
Dum (fs)  × × × ̶ × × × 
Note: “+” represents significant and positive relationships; “̶ “shows significant and negative relationships, and 5 
“×” indicates that the relationship is not significant. For more details, see Tables 4.8 to 4.23 in sections 4.3.1, 6 
4.3.2 and 4.3.3. 7 
Source: Author’s calculations 8 
Similarly, we calculated turning points for the changes in working capital. They are 9.387, 2.21, 9 
3.848, 5.841 and 7.10% for the subsample of non-financial firms, mature firms, firms listed on the MM, 10 
firms with above average WC and firms with high volatility in sales, respectively. One should 11 
understand that the turning point of change in working capital is an estimated figure and it changes 12 
in our subsamples’ results. Similarly, the concave relationship between the change in working capital 13 
and the cash dividend payout is based on a prerequisite, which is relatively high in a change in working 14 
capital. Based on our data, these relatively high changes in working capital are only found in some 15 
firms on the LSE. Nevertheless, the turning point (of ∆WC) sets a rough benchmark/target (when all 16 
else is held constant) for those firms either in the positive group or the negative group. It also helps 17 
firms to understand that how the working capital may affect dividend payouts differently.  18 
We also found that this nonlinear effect of working capital is not significant in the subsample of 19 
financial firms, young firms, AIM, negative working capital and low volatility in sales. The ∆TP 20 
coefficient reports a negative sign, while the ∆TR is not significant in our overall sample. In our mature 21 
firms, MM, above average WC and high volatility in sales subsamples, we find that both ∆TP and ∆TR 22 
are negatively correlated with cash dividend payout. However, the results are not significant in the 23 
young firms, AIM, negative working capital and low volatility in sales subsamples. As shown in Table 24 
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4.24, the lag of dividend payout coefficient is positive and significantly correlated with the current 1 
dividend payout in the overall sample and in the subsamples. The results further confirm that the cash 2 
dividend payout has a dynamic relationship. The Div-adj Earnings coefficient is not significant in any 3 
of the samples. Similarly, we found that the Rep (t-1) variable is not significant in any samples, which 4 
suggest that the substitution hypothesis between dividend payout and stock repurchase does not hold 5 
in our case. This finding contradicts Andres et al. (2015) who argues that dividends and repurchases 6 
are perfect substitutes. We find that the Dum (fs) is negatively correlated with cash dividend in mature 7 
firms, but that it is not significant in the overall sample nor the rest of the subsamples. To conclude, 8 
we argue that the Div-adj Earnings and Dum (fs) variables are not significant in determining dividend 9 
payout. 10 
Most of the control variables report consistent results. The Tax, MtB, and Size variables are 11 
positively correlated with the cash dividend, and the Gearing coefficient reports a negative sign. The 12 
Inv and Rep (t-1) coefficients are not significant.58 For macroeconomic variables, the results are mixed 13 
in the overall sample and subsamples. The GDPg shows a positive relation in the overall sample, 14 
mature firms group, firms listed on the Main Market, and firms with above average WC, but it is not 15 
significant in the rest of the subsamples. Similarly, the Inf rate is negatively correlated with cash 16 
dividends in the AIM, high volatility in sales and low volatility in sales samples, but we could not find 17 
significant results in the overall sample and other subsamples. We conclude that GDP growth has a 18 
positive impact on firms’ cash dividend payout, and that the inflation rate is not significant. 19 
Further, we detected a convex relationship between changes in working capital and stock 20 
dividend payouts. The SD (t-1) coefficient reports a negative sign. EPS is negatively correlated with the 21 
SD. However, the Size and Inf variables have a positive impact on the SD. We found that the Rep (t-1) 22 
is insignificant in the stock dividend models. 23 
The insignificant relationship between stock repurchase and dividend (both cash and stock 24 
dividend) suggests that they are not substitutes. Firms are flexible in deciding their dividend payout 25 
policies. Div-adj Earnings is insignificant in the cash dividend models. This indicates that current 26 
earnings are not a predominant factor in determining a firm’s dividend policy. 27 
The concave and convex relationships between working capital and dividends show that a cash 28 
dividend is very different from a stock dividend. Based on the relationship between working capital 29 
and dividend payout, we argue that cash dividends and stock dividends are substitutes. The results 30 
from the stock dividend models indicate that the stock dividend determinants are quite different 31 
                                                          
58 More specific results can be found in Tables 4.8 to 4.23. 
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compared to the cash dividend. According to our descriptive analysis and the sample size in cash and 1 
stock dividends, dividends (especially cash dividends) remain the dominant form of payout of firms 2 
listed on the LSE despite stock repurchase increases over the period. 3 
The total dividend payout shows an upward trend throughout the study period. We observed 4 
significant decreases in dividend payouts in 2008 and 2012. We also found that the 2008 global 5 
financial crisis influenced firms’ financial performances (such as earnings, working capital, and MtB). 6 
According to our empirical findings, the Dum (fs) is not significant, which means that the external 7 
financial shocks did not have a significant impact on firms’ dividend payouts. 8 
  9 
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Chapter 5 Conclusions 1 
5.1 Introduction 2 
Dividend payout, as a return for shareholders, has been extensively examined in prior literature. 3 
Developed by Modigliani and Miller (1961), the dividend irrelevance theory argues that dividend policy 4 
is not affected by share price, nor by the cost of capital. However, some studies (Stiglitz, 1974; Fairchild 5 
et al., 2014) have criticised this theory, due to its underlying assumptions. Owing to the friction 6 
between the practical and theoretical aspects of the dividend irrelevance model, the assumptions 7 
(perfect capital market, no taxes, no risk and fixed investment policy) do not hold true, most of the 8 
time. 9 
Determinants of dividend payouts can be summarised by, but not limited to, the following 10 
theories: dividend signalling theory (Darling, 1957; Dhanahi, 2005; Howatt et al., 2009), free cash flow 11 
theory (Jensen, 1986), life-cycle theory (Muller, 1972; Jensen, 1986), bird-in-hand theory (Brigham 12 
and Ehrhardt, 2008), agency theory (Jensen, 1976), and catering theory (Baker and Wurgler, 2004). 13 
However, the empirical results based on these theories are far from conclusive, which makes dividend 14 
payouts one of the most controversial issues in corporate finance. Black (1976) called this the 15 
“dividend puzzle”. 16 
By modifying the current earnings measurements, this study has increased the effectiveness of 17 
the research model, in particular, by improving the accuracy of the estimated coefficient of current 18 
earnings. This study has also bridged the gap between working capital and firm dividend payout. Due 19 
to the significance of working capital (on firm performance), as well as its high liquidity, we argue that 20 
the working capital may have an impact on the dividend payout. This study, therefore, has examined 21 
the dividend payouts of firms listed on the LSE, from 1991 to 2015, using the system GMM estimator 22 
to address endogeneity issues. We have shown that working capital has a significant impact on 23 
dividend payout, and that the relationship is nonlinear. This nonlinear relationship is confirmed by our 24 
overall sample and subsample results. 25 
This chapter is structured as follows: section 5.2 summarises the current study’s objectives and 26 
major findings. Section 5.3 presents an outline of policy implications based on the empirical findings. 27 
The contributions of the study are discussed in section 5.4, while section 5.5 provides the study’s 28 
limitations and directions for future research. 29 
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5.2 Summary of the Findings by Research Objective 1 
5.2.1 Research Objective One 2 
The aim of research objective one was to re-investigate the relationship between current earnings and 3 
dividend payout in the UK stock market. We re-measured the earnings variable (denoted as dividend-4 
adjusted earnings) because of the unsolved issue between earnings and dividend variables in previous 5 
studies. 6 
In Table 4.2, we have shown that firms which issue large dividends have greater net earnings, and 7 
that firms with the lower earnings issued the smallest dividends. For example, telecommunications 8 
and Oil and Gas firms the first and second largest dividend payers, and both of these sectors have 9 
substantial earnings, while Technology firms with the lowest cumulated earnings issue the smallest 10 
dividend payouts (Fama and French, 2001). It appears that earnings have a positive effect on the 11 
dividend payout. However, our empirical evidence (see Table 4.8) shows that there is no correlation 12 
between the (dividend-adjusted) earnings and dividend payout, which suggests that the current 13 
earnings are not a predominant factor in explaining dividend payout (Farsio et al., 2004). For 14 
comparison purposes, we included the results of normal earnings (unadjusted) in Table 4.8. The results 15 
show the normal earnings have a positive and significant impact on dividend payouts. The different 16 
findings of unadjusted and dividend adjusted earnings highlight the issue (between current earnings 17 
and dividend payout) we criticised in Chapter 2 and confirms that the current earnings are not 18 
significant in determining dividend payouts. 19 
Further, we found that the coefficient of earnings is not significant in any of the subsamples. The 20 
results are consistent with the overall sample’s findings. Therefore, the current (dividend-adjusted) 21 
earning cannot affect dividend payouts. One possible reason is that dividend policy is concerned with 22 
how much of its earnings a firm will issue to its shareholders. However, earnings only indicate how 23 
much a firm should have earned, not the cash that a firm actually has in any given accounting period. 24 
Generally, there is a difference between the proposed dividend payout and the actual amount 25 
distributable to shareholders. Therefore, the insignificant results between current earnings and 26 
dividend are robust. 27 
 28 
5.2.2 Research Objective Two 29 
Research objective two’s primary aim was to examine the correlation between working capital and 30 
dividend payouts in the context of the UK stock market. In the descriptive analysis, Figure 4.3 31 
illustrates the trend of dividend payouts regarding changes in working capital. We have observed that 32 
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the dividend payout and change in working capital share some similar movements, but not for the 1 
whole study sample period. 2 
Based on previous literature, which shows a nonlinear relationship between working capital and 3 
firm performance, we included the change in working capital squared and change in working capital 4 
in the regressions. The empirical evidence revealed that the coefficient of change in working capital 5 
squared and change in the working capital report -0.088 and 0.955, respectively. The joint results 6 
reflect a concave relationship between the change in working capital and the cash dividend payout, 7 
when all else is held constant. Based on the results, the estimated equation (3.17) can be rewritten as 8 
(when all else is held constant): 9 
𝐶𝐷𝑖𝑡  =  −0.088∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡² +  0.955∆𝑊𝐶𝑖𝑡  +  𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑠𝑡𝑎𝑛𝑡 10 
 The turning point of change in working capital is 5.426. In other words, when the change in 11 
working capital is less than 5.426, it has a positive impact on cash dividend payouts. However, when 12 
the change in working capital is greater than 5.426, it has a negative impact on cash dividend payouts.  13 
Figure 5.1 Dividend Payout and Change in Working Capital: Subsamples14 
  15 
(a) Positive Group (1,048 firms)     (b) Positive and Negative Group (527 firms) 16 
Source: Author’s calculations 17 
Further, we split the sample into two subsamples, according to this turning point of change in 18 
working capital (5.426). Equation (3.17) is re-estimated in both of the subsamples. We found that the 19 
concave relationship is significant in the positive and negative group, and the turning point of change 20 
in working capital increases slightly. This finding is consistent with our overall sample results. However, 21 
the concave relationship is not significant in the positive group, which implies that a linear relationship 22 
may be a better explanation for the positive group. We made a minor change to equation (3.17) by 23 
excluding the change in working capital squared variable and re-ran the regression for the positive 24 
group, and the results were similar to our expectation that the change in working capital has a linear 25 






















and the dividend payout of the subsamples are shown in Figure 5.1. 1 
Therefore, we conclude that the change in working capital has a significant impact on the 2 
dividend payout in the overall sample and that the relationship is nonlinear (concave). This concave 3 
relationship is a mixture of a positive linear relationship for 1,048 firms in the positive group, and a 4 
concave relationship in 527 firms located in the positive and negative group. Apart from the 5 
relationship between working capital variables and dividend payout, we also found similar results for 6 
the control variables. All of the control variable coefficients (in both subsamples) show high 7 
consistency compared to the overall sample results (see Tables 4.8 and 4.11). 8 
Finally, we divided the overall sample via different rationales: financial firms versus non-financial 9 
firms; young versus mature groups; firms listed on the Main Market (MM) versus the Alternative 10 
Investment Market (AIM); firms with sufficient working capital (Above Average WC) versus firms with 11 
insufficient working capital (Below Average WC); high volatility in sales group versus low volatility in 12 
sales group. These analyses were conducted in order to avoid statistical coincidences and obtain 13 
robust results. 14 
In the mature subsample, we found a concave relationship between the change in working capital 15 
and dividend payout, but this correlation was not as strong as in the overall sample. We found a strong 16 
concave relationship between the change in working capital and dividend payout in the subsamples 17 
of non-financial firms, mature, Main Market, Above Average WC, and high volatility in sales (see Table 18 
5.1).  19 
Based on the estimated results, we calculated the turning point of change in working capital in 20 
each subsample. One can infer that the turning points are slightly different from 5.426 in the overall 21 
sample results, as the different subsamples have a different number of observations. Nevertheless, 22 
the main conclusion is similar; that is, working capital is strongly correlated with cash dividend payouts. 23 
The results show that the working capital variable is not significant in financial firms, young, AIM, 24 
Below Average WC, and low volatility in sales subsamples. 25 


























The specific results are reported in Tables 4.12, 4.14, 4.16, 4.18 and 4.20, respectively. 27 
Source: Author’s Calculation 28 
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The results suggest that change in working capital is a significant factor in dividend payouts, and 1 
for a different group of firms, the relationship is different. The subsample analysis also reveals that 2 
firms located in the positive and negative group are most likely firms listed on the main market board 3 
on the LSE and have sufficient working capital and higher volatility in their sales revenue. 4 
 5 
5.2.3 Research Objective Three 6 
Research objective three sought to discover the relationship between trade receivables and dividend 7 
payouts, as well as the correlation between trade payables and dividend payouts in the UK stock 8 
market. This research objective was based on research objective 2 which tested the correlation 9 
between working capital and dividend payouts.  10 
Figure 4.2 shows that both the levels of trade receivables and trade payables are positive, and 11 
they exhibit a similar increasing trend over the study period. When compared to the dividend payout 12 
in Figure (4.1), trade receivables and trade payables exhibit a positive impact on the dividend payout, 13 
since these variables indicate an increasing trend. However, the empirical results demonstrate quite 14 
the opposite. The overall sample results show that both changes in trade payables and trade 15 
receivables report a negative coefficient and that the change in the trade receivables variable is not 16 
significant. This suggests that an increase in trade payables would decrease dividend payouts. This is 17 
because the current liabilities would increase burdens on the dividend payout. This also indicates that 18 
firms’ are more concerned with clearing their short-term debts, than paying any dividends when the 19 
change in the trade payables variable is positive. 20 









Above Avg. WC 
Sample 
High Volatility in 
Sales Sample 
∆TP negative negative negative negative negative 
∆TR negative negative negative negative negative 
The specific results are reported in Tables 4.13, 4.15, 4.17, 4.19 and 4.21, respectively. 22 
Source: Author’s calculations 23 
In the subsample of non-financial firms, mature, main market, above average WC, and high 24 
volatility in sales, we found that both changes in trade payables and trade receivables report a 25 
negative coefficient, and both of the variables are significant. This suggests that not only does a change 26 
in trade payables have an adverse effect on the dividend payout, but a change in trade receivables 27 
also sets a burden on the dividend payout. An increase in the change in trade receivables indicates 28 
more transactions are made via trade credit, which would allow customers/clients to delay their cash 29 
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payments. Therefore, the firm will enlarge the payment collection days, which would result in less 1 
available cash available for distributing dividends. The results show that both changes in trade 2 
payables and in trade receivables are negatively correlated with dividend payouts. This is different 3 
from our expectation that the trade payables and trade receivables variable would report two 4 
different coefficients and indicates that firms listed in the LSE manage their working capital 5 
conservatively. More specifically, the payment collection period would delay the dividend payout, and 6 
firms are reluctant to issue dividends at the cost of increasing current liabilities. We also found that 7 
trade payables and trade receivables variables are not significant in the young, AIM, below average 8 
WC, and low volatility in sales subsamples. Insignificant results in the rest of the subsamples also 9 
suggest that maintaining working capital level at an acceptable level is another important goal for 10 
managers, and that they have difficulty in altering dividend payouts using working capital (including 11 
trade payables and trade receivables). In conclusion, both trade receivables and trade payables have 12 
negative impacts upon dividend payouts. 13 
 14 
5.2.4 Research Objective Four 15 
Research objective four’s goal was to examine the impact of working capital on stock dividends and 16 
explore stock dividend determinants in the UK stock market. The descriptive analysis (see Table 4.3) 17 
shows that the number of firms that paid stock dividends is small. The stock dividend (163 18 
observations) is not widely adopted by firms listed on the LSE, particularly compared to the cash 19 
dividend. We also observed that the average stock dividend rate is relatively high (67.75%). This 20 
indicates that when firms issue stock dividends, they are less likely to issue cash dividends or engage 21 
in stock repurchasing, or, only issue a small proportion of cash dividends or stock repurchases at the 22 
same time.  23 
The empirical results reveal that changes in working capital have a significant impact on stock 24 
dividend. Specifically, the change in working capital coefficients squared and change in working capital 25 
are positively and negatively significant at 1% and 5% levels, respectively. These results suggest that 26 
the correlation presents a nonlinear (convex) pattern, which is opposite to the cash dividend model 27 
(equation (3.17)). Therefore, changes in working capital also have a nonlinear effect on stock dividends; 28 
low volatility in working capital would decrease stock dividends, while high volatility in working capital 29 
would increase stock dividends. Similarly, we calculated the working capital turning in the stock 30 
dividend model to be 18.41. When the change in working capital is less than 18.411, it has a negative 31 
relationship with the stock dividend; when the change in working capital is larger than 18.411, it has 32 
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a positive impact on the stock dividend. Therefore, one can argue that cash and stock dividends are 1 
substitutes when all else is held constant. 2 
In our stock dividend model (see Table 4.20), the firm size coefficient is positive and significant to 3 
the stock dividend. This shows that larger firms issue more stock dividends than smaller firms. The EPS 4 
coefficient is negatively correlated with the stock dividend (Wei and Xiao, 2009). A low earnings per 5 
share indicates that a firm is not profitable and may have difficulty in issuing cash dividends, and 6 
therefore, may choose to pay stock dividends instead. Higher earnings per share show that a firm’s 7 
profits are rising, and it would be more likely to issue cash dividends, rather than stock dividends. 8 
Additionally, we found that the inflation coefficient exhibits a positive relationship with the stock 9 
dividend. Firms are less likely to issue cash dividends when macroeconomic conditions are unstable. 10 
In such a scenario, firms may seek stock dividends as alternatives. The return on equity, tax, gearing 11 
ratio, and market to book ratio, stock repurchase and dummy (financial shocks) coefficients are not 12 
significant in our stock dividend model. This suggests that the stock dividend payout is not affected by 13 
these financial ratios. 14 
After splitting the working capital into trade receivables and trade payables, we found that 15 
neither the change in trade payables nor the change in trade receivables is significant in our stock 16 
dividend model (equation (3.20)). The earnings per share, firm size and inflation rate coefficients 17 
display consistent results: negative and positive, respectively. We found that the market to book ratio 18 
is positively correlated with the stock dividend. This means the higher the firm’s capitalisation value, 19 
the more stock dividends it pays. 20 
Combining the cash dividend and stock dividend findings, it is obvious that the determinants of 21 
the stock dividend are very different compared to the cash dividend. The cash dividend model 22 
presents more consistent results than the stock dividend model. One possible reason is that the 23 
system GMM has several benefits over FE regression, such as controlling for endogeneity, and serial 24 
correlation issues in equations (3.17) and (3.18). Another possible reason is that the stock dividend 25 
sample is smaller than the cash dividend sample. 26 
 27 
5.2.5 Research Objective Five 28 
Research objective five’s aim was to test the impact of external financial shocks on firm dividend 29 
payouts in the UK stock market. External financial shocks refer to the 2008 global financial crisis and 30 
the 2012 double-dip recession in the UK. The descriptive analysis indicates that GDP growth drops 31 
significantly, and inflation rises dramatically in both 2008 and 2012. The descriptive analysis also 32 
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indicates that dividend payouts decrease significantly, at around 17.86% and 23% in 2008 and 2012, 1 
respectively (see Table 4.1 and Figure 4.1). 2 
Interestingly, we observed that some financial indicators (such as stock repurchase, working 3 
capital, trade payables and trade receivables etc.) performed poorly in 2008 and 2012. However, the 4 
empirical results show that the external financial shock dummy variable was not significant in the 5 
overall sample. Similarly, the external financial shocks coefficient reports insignificant signs in the 6 
subsample analyses. We also observed that GDP growth reports a positive and significant coefficient 7 
in some of our samples. 8 
The significant GDP growth coefficient demonstrates that the healthier an economy, the higher 9 
dividend payouts are (Bozos et al., 2011). However, when economic conditions are unfavourable, 10 
dividend payouts are largely unaffected. 11 
 12 
5.3 Implications 13 
5.3.1 Academic Implications 14 
First, we redefined the earnings variable as dividend-adjusted earnings and obtained consistent results. 15 
The insignificant coefficient of (dividend-adjusted) earnings in the regressions demonstrates that 16 
current earnings are not firms’ primary concerns when setting dividend policy. We argue that it is 17 
necessary for scholars to retest these hypotheses using our definition of earnings, which mitigates 18 
issue within the variables and provides unbiased results. 19 
Besides, the dynamic relation of dividends (both cash and stock dividends) reveal that the 20 
previous dividend payout has a significant impact on current dividend payouts. However, the dynamic 21 
relationship between the cash dividend model and the stock dividend model is different. The lag of 22 
the cash dividend is positively correlated with the cash dividend, while the lag of the stock dividend 23 
has a negative impact on the stock dividend. The results also suggest that the cash dividend is more 24 
popular than the stock dividend for firms listed on the LSE. It also shows that they are reluctant to cut 25 
cash dividends (Brav et al., 2005). 26 
Our results shed light on the dividend determinants by providing new evidence. There is a 27 
concave relationship between working capital and dividend payout in the overall sample. In other 28 
words, a relatively low change in working capital has a positive impact on dividend payouts, while a 29 
relatively high change in working capital is negatively correlated with dividend payouts. In short, 30 
dividend payouts depend on changes in working capital. Further, this concave relationship is a mixture 31 
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of linear correlation (in the positive group) and a concave correlation (in the positive and negative 1 
group). This suggests that when exploring dividend payouts, a variable may present a nonlinear 2 
relationship, not just linear correlations (which is what most of the previous literature has focused on). 3 
Firms’ often make short-term decisions based on their working capital. Our results also show that the 4 
short-term financial indicator (change in working capital) has a significant impact on the dividend 5 
payout, which could be short-term (a special issue of dividend), or long-term (dividend policy). 6 
Third, the control variable findings are consistent on most occasions and can be explained 7 
reasonably well using the life-cycle theory (Mueller, 1972; Skinner, 2008). The theory suggests that 8 
young and small firms with high growth opportunities tend to issue low/no dividends because their 9 
cash flows may be low, compared to their capital expenditure. When firms mature and earn greater 10 
profits (or have more stable cash flows), it is more likely that the firms will issue a higher dividend 11 
(Mueller, 1972; Skinner, 2008). The insignificant coefficients of dividend-adjusted earnings, 12 
investment, stock repurchase, and dummy (fs) indicate that a firm’s dividend policy is irrelevant to its 13 
current earnings, investment policy, repurchase plan and external financial shocks. 14 
The stock dividend regression (see Table 4.20) reveals that a change in working capital also has a 15 
significant impact on stock dividend payouts. It shows a convex relation, which is opposite to the cash 16 
dividend model findings. The results suggest that cash and stock dividends are substitutes for each 17 
other under our working capital hypothesis. 18 
The stock dividend option sends a good signal to shareholders (McNihols and Dravid, 1990; 19 
Bessembinder and Zhang, 2015). Other studies show that firms unable to issue cash dividends will pay 20 
stock dividends instead as substitutes (such as Lakonishok and Lev, 1987; David and Ginglinger, 2016). 21 
This practice is normally viewed negatively. However, whether a stock dividend announcement is a 22 
positive or a negative sign is difficult to investigate in the current study, since stock dividend 23 
observations are small in our sample. What we observed is that the stock dividend is not as popular 24 
as the cash dividend (the number of firms that issued a stock dividend and the number of stock 25 
dividends that have been issued) for firms listed on the LSE. As Lasfer (1997b) suggests, a stock 26 
dividend is not used to save corporation tax and firms are less likely to issue any stock dividends when 27 
they have insufficient cash or financial difficulties. The main reasons for issuing stock dividends is 28 
shareholder pressure. Therefore, in our case, it is likely that shareholders have not demanded a stock 29 
dividend. We also found that stock dividend payout determinants are different from cash dividend 30 
determinants (see Tables 4.8 and 4.20). 31 
Regarding the methodology, the GMM instrument variables (cash dividend, stock repurchase, 32 
investment, market to book ratio and changes in working capital) with lagged levels (t-2) to (t-3) are 33 
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valid, and the two-step system GMM provided consistent results. Previous literature has revealed that 1 
it is important to address potential endogeneity problems within the data and obtain robust results 2 
(see Wooldridge, 2010; Wintoki et al., 2012 and Roberts and Whited, 2013). The results indicate that 3 
the GMM estimator handles this issue well in comparison to other IVs methods (2SLS, and QML).59 4 
 5 
5.3.2 Managerial and Policy Implications 6 
According to our empirical results, the unadjusted earnings have a positive and significant impact on 7 
dividend payouts. However, the consistent results (insignificant dividend-adjusted earnings coefficient) 8 
suggest that current earnings are irrelevant (or at least should not be viewed as the most important 9 
factor) in relation to dividend payouts. 10 
We also observed a concave relationship between changes in working capital and dividend 11 
payouts in our overall sample. This shows that working capital managers should consider the effect of 12 
their decisions on dividend payouts. It also increases working capital managers’ workloads, which 13 
involves trade-offs between dividend payouts and other short-term decisions. Similarly, firm 14 
policymakers also need to be aware of the potential of working capital as a source for dividend payout. 15 
In other words, short-term decisions (for example, working capital) may affect long-term decisions 16 
(for example, dividend payouts). However, we also found that this concave relationship does not apply 17 
to all of the firms listed on the LSE. The subsample analysis shows that this concave relationship is 18 
robust in 527 firms with a change in working capital higher and lower than the turning point. For the 19 
rest of the 1,048 firms, a positive and linear correlation between the change in working capital and 20 
dividend payout was observed (see also Figure 5.1). Since managers are reluctant to cut dividends and 21 
prefer to maintain stable dividend payouts (Brav et al., 2005; Al-Malkawi et al., 2014; Javakhadze et 22 
al., 2014), our results provide managers with another way of looking at dividend policy: using working 23 
capital to adjust dividend payouts. However, this recommendation can only be adopted when a firm 24 
has relatively higher changes in its working capital. In other words, for those firms with a lower change 25 
in their working capital (lower than the turning point), it will be a challenge to implement. 26 
 Using working capital for dividend payouts is not limited to these 527 firms, since a firm’s working 27 
capital can change from period to period. If a firm’s change in working capital drops below the turning 28 
point for some periods, then this firm will shift from the positive and negative group (527 firms) to the 29 
positive group (1,048 firms). Likewise, if a firm increases its change in working capital substantially 30 
                                                          
59 The 2SLS and Quasi-Maximum Likelihood (QML) were used to estimate cash dividend models, but the results 
are not significant. These results are available upon request. 
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(from a value below the turning point to a value over the turning point) for some periods, then the 1 
firm can adopt this recommendation. In addition, the concave relationship between working capital 2 
and dividend payouts holds for both financial firms and non-financial firms. Using working capital for 3 
dividend payouts is not just for non-financial firms. 4 
The turning point of change in working capital plays a crucial role in dividend payouts. As reported, 5 
the turning points of change in working capital are 9.837, 2.21, 3.848, 5.841 and 7.10 per cent for the 6 
non-financial firms, Mature, MM, Above Average WC and High volatility in Sales subsamples, 7 
respectively. The turning point of the change in working capital is different based on different 8 
subsamples’ regression. Nevertheless, the turning point (change in working capital) sets a rough 9 
benchmark (when all else is held constant), for firms either in the positive group or the positive and 10 
negative group. It also helps firms to understand dividend payouts via working capital. Managers 11 
should use the turning point with great care. This is because each firm has a unique turning point of 12 
change in working capital. It is not a fixed value and can change over the accounting period. 13 
Additionally, working capital management plays a significant role in firm performance (see Chapter 2). 14 
It is necessary for managers to evaluate the costs and benefits of adopting this recommendation in 15 
regards to other financial purposes. 16 
In the overall sample analysis, the negative relationship between the change in trade payables 17 
and the dividend payout suggests that firms’ priority is to pay debts (which are due within 12 months), 18 
rather than issue cash dividends. The negative correlation also reveals that managers understand the 19 
risks of issuing a cash dividend at the cost of delaying the payment of short-term debts. This 20 
relationship is further confirmed in the subsamples of non-financial firms, mature, MM, Above 21 
Average WC and High volatility in Sales. The subsample results demonstrate that the change in trade 22 
receivables has a negative impact on the cash dividend payout. This means that the more business 23 
transactions are made on credit, the fewer dividend payouts will be. A decrease in the trade 24 
receivables suggests that a firm receives payments from the previous deal(s) on credit, and the firm’s 25 
cash balance will increase. In this case, the firm is more likely to issue cash dividends. Therefore, 26 
managers could try to adopt a more efficient way to collect trade receivables or redeem payment via 27 
outsourcing trade receivables to a third party if the shareholders require dividends. 28 
In terms of the insignificant result between working capital (including trade payables/receivables) 29 
and dividends in the subsamples, we noticed that these firms’ net working capital is at a relatively low 30 
level (some of these firms may have a negative change in their working capital). This suggests that the 31 
managers do not prioritise dividend payouts. It is most likely that some of these managers are 32 
struggling to improve firm profitability or their working capital management. It may be difficult for 33 
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them to change dividend payouts via working capital at such an early stage, but our results also set a 1 
goal (the turning point of change in working capital) for managers/policymakers if they so desire to do 2 
so in the future. Finally, the insignificant coefficient of the dummy variable on financial shocks 3 
demonstrates that dividend payouts are not greatly affected by changes to the UK economy.  4 
 5 
5.4 Contributions 6 
The current study contributes to the dividend literature and managerial practice in several ways. First, 7 
we have foregrounded problems with the traditional measurement of earnings, arguing that it may 8 
cause collinearity problems. After defining the dividend-adjusted earnings, we have remedied this 9 
issue and increased the model’s efficiency. We found that dividend payout is not affected by current 10 
earnings. Earnings are not a key determinant of dividend payouts. 11 
Second, to the best of our knowledge, this is the first study that links changes in working capital 12 
and dividend payouts. The proposed dividend payout, via working capital, bridges the gap in the 13 
dividend payout literature. Previous studies have either independently linked the working capital to 14 
firm performance, such as profitability, or examined the relationship between earnings and dividend 15 
payout (see for example, Lintner, 1956; Denis and Osobov, 2008; Baños-Caballero et al., 2014; Aktas 16 
et al., 2015). The nonlinear relationship between working capital (trade receivables and trade payables) 17 
and dividend payout sheds new light on working capital management, which is often associated with 18 
short-term financial decisions. The current study reveals that short-term financial decisions can also 19 
affect long-term financial decisions, such as dividend payout. 20 
Third, we have observed that mature firms, firms listed on the AIM, firms with sufficient working 21 
capital, and firms with high volatility in sales tend to adjust their dividend payouts via working capital. 22 
Our empirical results provide managers/policymakers with an alternative solution to dividend payouts 23 
(with different implications). Before adopting this solution, managers should pay close attention to 24 
the turning point (change in working capital). More specifically, it is feasible for managers in the 566 25 
firms (positive and negative group) to alter their dividend payouts. If managers in the positive group 26 
(with a low change in working capital) seek to change their dividend payouts using the working capital, 27 
it is critical for them to be aware that the dividend payout will not decrease until the turning point of 28 
change in working capital is reached. For insignificant result groups, our core finding also provide 29 
managers/policymakers with a goal if they are interested in using working capital to fund dividend 30 
payouts in the future. Overall, our results provide new insight into the value of working capital, and 31 
suggest dividend payout via working capital is important for understanding corporate payout policy. 32 
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Moreover, the current study has provided evidence on the stock dividend payout of the UK stock 1 
market, which is often omitted/less observed in previous studies. The results show that stock and cash 2 
dividends are substitutes, when all else is held constant. The literature provides evidence on firms’ 3 
dividend payouts under the 2008 global financial crisis. However, the 2012 economic recession, the 4 
longest double-dip recession of the last 50 years, has largely been ignored in the literature regarding 5 
dividend payouts in the UK stock market. Our study has included both recessions and thus provides 6 
more comprehensive findings on dividend payouts under external financial shocks. 7 
Table 5.3 Dividend Payout Studies in Literature (Partial) 8 
Year Author/s (Last name) Research Method Country/Market Period Analysed  
1956 Lintner OLS US 1947–1953 
1978 Eisemann and Moses Questionnaire, Survey US 1975 
1980 Aharony and  Swary OLS US 1963–1976 
1994 Sant and Cowan OLS US 1962–1987 
1994 Schooley and Barney OLS US 1975–1985 
1996 Lasfer GLS UK 1973–1983 
1996 Noronha et al. OLS US 1986–1988 
1998 Adedeji OLS UK 1993–1996 
2001 Fama and French Logit US 1926–1999 
2002 Short et al. GLS UK 1988–1992 
2005 Brav et al. Survey US 1950–2002 
2006 Bhaduri, Durai Granger Causality India 1992–2004 
2006 Goddard et al. VAR  UK 1970–2003 
2007 Bond et al. OLS UK 1994–2001 
2008 Skinner Logit US 1970–2005 
2008 von Eije and Megginson OLS European Union 1989–2005 
2009 Brockman and Unlu Random Effects   52 Countries 1990–2006 
2009 Wei and Xiao Random Effects   China 1995–2006 
2010 Engsted and Pedersen OLS and VAR US and Europe 1926–2008 
2014 Al-Malkawi et al. Tobit Oman 2001–2010 
2014 Brunzell et al. Survey Nordic Countries 2007–2008 
2014 McMillan Fixed Effects Cross Countries 1973–2010 
2014 Nirmala et al. Panel VECM India 1999–2008 
2015 Bildik et al. OLS US and 32 Countries 1985–2011 
2015 Moon et al. OLS US 2000–2012 
2016 Attig et al.  Tobit  East Asian 2006–2010 
Source: Author’s compilation 9 
The current study also contributes to literature regarding the methodology of dividend payouts. 10 
Table 5.3 illustrates that the literature on dividend payouts normally adopts traditional OLS/GLS or 11 
“static models,” which may lead to biased results. Most finance variables present endogeneity issues 12 
(Wintoki et al., 2012) and thus, violate the effectiveness of the findings and implications in the 13 
previous literature. Our study has overcome this issue by adopting the two-step system GMM 14 
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estimator and provides unbiased and robust results, which do not misguide/mislead scholars and 1 
managers/policymakers. 2 
 3 
5.5 Research Limitations 4 
There are a few limitations in the current study. Firstly, the secondary data that we collected from the 5 
Bloomberg Database has missing values (it is unbalanced panel), especially in the early period (the 6 
1990s). Those missing values reduce the representativeness of our sample firms, to some extent, and 7 
may distort inferences about the population firms. However, according to the LSE, firms were not 8 
obliged to report financial data during this period. Thus, the missing values are unavoidable under 9 
these circumstances. 10 
Secondly, the stock dividends (ratios), which are not directly available in the Bloomberg Database, 11 
are based on a simple calculation, and cannot represent the precise firm stock dividend payouts. 12 
However, the number of firms that issue stock dividends (around 8% of all listed firms) is much smaller 13 
compared to the number of firms that issue cash dividends. Therefore, the overall data sample for the 14 
stock dividend model is relatively small. 15 
As discussed in Chapter 3, we have emphasised the benefits of the GMM estimator over the FE 16 
model and our reasons for adopting the GMM model. However, in the stock dividend sample, we used 17 
the FE estimator instead. This is because of the small number of observations in the stock dividend, 18 
which means that the GMM estimator was not suitable. Thus, if the endogeneity issue presents in the 19 
FE models, our stock dividend models may be biased and we do not offer evidence of a causal 20 
relationship between stock dividend and working capital. Therefore, readers should interpret our 21 
results carefully. 22 
The current study only focused on the financial aspects of firms’ dividend payouts in the UK stock 23 
market. The proposed dividend payout via working capital model neglects managerial perspectives. 24 
While this was not part of our study’s objectives we believe that the non-financial perspectives of 25 
dividend payouts are equally important. 26 
 27 
5.6 Recommendations for Future Research 28 
Future studies may also add the dividend-adjusted earnings as one explanatory variable along with 29 
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the retained earnings regarding dividend payout. Whilst the information contained in the dividend is 1 
related to quarterly earnings and sales, future research could use quarterly earnings or sales data 2 
(both in forecasted and realised) to test whether dividend payouts are a function of quarterly earnings 3 
or sales. By doing so, more coherent evidence on the relationship between earnings and the dividend 4 
payouts could be observed. 5 
Future studies might also examine whether the dividend payout via working capital holds in other 6 
stock markets, for example, in emerging/frontier stock markets, or extend it through a cross-sectional 7 
study and compare the results for different stock markets. Although the financial firms and non-8 
financial firms do not show significant differences in our empirical analysis, it is necessary and 9 
advisable to control for industry-specifics when exploring the relationship between working capital 10 
and dividend payouts in future studies. 11 
The current study shows that trade payables are negatively correlated with dividend payouts. If 12 
trade payables cannot be increased, it is theoretically feasible that short-term debt may ease 13 
constraint on the payment of dividends, according to dividend signalling theory. Future studies may 14 
investigate whether other shorter-term debts have an impact on dividend payouts. 15 
Primary research (using survey questionnaire or interview) on the managerial perspective of the 16 
feasibility of changing dividends though working capital would be an interesting avenue for future 17 
research. In particular, interviewing working capital managers about their thoughts on the correlation 18 
between working capital and dividend payout, and whether managers are willing to use the working 19 
capital for dividend payout would provide important practical information. For example, if working 20 
capital managers are reluctant to use this approach when shareholders demand dividend payouts, this 21 
may create a conflict of interest between the parties. Similarly, gathering policymakers’ opinions on 22 
investors’ preferences for investment decisions, business expansion (working capital) and payout 23 
policy will provide more insight into this matter. Policymakers’ responses could also provide useful 24 
information regarding the trade-offs among dividend-related financial decisions and current payout 25 
policy rationales. 26 
Apart from the managerial perspective, future studies could also examine the economic 27 
consequences of firms that use working capital for dividend payouts, and compare these with others 28 
who do not. Scholars could also explore whether working capital managers and policymakers exhibit 29 
any significant differences regarding dividend payouts. Using working capital for dividend payouts may 30 
involve the debtholders (short-term debts) and shareholders (dividends), thus future studies could 31 
examine whether debtholders/working capital managers and shareholders have any conflict of 32 
interests regarding the use of working capital for dividend payouts. 33 
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Appendices 1 
Appendix 1(a): Robustness Check in the Overall Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 2 
3.17) 3 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.705 16.82 0.000*** 
  (0.042)   
WC² - 3.517 -1.99 0.022** 
 (1.770)   
WC 0.144 2.10 0.001*** 
 (0.068)   
Div-adj Earnings -1.477 -0.92 0.359    
 (1.608)   
Tax 15.128 4.30 0.000*** 
 (3.516)   
Inv -0.670 -0.15 0.884  
 (4.590)   
Gearing (%) - 0.042 -4.52 0.000*** 
 (0.009)   
MtB (%) 1.084 6.52 0.000*** 
 (0.166)   
Size 1.867 4.33 0.000*** 
 (0.432)   
Rep(t-1) - 11.836 -0.25 0.806    
 (48.193)   
Dum(fs) -0.261 -0.49 0.623    
 (0.529)   
GDPg (%) 0.120 1.71 0.088* 
 (0.070)   
Inf (%) - 0.088 -0.72 0.470  
 (0.122)   
Constant -3.410 -2.30 0.022** 
 (1.481)   
m₂   0.110 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.162 
Diff-Hansen test (p-value)   0.229 
Number of observations   14,274 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 4 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 5 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within the firm’s serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of 6 
second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-7 
Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. 8 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively.  9 
Source: Author’s calculations 10 
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Appendix 1(b): Robustness Check in the Overall Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 1 
3.18) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients     t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.513 14.40 0.000*** 
 (0.036)   
TP -3.815 -2.22 0.021** 
 (1.719)   
TR -6.284 -1.88 0.030** 
 (3.343)   
Div-adj Earnings -0.425 0.33 0.743 
 (1.296)   
Tax 19.494 5.90 0.000*** 
 
(3.305)   
Inv 1.564 0.24 0.809 
 
(6.485)   
Gearing (%) -0.053 -4.56 0.000*** 
 
(0.012)   
MtB 1.296 7.12 0.000*** 
 
(0.182)   
Size 3.010 7.21 0.000*** 
 
(0.418)   
Rep(t-1) -21.564 -1.28 0.202 
 
(16.907)   
Dum(fs) 0.383 0.89 0.371 
 
(0.428)   
GDPg (%) 0.206 3.25 0.001*** 
 
(0.063)   
Inf (%) -0.161 -1.33 0.184 
 
(0.121)   
Constant -1.779 -0.87 0.387 
 (2.056)   
m₂   0.276 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.172 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)   0.165 
Number of observations   14,261 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of second-5 
order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test 6 
reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 7 
respectively.  8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Appendix 2(a): Robustness Check in the Mature Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 1 
3.17) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.540 10.98 0.000*** 
  (0.049)   
WC² - 3.837 -2.92 0.035** 
 (1.314)   
WC 1.517 1.78 0.043*** 
 (0.852)   
Div-adj Earnings -2.652 -1.04 0.298    
 
(2.547)   
Tax 20.155 5.34 0.000*** 
 
(3.777)   
Inv -2.103 -0.29 0.773 
 
(7.292)   
Gearing (%) - 0.045 -5.03 0.000*** 
 (0.009)   
MtB (%) 1.237 5.38 0.000*** 
 (0.230)   
Size 2.691 5.70 0.000*** 
 (0.472)   
Rep(t-1) 1.334 0.08 0.940   
 
(17.753)   
Dum(fs) -0.518 -0.66 0.506   
 
(0.779)   
GDPg (%) 0.208 2.12 0.035** 
 (0.098)   
Inf (%) - 0.002 -0.01 0.988 
 
(0.166)   
Constant -3.993 -1.96 0.050** 
 (2.035)   
m₂   0.443 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.209 
Diff-Hansen test (p-value)   0.827 
Number of observations   8,383 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within the firm’s serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of 5 
second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-6 
Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. 7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Appendix 2(b): Robustness Check in the Mature Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 1 
3.18) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients     t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.540 11.05 0.000*** 
 (0.049)   
TP -10.172 -2.11 0.036** 
 (4.830)   
TR -3.529 -1.82 0.012** 
 (1.939)   
Div-adj Earnings -1.242 -0.47 0.641 
 (2.662)   
Tax 21.108 5.36 0.000*** 
 
(3.939)   
Inv 0.222 0.03 0.973 
 
(6.585)   
Gearing (%) -0.044 -5.37 0.000*** 
 
(0.008)   
MtB 1.204 6.18 0.000*** 
 
(0.195)   
Size 2.315 6.26 0.000*** 
 
(0.370)   
Rep(t-1) 3.683 0.21 0.832 
 
(17.382)   
Dum(fs) -0.180 -0.29 0.771 
 
(0.616)   
GDPg (%) 0.298 2.92 0.004*** 
 
(0.102)   
Inf (%) -0.023 0.14 0.888 
 
(0.162)   
Constant 1.387 0.71 0.481 
 (1.966)   
m₂   0.431 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.393 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)   0.299 
Number of observations   8,371 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of second-5 
order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test 6 
reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 7 
respectively.  8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Appendix 3(a): Robustness Check in the MM Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 3.17) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.518 12.22 0.000*** 
  (0.042)   
WC² -5.560 -2.47 0.031** 
 (2.251)   
WC  0.960 1.38 0.017** 
 (0.696)   
Div-adj Earnings -10.558 -2.24 0.126    
 (4.714)   
Tax 34.107 5.91 0.000*** 
 (5.771)   
Inv -2.522 -0.34 0.734 
 (7.413)   
Gearing (%) -0.050 -4.65 0.000*** 
 (0.011)   
MtB (%) 1.668 6.81 0.000*** 
 (0.245)   
Size 1.649 2.67 0.008*** 
 (0.617)   
Rep(t-1) 10.667 0.52 0.606 
 (20.691)   
Dum(fs) -0.663 -0.64 0.522  
 (1.034)   
GDPg (%) 0.194 1.68 0.093* 
 (0.115)   
Inf (%) 0.160 0.78 0.439 
 (0.206)   
Constant 0.187 0.05 0.957 
 (3.494)   
m₂   0.207 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.245 
Diff-Hansen test (p-value)   0.569 
Number of observations   7,534 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within the firm’s serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of 4 
second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-5 
Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. 6 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 7 
Source: Author’s calculations  8 
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Appendix 3(b): Robustness Check in the MM Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 3.18) 1 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients     t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.520 12.57 0.000*** 
 (0.041)   
TP 3.193 0.49 0.625 
 (6.527)   
TR -5.259 -3.91 0.037** 
 (1.345)   
Div-adj Earnings -9.711 -1.03 0.442 
 (9.428)   
Tax 34.306 5.71 0.000*** 
 (6.009)   
Inv -4.593 -0.67 0.502 
 (6.840)   
Gearing (%) -0.050 -4.93 0.000*** 
 (0.010)   
MtB 1.655 7.12 0.000*** 
 (0.233)   
Size 1.564 3.25 0.001*** 
 (0.482)   
Rep(t-1) 9.968 0.46 0.649 
 (21.862)   
Dum(fs) -0.167 -0.21 0.836 
 (0.806)   
GDPg (%) 0.254 2.16 0.031** 
 (0.117)   
Inf (%) 0.100 0.49 0.622 
 (0.203)   
Constant 0.627 0.19 0.847 
 (3.258)   
m₂   0.201 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.349 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)   0.728 
Number of observations   7,522 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 2 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 3 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of second-4 
order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test 5 
reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 6 
respectively.  7 
Source: Author’s calculations 8 
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Appendix 4(a): Robustness Check in the Above Avg. WC Sample: Cash Dividend 1 
(Eq. 3.17) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.429 8.40 0.000*** 
  (0.051)   
WC² -8.874 -2.46 0.043** 
 (3.607)   
WC  15.136 2.76 0.044** 
 (5.484)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.472 0.17 0.867    
 
(2.810)   
Tax 34.953 6.33 0.000*** 
 
(5.521)   
Inv 1.859 0.21 0.832 
 
(8.777)   
Gearing (%) -0.034 -2.67 0.008*** 
 (0.013)   
MtB (%) 1.466 5.58 0.000*** 
 (0.263)   
Size 2.719 4.23 0.000*** 
 (0.643)   
Rep(t-1) 17.005 0.64 0.521 
 
(26.462)   
Dum(fs) -0.333 -0.44 0.663 
 
(0.764)   
GDPg (%) 0.232 1.99 0.047** 
 (0.116)   
Inf (%) -0.162 -0.07 0.948 
 
(0.247)   
Constant -8.610 -1.58 0.113 
 (5.431)   
m₂   0.305 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.122 
Diff-Hansen test (p-value)   0.196 
Number of observations   5,997 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within the firm’s serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of 5 
second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-6 
Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. 7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Appendix 4(b): Robustness Check in the Above Avg. WC Sample: Cash Dividend 1 
(Eq. 3.18) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients     t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.420 8.05 0.000*** 
 (0.052)   
TP -1.505 -2.28 0.018** 
 (0.280)   
TR -9.891 -1.97 0.049** 
 (5.027)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.183 0.07 0.943 
 (2.573)   
Tax 35.058 6.05 0.000*** 
 
(5.793)   
Inv -0.379 -0.05 0.962 
 
(0.011)   
Gearing (%) -0.310 -2.79 0.005*** 
 
(0.011   
MtB 1.334 5.31 0.000*** 
 
(0.251)   
Size 2.839 4.69 0.000*** 
 
(0.605)   
Rep(t-1) 4.804 0.19 0.851 
 
(25.515)   
Dum(fs) -0.192 -0.24 0.808 
 
(0.792)   
GDPg (%) 0.327 2.88 0.004*** 
 
(0.113)   
Inf (%) -0.138 -0.59 0.554 
 
(0.233)   
Constant -0.531 -0.20 0.845 
 (2.713)   
m₂   0.347 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.267 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)   0.227 
Number of observations   5,995 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression was estimated by two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of second-5 
order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test 6 
reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 7 
respectively.  8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Appendix 5(a): Robustness Check in the High ∆Sales Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 1 
3.17) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.471 5.91 0.000*** 
  (0.080)   
WC² -2.037 -2.56 0.018** 
 (0.796)   
WC  1.860 2.53 0.039** 
 (0.735)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.932 0.32 0.753    
 
(2.959)   
Tax 28.814 3.69 0.000*** 
 
(7.808)   
Inv 15.886 1.11 0.266 
 
(14.265)   
Gearing (%) -0.027 -2.69 0.007*** 
 (0.010)   
MtB (%) 0.819 2.16 0.031** 
 (0.380)   
Size 1.832 2.58 0.010*** 
 (0.710)   
Rep(t-1) 63.945 1.11 0.267 
 
(57.620)   
Dum(fs) -1.136 -0.63 0.528 
 
(1.800)   
GDPg (%) 0.019 0.09 0.925 
 (0.203)   
Inf (%) -0.816 -2.28 0.023** 
 
(0.358)   
Constant 2.177 0.74 0.460 
 (2.943)   
m₂   0.432 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.566 
Diff-Hansen test (p-value)   0.453 
Number of observations   2,803 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within the firm’s serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of 5 
second-order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-6 
Hansen test reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. 7 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
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Appendix 5(b): Robustness Check in the High ∆Sales Sample: Cash Dividend (Eq. 1 
3.18) 2 
Dependent Variable: CD Coefficients     t-statistics p-value 
CD(t-1) 0.493 6.25 0.000*** 
 (0.078)   
TP -2.393 -2.35 0.024** 
 (1.018)   
TR -4.443 -2.69 0.049** 
 (1.651)   
Div-adj Earnings 0.392 0.15 0.878 
 (2.560)   
Tax 27.304 3.55 0.000*** 
 
(7.684)   
Inv 9.918 0.84 0.400 
 
(11.780)   
Gearing (%) -0.024 -2.22 0.027** 
 
(0.011)   
MtB 0.719 2.18 0.030** 
 
(0.330)   
Size 1.876 3.06 0.002*** 
 
(0.613)   
Rep(t-1) 59.961 1.02 0.307 
 
(58.723)   
Dum(fs) -0.993 -0.56 0.576 
 
(1.776)   
GDPg (%) 0.128 0.62 0.533 
 
(0.206)   
Inf (%) -0.795 -2.20 0.028** 
 
(0.362)   
Constant 4.268 1.38 0.167 
 (3.090)   
m₂   0.418 
Hansen J-test  (p-value)   0.206 
Diff-Hansen (p-value)   0.177 
Number of observations   2,794 
Dynamic cash dividend (CD) regression is estimated using two-step system GMM. Fixed firm and time effect are 3 
included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. Standard 4 
errors are robust to heteroscedasticity and within firm serial correlation. m₂ is a serial correlation test of second-5 
order using residuals of first differences. Hansen J-test is a test of over-identifying restrictions. Diff-Hansen test 6 
reports the exogeneity of instrument subsets. *, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, 7 
respectively. 8 
Source: Author’s calculations 9 
157 
Appendix 6: Robustness Check in the Overall Sample: Stock Dividend (Eq. 3.19) 1 
Dynamic stock dividend (SD) regression is estimated using Fixed-Effects Regression. Fixed firm and time effect 2 
are included. All variables are winsorised (except for Size) at the 1% level to mitigate the impact of outliers. 3 
Standard errors are robust to heteroscedasticity. 4 
*, ** and *** represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% levels, respectively. 5 
Source: Author’s calculations 6 
 7 
Dependent Variable: SD Coefficients t-statistics p-value 
SD(t-1) -0.281 -2.01 0.047** 
 (0.139)   
∆WC² 30.465 2.85 0.018** 
 (10.690)   
∆WC -13.556 -2.83 0.038** 
 (4.795)   
ROE  -0.070 -0.41 0.681 
 (0.170)   
EPS -7.430 -1.58 0.119 
 (4.717)   
Tax -22.728 -0.97 0.337 
 (23.551)   
Size 15.686 1.98 0.051* 
 (7.907)   
Gearing -0.041 -1.45 0.151 
 (0.029)   
MtB  0.339 1.78 0.078* 
 (0.190)   
Rep(t-1) 29.950 0.60 0.553 
 (50.296)   
Dum(fs) -0.232 -0.04 0.965 
 (5.216)   
GDPg 3.436 0.91 0.363 
 (3.759)   
Inf 1.407 1.72 0.089* 
 (0.818)   
Constant -97.555 -1.85 0.068* 
 (52.711)   
F-Statistics (p-value)    36.08*** 
R-square   43.36% 
Number of observations       163 
Number of firms   82 
